WISCONSIN
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures governing elections in Wisconsin.
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the Election Code in the Wisconsin Statutes are abbreviated "WS"
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the Election Code in the Wisconsin Statutes are abbreviated "WS"
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
QUESTION 1: What are the roles of election boards, poll workers, and observers?
1.a. A hierarchy of institutions and officials oversee elections in Wisconsin.
Wisconsin Elections Commission: The Wisconsin Elections Commission is responsible for administering elections in the state, including overseeing local election officials, approving election equipment, investigating election-related complaints, and establishing rules and regulations for the conduct of elections (WS §5.05). This bipartisan commission is composed of six members: two Democrats and two Republicans are selected by their respective party leaders in both chambers of the state legislature, while one Democrat and one Republican who formerly served as municipal or county clerks are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate (these appointees are drawn from lists of three candidates prepared by the legislative leadership of each party) (WS §15.61).
County Clerks: Elected county clerks perform election administration duties including preparing ballots, receiving municipal returns, and participating in the county canvass (WS §7.10). In counties with a population over 750,000, a county election commission handles these duties (WS §7.20).
Municipal Clerks: Municipal clerks, whether elected or appointed, supervise elections in their municipality, including equipping polling places, preparing ballots, and training election officials (WS §7.15).
Election Inspectors: Election inspectors are poll workers appointed by the municipality. When the major political parties submit timely lists of nominees, election officials generally must select inspectors from those lists, with the party whose candidate for governor or president received the most votes in the relevant jurisdiction entitled to one more inspector than the other major party (WS §7.30).
Municipal Board of Canvassers: In any municipality with more than one ward, the municipal clerk and two qualified electors of the municipality appointed by the clerk constitute the municipal board of canvassers (WS §7.53). The municipal board of canvassers is responsible for canvassing the returns for municipal elections and, for any elected offices spanning more than one municipality, reporting results to the relevant county board of canvassers.
County Board of Canvassers: The county clerk and two qualified electors of the county appointed by the clerk constitute the county board of canvassers (WS §7.60). One member of the board must belong to a different political party than the clerk. The county board of canvassers is responsible for opening and publicly examining (canvassing) the returns from the election.
Board of Absentee Ballot Canvassers: The board of absentee ballot canvassers is a municipal body that can be established by ordinance to count absentee ballots centrally instead of at polling places (WS §7.52). The board publicly convenes to count absentee ballots any time after polls open and before 10 p.m. on Election Day. Cities with these boards include Milwaukee and Green Bay.
Election Observers: Wisconsin does not require election observers to be appointed by a candidate or political party. Members of the public generally may observe election proceedings by signing in at a polling place or other location where election activity occurs (WS §7.41; Wisconsin Administrative Code Ch. EL 4). Observers, and any voters, may challenge the eligibility of individual voters or absentee ballots, based on specific allegations filed with polling place officials (WS §6.925; §6.93).
1.b. Wisconsin allows most people to be election observers.
Who can observe: Anyone has the right to observe the conduct and administration of the election (WS §7.41). There is no residency or organizational affiliation requirement. To be designated an observer, a member of the public must sign in, present photo identification, and agree to abide by relevant rules and regulations (Wisconsin Administrative Code Ch. EL 4). They must also wear an observer badge and stay in the designated observer areas.
Who cannot observe: Candidates may not serve as observers (WS §7.41). Election officials have the authority to limit the number of observers due to space constraints and can reasonably limit the number of observers representing the same organization (WS §7.41). Officials also have the authority to expel an observer who is disruptive or does not follow the rules.
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CONTEXT: Training can help observers.
Wisconsin provides more opportunities than many other states for the public to view election activity up close. However, that openness means that observers are not required to receive official training from election administrators or other knowledgeable organizations. Like some other states, Wisconsin has faced disruptions by observers at polling stations in recent elections.
The Principles for Trusted Elections, across-partisan national program led by the Carter Center and Ford Presidential Foundation, calls on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
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Wisconsin Elections Commission: The Wisconsin Elections Commission is responsible for administering elections in the state, including overseeing local election officials, approving election equipment, investigating election-related complaints, and establishing rules and regulations for the conduct of elections (WS §5.05). This bipartisan commission is composed of six members: two Democrats and two Republicans are selected by their respective party leaders in both chambers of the state legislature, while one Democrat and one Republican who formerly served as municipal or county clerks are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state senate (these appointees are drawn from lists of three candidates prepared by the legislative leadership of each party) (WS §15.61).
County Clerks: Elected county clerks perform election administration duties including preparing ballots, receiving municipal returns, and participating in the county canvass (WS §7.10). In counties with a population over 750,000, a county election commission handles these duties (WS §7.20).
Municipal Clerks: Municipal clerks, whether elected or appointed, supervise elections in their municipality, including equipping polling places, preparing ballots, and training election officials (WS §7.15).
Election Inspectors: Election inspectors are poll workers appointed by the municipality. When the major political parties submit timely lists of nominees, election officials generally must select inspectors from those lists, with the party whose candidate for governor or president received the most votes in the relevant jurisdiction entitled to one more inspector than the other major party (WS §7.30).
Municipal Board of Canvassers: In any municipality with more than one ward, the municipal clerk and two qualified electors of the municipality appointed by the clerk constitute the municipal board of canvassers (WS §7.53). The municipal board of canvassers is responsible for canvassing the returns for municipal elections and, for any elected offices spanning more than one municipality, reporting results to the relevant county board of canvassers.
County Board of Canvassers: The county clerk and two qualified electors of the county appointed by the clerk constitute the county board of canvassers (WS §7.60). One member of the board must belong to a different political party than the clerk. The county board of canvassers is responsible for opening and publicly examining (canvassing) the returns from the election.
Board of Absentee Ballot Canvassers: The board of absentee ballot canvassers is a municipal body that can be established by ordinance to count absentee ballots centrally instead of at polling places (WS §7.52). The board publicly convenes to count absentee ballots any time after polls open and before 10 p.m. on Election Day. Cities with these boards include Milwaukee and Green Bay.
Election Observers: Wisconsin does not require election observers to be appointed by a candidate or political party. Members of the public generally may observe election proceedings by signing in at a polling place or other location where election activity occurs (WS §7.41; Wisconsin Administrative Code Ch. EL 4). Observers, and any voters, may challenge the eligibility of individual voters or absentee ballots, based on specific allegations filed with polling place officials (WS §6.925; §6.93).
1.b. Wisconsin allows most people to be election observers.
Who can observe: Anyone has the right to observe the conduct and administration of the election (WS §7.41). There is no residency or organizational affiliation requirement. To be designated an observer, a member of the public must sign in, present photo identification, and agree to abide by relevant rules and regulations (Wisconsin Administrative Code Ch. EL 4). They must also wear an observer badge and stay in the designated observer areas.
Who cannot observe: Candidates may not serve as observers (WS §7.41). Election officials have the authority to limit the number of observers due to space constraints and can reasonably limit the number of observers representing the same organization (WS §7.41). Officials also have the authority to expel an observer who is disruptive or does not follow the rules.
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CONTEXT: Training can help observers.
Wisconsin provides more opportunities than many other states for the public to view election activity up close. However, that openness means that observers are not required to receive official training from election administrators or other knowledgeable organizations. Like some other states, Wisconsin has faced disruptions by observers at polling stations in recent elections.
The Principles for Trusted Elections, across-partisan national program led by the Carter Center and Ford Presidential Foundation, calls on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election observers (monitors) and the public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Wisconsin does not provide nonpartisan observers with additional access.
Wisconsin provides all members of the public with the same equal access to observe elections (WS §7.41). It does not explicitly provide any additional monitoring opportunities for impartial or nonpartisan monitors.
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Wisconsin does not provide nonpartisan observers with additional access.
Wisconsin provides all members of the public with the same equal access to observe elections (WS §7.41). It does not explicitly provide any additional monitoring opportunities for impartial or nonpartisan monitors.
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are poll observers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to observation.
Observers are allowed to observe all election processes from designated areas within the polling place, which should be between three and eight feet from the voter check-in table (Wisconsin Election Administrative Code Ch. EL 4.03). They may examine the poll book, providing such activity does not interfere with voting and that confidential information is not viewable (Wisconsin Election Administrative Code Ch. EL 4.03). Observers cannot interfere with or impede voting and other election procedures, and they can be asked to leave if they do so. Canvass meetings are also open to public observation, but may adhere to different sign-in practices than those required at polling and tabulation sites.
Observers are allowed to observe all election processes from designated areas within the polling place, which should be between three and eight feet from the voter check-in table (Wisconsin Election Administrative Code Ch. EL 4.03). They may examine the poll book, providing such activity does not interfere with voting and that confidential information is not viewable (Wisconsin Election Administrative Code Ch. EL 4.03). Observers cannot interfere with or impede voting and other election procedures, and they can be asked to leave if they do so. Canvass meetings are also open to public observation, but may adhere to different sign-in practices than those required at polling and tabulation sites.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance, including seal numbers on equipment, the number of ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 4: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
4.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before voting.
Vote counting in Wisconsin is generally done with scanners that read voters’ hand-marked ballots and total the votes when the ballots are entered. Absentee ballots are scanned by election inspectors under the supervision of the local clerk or election commission and in a location viewable by the public.
Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated by each scanner (WS §5.84). This process is called “logic and accuracy” testing and can be observed by the public. Wisconsin’s testing, combined with the state’s audits, recounts, and other procedures, is structured to catch errors before election results are finalized.
4.b. Most voters use hand-marked paper ballots and electronic voting devices must produce a paper record.
Local governing bodies and election commissions have discretion over what type of voting systems their voters will use, including hand-marked paper ballots or electronic voting using state-certified machines (WS §5.76). According to Verified Voting, on Election Day most jurisdictions in Wisconsin use hand-marked paper ballots, while having electronic systems available for some voters, including voters with accessibility requirements. Regardless of the voting system used, every vote must produce a paper trail (WS §5.91). Having a paper trail allows officials to audit or recount the ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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4.c. Equipment must meet state and federal security requirements.
Only pre-approved voting systems can be used in elections, including poll books. The systems must come from a list of technology certified by the Wisconsin Elections Commission, based on compliance with state and federal security requirements (WS §5.91).
The Wisconsin Elections Commission has certified “modem capable equipment,” which can be connected to a secure network after the polls close in order to transmit unofficial election results. Voting equipment is not connected to the internet or other external networks while votes are cast.
Vote counting in Wisconsin is generally done with scanners that read voters’ hand-marked ballots and total the votes when the ballots are entered. Absentee ballots are scanned by election inspectors under the supervision of the local clerk or election commission and in a location viewable by the public.
Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated by each scanner (WS §5.84). This process is called “logic and accuracy” testing and can be observed by the public. Wisconsin’s testing, combined with the state’s audits, recounts, and other procedures, is structured to catch errors before election results are finalized.
4.b. Most voters use hand-marked paper ballots and electronic voting devices must produce a paper record.
Local governing bodies and election commissions have discretion over what type of voting systems their voters will use, including hand-marked paper ballots or electronic voting using state-certified machines (WS §5.76). According to Verified Voting, on Election Day most jurisdictions in Wisconsin use hand-marked paper ballots, while having electronic systems available for some voters, including voters with accessibility requirements. Regardless of the voting system used, every vote must produce a paper trail (WS §5.91). Having a paper trail allows officials to audit or recount the ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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4.c. Equipment must meet state and federal security requirements.
Only pre-approved voting systems can be used in elections, including poll books. The systems must come from a list of technology certified by the Wisconsin Elections Commission, based on compliance with state and federal security requirements (WS §5.91).
The Wisconsin Elections Commission has certified “modem capable equipment,” which can be connected to a secure network after the polls close in order to transmit unofficial election results. Voting equipment is not connected to the internet or other external networks while votes are cast.
QUESTION 5: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
5.a. Wisconsin officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Wisconsin, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Wisconsin is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, municipal clerks may update voter registration with information from other state and national databases. Wisconsin law also requires that the Elections Commission remove inactive voters after a notice period (WS §6.50). This voter list maintenance is regularly conducted the year after each general election.
Wisconsin residents can check their registration status online.
5.b. Wisconsin law prohibits registration by noncitizens.
To register to vote in Wisconsin, state law requires the registrant to be an adult U.S. citizen, as well as a resident of the district in which they plan to vote for at least 28 consecutive days (WS §6.02). Registrants who have lived at their current address for less than 28 days may register at their previous Wisconsin address (WS §6.02). Documentary proof of citizenship is not required to register, but applicants must assert their citizenship status and other qualifications on the signed application form. Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency or lack of citizenship, is a Class I felony under state law (WS §12.13, §12.60). Federal law separately makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
5.c. Wisconsin allows challenges to voter eligibility.
Wisconsin law allows a person's qualifications to vote to be challenged by any election official from their city or county and by any elector (qualified voter) from their municipality (WS §6.48).
Although there is no limit to the number of challenges any one person can make, pre-election challengers must appear before the clerk or board in person or their petition will be dismissed (WS §6.48). In addition to voters, during in-person voting, election inspectors may challenge, under oath, any voter they "know or suspect is not a qualified elector" (WS §6.92). Challenges must be based on an accusation tied to state law, such as disqualification due to age or residence (WS §6.03).
5.d. Photo ID is required to vote in person.
Wisconsin requires voters to show photo identification to vote (WI Const. III §1m). Citizens who do not have appropriate ID are given a provisional ballot, which is isolated and only counted if the voter brings an acceptable form of ID to the municipal clerk's office by 4 p.m. on the Friday following the election.
5.e. Vote by mail and early voting also requires a photo ID.
Wisconsin offers no-excuse vote by mail. Most voters must provide a copy of their photo ID along with their absentee ballot request (WS §6.87). Voters have multiple options to return their absentee ballot, including by mail, in person to the municipal clerk’s office, or at their polling place on Election Day; clerks are also permitted to establish secure drop boxes for absentee ballot return (WS §6.87). Absentee ballots must be received no later than 8 p.m. on Election Day (WS §6.87).
A challenge that Wisconsin, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Wisconsin is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, municipal clerks may update voter registration with information from other state and national databases. Wisconsin law also requires that the Elections Commission remove inactive voters after a notice period (WS §6.50). This voter list maintenance is regularly conducted the year after each general election.
Wisconsin residents can check their registration status online.
5.b. Wisconsin law prohibits registration by noncitizens.
To register to vote in Wisconsin, state law requires the registrant to be an adult U.S. citizen, as well as a resident of the district in which they plan to vote for at least 28 consecutive days (WS §6.02). Registrants who have lived at their current address for less than 28 days may register at their previous Wisconsin address (WS §6.02). Documentary proof of citizenship is not required to register, but applicants must assert their citizenship status and other qualifications on the signed application form. Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency or lack of citizenship, is a Class I felony under state law (WS §12.13, §12.60). Federal law separately makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
5.c. Wisconsin allows challenges to voter eligibility.
Wisconsin law allows a person's qualifications to vote to be challenged by any election official from their city or county and by any elector (qualified voter) from their municipality (WS §6.48).
Although there is no limit to the number of challenges any one person can make, pre-election challengers must appear before the clerk or board in person or their petition will be dismissed (WS §6.48). In addition to voters, during in-person voting, election inspectors may challenge, under oath, any voter they "know or suspect is not a qualified elector" (WS §6.92). Challenges must be based on an accusation tied to state law, such as disqualification due to age or residence (WS §6.03).
5.d. Photo ID is required to vote in person.
Wisconsin requires voters to show photo identification to vote (WI Const. III §1m). Citizens who do not have appropriate ID are given a provisional ballot, which is isolated and only counted if the voter brings an acceptable form of ID to the municipal clerk's office by 4 p.m. on the Friday following the election.
5.e. Vote by mail and early voting also requires a photo ID.
Wisconsin offers no-excuse vote by mail. Most voters must provide a copy of their photo ID along with their absentee ballot request (WS §6.87). Voters have multiple options to return their absentee ballot, including by mail, in person to the municipal clerk’s office, or at their polling place on Election Day; clerks are also permitted to establish secure drop boxes for absentee ballot return (WS §6.87). Absentee ballots must be received no later than 8 p.m. on Election Day (WS §6.87).
QUESTION 6: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
6.a. Wisconsin officials cannot begin counting absentee ballots before Election Day.
Prior to Election Day, clerks may inspect the signed certificate on the outside of the absentee ballot return envelope and contact any voter with an incomplete certificate (WS §6.87). However, absentee ballots may not be opened, processed, or counted until Election Day (WS §6.88).
Municipalities also differ in how they count absentee ballots. In most places, absentee ballots are counted on Election Day at the polling place in the precinct in which the absentee voter resides (WS §6.88). However, in a few municipalities, including Milwaukee and Green Bay, a central board of absentee ballot canvassers convenes on Election Day to count all of the absentee ballots for the city (WS §7.52).
6.b. Voting systems are subject to post-election audits.
For each general election, Wisconsin conducts a post-election audit aimed at determining the error rate of voting equipment (WS §7.08). The Wisconsin Elections Commission randomly selects at least 5% of reporting units—wards (precinct) or combinations of wards—across the state for auditing. The audit must include at least one reporting unit per county, and a minimum of five reporting units are selected for each type of voting system available in the state.
The audit is conducted using a hand count only. Four contests are counted, including the top contest on the ballot and three others selected randomly by Wisconsin Elections Commission. The results of the hand count are compared to the relevant voting equipment totals. The audit is administered by the municipal clerks or county clerks, depending on who is responsible for programming the voting equipment. The results of these audits are reported to the Commission, which reviews them for any discrepancies.
In general, audits must be completed prior to certification of the election. However, in the event of a recount, affected reporting units may have an additional five weeks to complete their work.
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. Candidates in close elections can request recounts.
Candidates in close elections, or voters who cast ballots in a closely-decided referendum, can request a recount (WS §9.01). The recount option applies to elections for most offices and ensures that additional scrutiny is available in close races, where wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern.
In an election in which more than 4,000 votes were cast, a recount may be requested if the winning margin is less than 1 percent of the vote (WS §9.01). A recount petitioner must sign a statement under oath stating that they believe a “mistake or fraud” was committed and/or that other specified “defects, irregularities, or illegalities” occurred (WS §9.01). However, the petitioner does not need to provide specific evidence to support their allegations. A recount petition can include one or all wards (voting precincts); if the election was lost by more than 0.25% of the vote, the petitioner must pay the costs of the recount in advance (WS §9.01).
For state and federal elections, the county board of canvassers conducts the recount, which is open to observation by the public (WS §9.01).
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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6.d. In general, Wisconsin certification cannot happen until all audits and recounts are complete.
Election returns are canvassed and certified at the municipal, county, and state levels (WS §7). Municipal boards of canvassers typically begin canvassing election returns on election night (or in the following days for larger municipalities), and generally must complete the canvass and transmit results to the county no later than the Monday after the election (WS §7.53). The county board of canvassers must begin to canvass results no later than the Tuesday following the election, and transmit the results to the Wisconsin Elections Commission within 14 days of the election (WS §7.60). Once county returns are transmitted to the Wisconsin Election Commission, the Commission Chairperson must canvass and certify the results no later than December 1 (WS §7.70).
6.e. Wisconsin’s method of auditing and recounts is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. Wisconsin and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
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CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods.
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Prior to Election Day, clerks may inspect the signed certificate on the outside of the absentee ballot return envelope and contact any voter with an incomplete certificate (WS §6.87). However, absentee ballots may not be opened, processed, or counted until Election Day (WS §6.88).
Municipalities also differ in how they count absentee ballots. In most places, absentee ballots are counted on Election Day at the polling place in the precinct in which the absentee voter resides (WS §6.88). However, in a few municipalities, including Milwaukee and Green Bay, a central board of absentee ballot canvassers convenes on Election Day to count all of the absentee ballots for the city (WS §7.52).
6.b. Voting systems are subject to post-election audits.
For each general election, Wisconsin conducts a post-election audit aimed at determining the error rate of voting equipment (WS §7.08). The Wisconsin Elections Commission randomly selects at least 5% of reporting units—wards (precinct) or combinations of wards—across the state for auditing. The audit must include at least one reporting unit per county, and a minimum of five reporting units are selected for each type of voting system available in the state.
The audit is conducted using a hand count only. Four contests are counted, including the top contest on the ballot and three others selected randomly by Wisconsin Elections Commission. The results of the hand count are compared to the relevant voting equipment totals. The audit is administered by the municipal clerks or county clerks, depending on who is responsible for programming the voting equipment. The results of these audits are reported to the Commission, which reviews them for any discrepancies.
In general, audits must be completed prior to certification of the election. However, in the event of a recount, affected reporting units may have an additional five weeks to complete their work.
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. Candidates in close elections can request recounts.
Candidates in close elections, or voters who cast ballots in a closely-decided referendum, can request a recount (WS §9.01). The recount option applies to elections for most offices and ensures that additional scrutiny is available in close races, where wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern.
In an election in which more than 4,000 votes were cast, a recount may be requested if the winning margin is less than 1 percent of the vote (WS §9.01). A recount petitioner must sign a statement under oath stating that they believe a “mistake or fraud” was committed and/or that other specified “defects, irregularities, or illegalities” occurred (WS §9.01). However, the petitioner does not need to provide specific evidence to support their allegations. A recount petition can include one or all wards (voting precincts); if the election was lost by more than 0.25% of the vote, the petitioner must pay the costs of the recount in advance (WS §9.01).
For state and federal elections, the county board of canvassers conducts the recount, which is open to observation by the public (WS §9.01).
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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6.d. In general, Wisconsin certification cannot happen until all audits and recounts are complete.
Election returns are canvassed and certified at the municipal, county, and state levels (WS §7). Municipal boards of canvassers typically begin canvassing election returns on election night (or in the following days for larger municipalities), and generally must complete the canvass and transmit results to the county no later than the Monday after the election (WS §7.53). The county board of canvassers must begin to canvass results no later than the Tuesday following the election, and transmit the results to the Wisconsin Elections Commission within 14 days of the election (WS §7.60). Once county returns are transmitted to the Wisconsin Election Commission, the Commission Chairperson must canvass and certify the results no later than December 1 (WS §7.70).
6.e. Wisconsin’s method of auditing and recounts is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. Wisconsin and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
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CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods.
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QUESTION 7: Who certifies results in Wisconsin, and what issues have arisen around certification?
7.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In Wisconsin, certification happens at the municipal, county, and state levels. Prior to certification, the boards of canvassers review tally sheets and inspectors' statements from each voting district. County boards must complete their canvass, issue a statement certifying the names of all persons who have won the election, and send the statement to the Wisconsin Elections Commission within 14 days after the general election (WS §7.60).
State-level certification is the responsibility of the Chairperson of the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WS §7.70). The Chairperson must make determinations and issue certificates for the election by December 1. The chairperson or designee examines the certified statements from county boards, prepares statements of vote totals, and issues certificates of election to winning candidates.
7.b. Certifying results is a ministerial, non-discretionary, required function.
Wisconsin courts have confirmed the ministerial nature of certification. The county boards of canvassers in Wisconsin have some powers to investigate and correct errors. According to state law, if the board finds any "informal or defective" returns, they shall dispatch a messenger to deliver the returns back to the municipal board of canvassers with written specifications of the informalities or defects and command them to immediately complete or remedy the returns (WS §7.60). The board may also summon election officials to appear with election materials if needed to correct errors (WS §7.60). However, the law is also clear that “the county clerk shall deliver or transmit the certified statement to the elections commission no later than…14 days after the general election” (WS §7.60). The Wisconsin Elections Commission has similar authority and must “conclude the state canvass within 10 days after its commencement” (WS §7.70).
Wisconsin officials have fully complied with their duties and state law in certifying elections in recent years. However, if a county board refused to certify, the Wisconsin Elections Commission could utilize its canvass oversight authority to ensure results were certified. In addition, a court may mandate that local or state certification be completed using a writ of mandamus.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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In Wisconsin, certification happens at the municipal, county, and state levels. Prior to certification, the boards of canvassers review tally sheets and inspectors' statements from each voting district. County boards must complete their canvass, issue a statement certifying the names of all persons who have won the election, and send the statement to the Wisconsin Elections Commission within 14 days after the general election (WS §7.60).
State-level certification is the responsibility of the Chairperson of the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WS §7.70). The Chairperson must make determinations and issue certificates for the election by December 1. The chairperson or designee examines the certified statements from county boards, prepares statements of vote totals, and issues certificates of election to winning candidates.
7.b. Certifying results is a ministerial, non-discretionary, required function.
Wisconsin courts have confirmed the ministerial nature of certification. The county boards of canvassers in Wisconsin have some powers to investigate and correct errors. According to state law, if the board finds any "informal or defective" returns, they shall dispatch a messenger to deliver the returns back to the municipal board of canvassers with written specifications of the informalities or defects and command them to immediately complete or remedy the returns (WS §7.60). The board may also summon election officials to appear with election materials if needed to correct errors (WS §7.60). However, the law is also clear that “the county clerk shall deliver or transmit the certified statement to the elections commission no later than…14 days after the general election” (WS §7.60). The Wisconsin Elections Commission has similar authority and must “conclude the state canvass within 10 days after its commencement” (WS §7.70).
Wisconsin officials have fully complied with their duties and state law in certifying elections in recent years. However, if a county board refused to certify, the Wisconsin Elections Commission could utilize its canvass oversight authority to ensure results were certified. In addition, a court may mandate that local or state certification be completed using a writ of mandamus.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming the results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results
QUESTION 8: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
8.a. Voters in Wisconsin have limited ability to challenge an election through the court system.
Wisconsin law provides several avenues for election disputes. An elector may file certain complaints against local election officials with Wisconsin Elections Commission (WS §5.06), and judicial review of a Commission decision is available to a complainant who is “aggrieved” by the order. Separately, state law provides the recount and recount-appeal process for eligible candidates and referendum voters (see Question 6c).
In addition, parties with standing may bring complaints to federal court. People or entities challenging elections in federal court have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
Wisconsin law provides several avenues for election disputes. An elector may file certain complaints against local election officials with Wisconsin Elections Commission (WS §5.06), and judicial review of a Commission decision is available to a complainant who is “aggrieved” by the order. Separately, state law provides the recount and recount-appeal process for eligible candidates and referendum voters (see Question 6c).
In addition, parties with standing may bring complaints to federal court. People or entities challenging elections in federal court have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 9: What’s required of plaintiffs and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
9.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
9.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broad set of allegations and races.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
9.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
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CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
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9.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
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CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
9.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broad set of allegations and races.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
9.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
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CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
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9.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
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CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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QUESTION 10: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
10.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Failure to State a Claim: The plaintiff’s allegations may not contain a legally recognizable claim that can be adjudicated by the courts.
- Unreasonable Delays (also known as "Laches"): A case may be dismissed if a party unreasonably delays bringing it, and if that delay causes prejudice.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
QUESTION 11: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
11.a. The timelines are tight.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
11.b. The legal system generally is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
11.b. The legal system generally is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Timeline of Wisconsin Election Procedures
Wisconsin Election Code
Wisconsin Election Administration Manual
Wisconsin Elections Commission Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Wisconsin Election Code
Wisconsin Election Administration Manual
Wisconsin Elections Commission Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Date |
Election Activity |
11/3/26 |
Election Day |
11/3/26 |
County clerks publish unofficial results immediately following vote counting and tabulation. |
11/6/26 |
Deadline to verify identify for provisional ballots. |
11/9/26 |
Deadline for Municipal Board of Canvassers to canvass results. |
11/10/26 |
Deadline for County Board of Canvassers to canvass results. |
11/17/26 |
Deadline for county clerks to submit results of county canvass for state and federal offices to the Wisconsin Elections Commission. |
12/1/26 |
Deadline for Chair of Wisconsin Elections Commission to certify results. |
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
