STATE NAME
PILLAR 1: Verification
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance including seal numbers on equipment, ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 1: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified in Arizona?
1.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before and after voting.
Vote counting in Arizona is done with optical scanners that read voters’ hand-marked ballots and total up the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. In large communities, nearly all ballots marked at the polling station on election day are fed into the scanner by the voters themselves. In smaller counties, ballots are sometimes counted in a central location with oversight from observers and a legally mandated live-stream. The exceptions are provisional ballots, or ballots that are mailed or placed in drop boxes. Mailed and drop-box ballots are transported to central facilities and scanned with high-speed scanners. For both types of equipment, election officials must demonstrate before and after voting takes place that a set of test ballots is accurately counted. (This process is called “Logic and Accuracy” testing.) [1]
Arizona performs some of the most rigorous logic and accuracy testing of voting machines in the country. Observers from local political parties are even invited to contribute their own votes on a test ballot to ensure the tabulator counts them accurately.[2],[3]
1.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Tabulation and other voting equipment is physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections throughout the process.[4] Equipment is ‘air-gapped’ meaning there is no physical or network connection between pieces of equipment. When centralization is called for, vote tabulations are stored on a protected external drive and physically transported.[5]
A person who inappropriately modifies voting equipment may be charged with a class 5 felony.[6]
1.c. Votes are marked on paper ballots which are retained to be available for rechecking.
Paper ballots are considered best-practice. Maintaining a paper-trail, as Arizona counties do, is the recommended approach for election administration nationwide. Officials can audit or recount the paper ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.[7]
Voters who are unable to mark a ballot by hand have the option to use a ballot-marking-device (BMD), an assistive device like a touch screen that provides voters with a printed copy or coded version of their ballot.[8] BMDs do not store information; the only record is the paper ballot provided to the voter. The vast majority of voters in the U.S., including in Arizona, mark their ballots by hand.[9]
1.d. Equipment is certified by the Secretary of State.
Only pre-approved equipment can be used in elections including the poll books, BDPs, and tabulation equipment. Tabulation equipment must come from a list of technology certified by the Secretary of State and in compliance with federal security guidelines.[10], [11]
Vote counting in Arizona is done with optical scanners that read voters’ hand-marked ballots and total up the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. In large communities, nearly all ballots marked at the polling station on election day are fed into the scanner by the voters themselves. In smaller counties, ballots are sometimes counted in a central location with oversight from observers and a legally mandated live-stream. The exceptions are provisional ballots, or ballots that are mailed or placed in drop boxes. Mailed and drop-box ballots are transported to central facilities and scanned with high-speed scanners. For both types of equipment, election officials must demonstrate before and after voting takes place that a set of test ballots is accurately counted. (This process is called “Logic and Accuracy” testing.) [1]
Arizona performs some of the most rigorous logic and accuracy testing of voting machines in the country. Observers from local political parties are even invited to contribute their own votes on a test ballot to ensure the tabulator counts them accurately.[2],[3]
1.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Tabulation and other voting equipment is physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections throughout the process.[4] Equipment is ‘air-gapped’ meaning there is no physical or network connection between pieces of equipment. When centralization is called for, vote tabulations are stored on a protected external drive and physically transported.[5]
A person who inappropriately modifies voting equipment may be charged with a class 5 felony.[6]
1.c. Votes are marked on paper ballots which are retained to be available for rechecking.
Paper ballots are considered best-practice. Maintaining a paper-trail, as Arizona counties do, is the recommended approach for election administration nationwide. Officials can audit or recount the paper ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.[7]
Voters who are unable to mark a ballot by hand have the option to use a ballot-marking-device (BMD), an assistive device like a touch screen that provides voters with a printed copy or coded version of their ballot.[8] BMDs do not store information; the only record is the paper ballot provided to the voter. The vast majority of voters in the U.S., including in Arizona, mark their ballots by hand.[9]
1.d. Equipment is certified by the Secretary of State.
Only pre-approved equipment can be used in elections including the poll books, BDPs, and tabulation equipment. Tabulation equipment must come from a list of technology certified by the Secretary of State and in compliance with federal security guidelines.[10], [11]
QUESTION 2: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
2.a. An ID is required to vote in person, or a voter may use a conditional provisional ballot.
All in-person voters must show ID and be a US citizen and a legal resident of Arizona to vote. Those that do not have appropriate ID are given a conditional provisional ballot which is isolated, and only counted if the voter brings their ID to the County Recorder within five business days.[12]
Arizona is one of 12 states that requires individuals without an ID to confirm their registration later. This makes the state’s voter ID laws stricter than most others in the country.[13]
2.b. State law in AZ protects against illegal voting and voting by non-citizens.
Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency, criminal status, or lack of citizenship, is considered a felony offense in Arizona (A.R.S. § 16-182). Voter registration is cross-referenced with other state and national databases and sources including the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles, the Social Security Administration, ERIC, and court documentation on felony convictions and jury service disclosure. [AZ EPM, p 36-48]
Arizona has one of the strictest citizenship enforcement mechanisms in the country. To vote a full ballot with both federal and state candidates, voters must submit proof of citizenship in addition to attesting that they hold citizenship, which is required to register for federal election.
All in-person voters must show ID and be a US citizen and a legal resident of Arizona to vote. Those that do not have appropriate ID are given a conditional provisional ballot which is isolated, and only counted if the voter brings their ID to the County Recorder within five business days.[12]
Arizona is one of 12 states that requires individuals without an ID to confirm their registration later. This makes the state’s voter ID laws stricter than most others in the country.[13]
2.b. State law in AZ protects against illegal voting and voting by non-citizens.
Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency, criminal status, or lack of citizenship, is considered a felony offense in Arizona (A.R.S. § 16-182). Voter registration is cross-referenced with other state and national databases and sources including the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles, the Social Security Administration, ERIC, and court documentation on felony convictions and jury service disclosure. [AZ EPM, p 36-48]
Arizona has one of the strictest citizenship enforcement mechanisms in the country. To vote a full ballot with both federal and state candidates, voters must submit proof of citizenship in addition to attesting that they hold citizenship, which is required to register for federal election.
WHAT ABOUT THE FEDERAL ONLY BALLOTS?
Those who fail to provide full proof of citizenship but otherwise complete their registration can vote in federal races only. As of April 2024, 35,273 people, or 4% of total registered voters, were registered to vote a federal only ballot. One geographic analysis shows that rather than citizenship status, the likely reason for this partial registration is that the applicants are college students or homeless individuals who do not have easy access to a birth certificate or other proof of citizenship.
Those who fail to provide full proof of citizenship but otherwise complete their registration can vote in federal races only. As of April 2024, 35,273 people, or 4% of total registered voters, were registered to vote a federal only ballot. One geographic analysis shows that rather than citizenship status, the likely reason for this partial registration is that the applicants are college students or homeless individuals who do not have easy access to a birth certificate or other proof of citizenship.
2.c. Vote by mail is signature-verified.
As of 2023, Arizona, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia have no-excuse absentee laws. (Seven states conduct their entire election by “absentee” ballot.[14]) In Arizona, ballots can be mailed or dropped off at polling locations or other approved locations that must be situated at a government building.[15]
All early ballots, including ballots-by-mail and those cast in-person must be signed, and the signature must be checked against the signature on file from the voter’s registration by the County Recorder or other officer in charge of elections.[16]
As of 2023, Arizona, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia have no-excuse absentee laws. (Seven states conduct their entire election by “absentee” ballot.[14]) In Arizona, ballots can be mailed or dropped off at polling locations or other approved locations that must be situated at a government building.[15]
All early ballots, including ballots-by-mail and those cast in-person must be signed, and the signature must be checked against the signature on file from the voter’s registration by the County Recorder or other officer in charge of elections.[16]
GOOD NEWS ON PROVISIONALS:
The number of provisional ballots in Arizona has trended downwards since 2012 when 7.89% of ballots cast were provisional.
In 2020 and 2022 provisional ballots made up 1.47% and .66% of ballots cast. Of the provisional ballots cast in 2020, only .59% were ultimately rejected. One likely reason for this trend is that the public is better educated about how to keep their registrations up to date and what ID to present when voting.
The number of provisional ballots in Arizona has trended downwards since 2012 when 7.89% of ballots cast were provisional.
In 2020 and 2022 provisional ballots made up 1.47% and .66% of ballots cast. Of the provisional ballots cast in 2020, only .59% were ultimately rejected. One likely reason for this trend is that the public is better educated about how to keep their registrations up to date and what ID to present when voting.
2.d. Arizona officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In Arizona, early in-person and mail ballots can be processed and tabulated as soon as the safety and accuracy of tabulation equipment is verified.[17] However, the results cannot be reported until all voting is complete. Allowing officials to verify signatures, prepare ballots for counting, and scan ballots into tabulators before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.[18]
In Arizona, early in-person and mail ballots can be processed and tabulated as soon as the safety and accuracy of tabulation equipment is verified.[17] However, the results cannot be reported until all voting is complete. Allowing officials to verify signatures, prepare ballots for counting, and scan ballots into tabulators before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.[18]
QUESTION 3: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
3.a. The initial results are subject to strict confirmation testing and oversight.
Within 24 hours after the polls close, local elections officials launch a tabulation audit in a random selection of at least 2% of precincts in the county or two precincts (whichever is greater). In the audit, officials compare a hand count of votes from a randomly selected set of races to the electronic tallies at the close of the polls.[19],[20]
Election results do not become official until ballots are reviewed and processed, and until the auditing process is complete. Official certification, via canvassing, cannot happen until six days after voting.[22]
Within 24 hours after the polls close, local elections officials launch a tabulation audit in a random selection of at least 2% of precincts in the county or two precincts (whichever is greater). In the audit, officials compare a hand count of votes from a randomly selected set of races to the electronic tallies at the close of the polls.[19],[20]
Election results do not become official until ballots are reviewed and processed, and until the auditing process is complete. Official certification, via canvassing, cannot happen until six days after voting.[22]
OFFICIAL RESULTS COME LATER: In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night. But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted, audited, and certified.
Note of caution: In recent elections, the time period between the preliminary results and the final certification has been used by spreaders of disinformation to advance conspiracy theories and make it harder for officials to do their jobs in an efficient and accurate manner.
Note of caution: In recent elections, the time period between the preliminary results and the final certification has been used by spreaders of disinformation to advance conspiracy theories and make it harder for officials to do their jobs in an efficient and accurate manner.
3.b. Arizona’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Studies show that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure.[23] Arizona and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Studies show that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure.[23] Arizona and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
MORE ON HANDCOUNTS:
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors and gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We want our teachers and police officers to do their jobs using the best, most proven, technology and methods. We should want the same for election officials. In Arizona, conducting audits and carrying out automatic recounts empowers officials to get voters results in a timely and effective manner.
However, if Arizona wanted – in the future – to improve on this already solid foundation of checks and confirmations, it could adopt risk-limiting audits, an approach some states use.
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors and gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We want our teachers and police officers to do their jobs using the best, most proven, technology and methods. We should want the same for election officials. In Arizona, conducting audits and carrying out automatic recounts empowers officials to get voters results in a timely and effective manner.
However, if Arizona wanted – in the future – to improve on this already solid foundation of checks and confirmations, it could adopt risk-limiting audits, an approach some states use.
3.c. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the official recording and certification of the results. The canvass requires documentation to ensure that appropriate election procedures were conducted, including audits and investigation of concerns. The Secretary of State must canvass the results on the fourth Monday after voting ends, with delays allowed for up to 30 days.[24]
3.d. Close elections are automatically subject to a recount.
Automatic recounts apply to elections for most offices and ensure that close races, where wrongdoing is of heightened concern, are triple checked.[25] In 2022, Arizona lowered the threshold for automatic recounts, meaning that more are likely to be required.
Some states allow campaigns or individuals to request a recount when the margin is too large to trigger an automatic recount, but Arizona does not have this provision. The automatic recount process is largely the same as the original count procedure. All equipment must be tested again and random precincts are audited. These procedures are in place to ensure that discrepancies are found and investigated, and cannot occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election.
Where there are discrepancies between the initial result and the result from the automatic recount, the officer in charge of elections shall undertake reasonable efforts to reconcile the discrepancy and provide a report to the Secretary of State explaining the reasons.
The canvass is the official recording and certification of the results. The canvass requires documentation to ensure that appropriate election procedures were conducted, including audits and investigation of concerns. The Secretary of State must canvass the results on the fourth Monday after voting ends, with delays allowed for up to 30 days.[24]
3.d. Close elections are automatically subject to a recount.
Automatic recounts apply to elections for most offices and ensure that close races, where wrongdoing is of heightened concern, are triple checked.[25] In 2022, Arizona lowered the threshold for automatic recounts, meaning that more are likely to be required.
- Previously, only races that were as close as .1% or less would see a recount. Now, races in which the difference is .5% or less will see a recount.
- Under the old margin, there were only five recounts of state races between 2000-2020. In 2022, the first election with the new margins, there were three recounts in one general election.
Some states allow campaigns or individuals to request a recount when the margin is too large to trigger an automatic recount, but Arizona does not have this provision. The automatic recount process is largely the same as the original count procedure. All equipment must be tested again and random precincts are audited. These procedures are in place to ensure that discrepancies are found and investigated, and cannot occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election.
Where there are discrepancies between the initial result and the result from the automatic recount, the officer in charge of elections shall undertake reasonable efforts to reconcile the discrepancy and provide a report to the Secretary of State explaining the reasons.
RECOUNTS RARELY CHANGE THE OUTCOME.
In roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S since 2000, there have only been three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%.[1] However, small discrepancies can happen. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts isn’t to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
While the recount is in progress, officials can’t release vote totals. Instead, the court must declare the winner in open court.[26]
In roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S since 2000, there have only been three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%.[1] However, small discrepancies can happen. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts isn’t to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
While the recount is in progress, officials can’t release vote totals. Instead, the court must declare the winner in open court.[26]
Pillar 1 Endnotes
Arizona flag image credit: Wikimedia Creative Commons
[1] “A post-election L&A test must be performed using the same election program and tabulation equipment used for the pre-election L&A test and the election. The same test ballots and test script from the pre-election L&A test must be utilized.” (Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 234))
[2] Walker, J., Bajaj, N., Crimmins, B.L., & Halderman, J.A. (2022). Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review. In R. Krimmer, M. Volkamer, D. Duenas-Cid, P. Rønne, & M. Germann (Eds.), Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 13553). Springer, Cham.
[3] The Carter Center. (2022). Explaining Logic and Accuracy Testing in Arizona Midterm Recount.
[4] Arizona Secretary of State. (n.d.). Voting Equipment.
[5] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.101)
[6] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.101)
[7] While some experts suggest voting can be made more efficient and accessible if all voters used a BMD, others disagree. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, however they are marked. (U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2022). Best Practices for Election Technology; Appel, A. (n.d.). Why Voters Should Mark Ballots by Hand. Verified Voting; Center for Civic Design. (n.d.) Why not just use pens to mark a ballot?. DeSoi, C. (2018). MEDSL Explains: Voting Technology. MIT Election Data + Science Lab.)
[8] For information on BMDs used by individual counties see the Arizona Secretary of State’s 2024 election cycle / voting equipment list.
[9] Nearly 70% of voters in the United States live in “jurisdictions using Hand Marked Paper Ballots for most voters.” (Verified Voting. (n.d.). The Verifier — Election Day Equipment — November 2024.)
[10] Arizona Revised Statutes § 16-442
[11] Arizona Secretary of State. (n.d.). Voting Equipment.
[12] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 183)
[13] In 20 states that require ID, voters who do not have one are allowed to cast a provisional ballot that is subject to review but is not conditional on them showing ID at a later date. Voting Rights Lab. ID Requirements; National Conference of State Legislatures. Voter ID Laws
[14] MIT Election Data & Science Lab. (2024) Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting.
[15] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual.
[16] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 83)
[17] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 87)
[18] https://app.box.com/s/87iv4yfv621ocbhn3v7ga878v04mgjiy; pg 6
[19] “A hand count audit of a limited number of precincts or vote centers and limited number of early ballots must be conducted for a random selection of races after each countywide primary, special, general, and PPE election and compared against the results from the electronic tabulation system, unless applicable exceptions apply.” Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 221)
[20] Arizona Revised Statutes § 16-602.
[21] https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits
[22] https://www.leg.gov/viewdocument/?docName=https://www.leg.gov/ars/16/00642.htm
[23] https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2010.0098
[24] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual.
[25] If the margin of votes in the official canvass is less than or equal to .5% of the total number of votes cast for the top two candidates or a ballot measure, an automatic recount is triggered. Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 254)
[26] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 255)
[1] “A post-election L&A test must be performed using the same election program and tabulation equipment used for the pre-election L&A test and the election. The same test ballots and test script from the pre-election L&A test must be utilized.” (Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 234))
[2] Walker, J., Bajaj, N., Crimmins, B.L., & Halderman, J.A. (2022). Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review. In R. Krimmer, M. Volkamer, D. Duenas-Cid, P. Rønne, & M. Germann (Eds.), Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 13553). Springer, Cham.
[3] The Carter Center. (2022). Explaining Logic and Accuracy Testing in Arizona Midterm Recount.
[4] Arizona Secretary of State. (n.d.). Voting Equipment.
[5] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.101)
[6] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.101)
[7] While some experts suggest voting can be made more efficient and accessible if all voters used a BMD, others disagree. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, however they are marked. (U.S. Election Assistance Commission. (2022). Best Practices for Election Technology; Appel, A. (n.d.). Why Voters Should Mark Ballots by Hand. Verified Voting; Center for Civic Design. (n.d.) Why not just use pens to mark a ballot?. DeSoi, C. (2018). MEDSL Explains: Voting Technology. MIT Election Data + Science Lab.)
[8] For information on BMDs used by individual counties see the Arizona Secretary of State’s 2024 election cycle / voting equipment list.
[9] Nearly 70% of voters in the United States live in “jurisdictions using Hand Marked Paper Ballots for most voters.” (Verified Voting. (n.d.). The Verifier — Election Day Equipment — November 2024.)
[10] Arizona Revised Statutes § 16-442
[11] Arizona Secretary of State. (n.d.). Voting Equipment.
[12] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 183)
[13] In 20 states that require ID, voters who do not have one are allowed to cast a provisional ballot that is subject to review but is not conditional on them showing ID at a later date. Voting Rights Lab. ID Requirements; National Conference of State Legislatures. Voter ID Laws
[14] MIT Election Data & Science Lab. (2024) Voting by Mail and Absentee Voting.
[15] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual.
[16] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 83)
[17] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 87)
[18] https://app.box.com/s/87iv4yfv621ocbhn3v7ga878v04mgjiy; pg 6
[19] “A hand count audit of a limited number of precincts or vote centers and limited number of early ballots must be conducted for a random selection of races after each countywide primary, special, general, and PPE election and compared against the results from the electronic tabulation system, unless applicable exceptions apply.” Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 221)
[20] Arizona Revised Statutes § 16-602.
[21] https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits
[22] https://www.leg.gov/viewdocument/?docName=https://www.leg.gov/ars/16/00642.htm
[23] https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/10.1089/elj.2010.0098
[24] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual.
[25] If the margin of votes in the official canvass is less than or equal to .5% of the total number of votes cast for the top two candidates or a ballot measure, an automatic recount is triggered. Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 254)
[26] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 255)
PILLAR 2: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, with a process as critical as elections, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for this. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
Political party observers are an important part of the process. By making sure election rules are followed, observers support candidates and their party’s interests. In other words, they are biased by design. It is unfortunate that in Arizona they do not receive any official training from election administrators. One measure of the importance of training observers comes from Carter/Ford Candidate Principles for Trusted Elections. The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
Political party observers are an important part of the process. By making sure election rules are followed, observers support candidates and their party’s interests. In other words, they are biased by design. It is unfortunate that in Arizona they do not receive any official training from election administrators. One measure of the importance of training observers comes from Carter/Ford Candidate Principles for Trusted Elections. The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
QUESTION 4: Who can observe elections?
4.a. The major parties are provided with multiple opportunities to hold the election process accountable and protect their candidates.[1]
Arizona does not require any training to become an election observer, though to be useful to the parties they are representing, observers should be trained in their role and knowledgeable about election procedures. That can help ensure credibility of their accounts if they observe problems.
Many states require observers to be trained and, in some states, the state election department supports observer training. Parties also have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand their role, and know not to interfere in any way with the election process.
- Inspectors and judges are senior poll workers that are hired by the board of supervisors. Candidates for the position of judge, and in some cases inspector, may be chosen by the parties.[2]
- Observers are designated representatives of the parties and candidates who may observe and take written record of election procedures including testing of equipment, voting operations, ballot transfers, and recounts.[3] Nonpartisan candidates and political action committees for ballot measures are together only allowed three additional people at a time and only during certain processes.[4]
- Challengers are designated representatives of the parties who may challenge early ballots based on specific statutory grounds.[5]
- Who can observe: Partisan observers must be residents and registered to vote in Arizona.[6] They are not required to be registered in the county in which they do their observation, as is the case in many states. Also, unlike other states, Arizona allows the immediate family members of candidates to serve as observers.[7]
- Who cannot observe: Precinct committeeman candidates, candidates appearing on the ballot, and official write-in candidates.[8] Only observers appointed by recognized parties and groups are allowed to closely watch the election process. Documentation of their appointment to specific locations is provided by the parties in writing and, in general, no more than one representative per party is allowed to be present at a site.[9]
Arizona does not require any training to become an election observer, though to be useful to the parties they are representing, observers should be trained in their role and knowledgeable about election procedures. That can help ensure credibility of their accounts if they observe problems.
Many states require observers to be trained and, in some states, the state election department supports observer training. Parties also have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand their role, and know not to interfere in any way with the election process.
Political party observers are an important part of the process.
By making sure election rules are followed, observers support candidates and their party’s interests. In other words, they are biased by design. It is unfortunate that in Arizona they do not receive any official training from election administrators. One measure of the importance of training observers comes from Carter/Ford program Principles for Trusted Elections. The program calls on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Learn more about all five principles.
By making sure election rules are followed, observers support candidates and their party’s interests. In other words, they are biased by design. It is unfortunate that in Arizona they do not receive any official training from election administrators. One measure of the importance of training observers comes from Carter/Ford program Principles for Trusted Elections. The program calls on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Learn more about all five principles.
QUESTION 5: What are observers allowed to see?
5.a. Most election procedures, including testing of election equipment, are open to observation from party representatives and the public.
Party observers must be able to observe any significant voting, processing, and counting activities as well as transportation of ballots from the voting location to a receiving site. Observers cannot interfere with or impede the election procedures or staff, and they can be asked to leave if they do so.[10]
Party observers must be able to observe any significant voting, processing, and counting activities as well as transportation of ballots from the voting location to a receiving site. Observers cannot interfere with or impede the election procedures or staff, and they can be asked to leave if they do so.[10]
Pillar 2 Endnotes
[1] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.138)
[2] Arizona Revised Statutes § 16.531.
[3] Arizona Revised Statutes §16.590.
[4] The Carter Center. Arizona Revised Statutes § 16.621.
[5] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.79)
[6] Arizona Revised Statutes §16.590.
[7] NMSA 1978, 1-2-22
[8] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 138)
[9] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.139)
[10] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual.
[2] Arizona Revised Statutes § 16.531.
[3] Arizona Revised Statutes §16.590.
[4] The Carter Center. Arizona Revised Statutes § 16.621.
[5] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.79)
[6] Arizona Revised Statutes §16.590.
[7] NMSA 1978, 1-2-22
[8] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p. 138)
[9] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.139)
[10] Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual.
PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited than the judicial system to consider evidence and render judgment; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was minimal, inconsistent, and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
Fortunately, this era – when the protection of courts sometimes stopped at the polling station door – has largely come to an end. State and federal courts now provide a critical check against the vast majority of unlawful activities that could impact results. But our political culture hasn’t fully caught up. Overviews of election procedures usually don’t include judicial review as a step in the process, when, arguably it provides one of the most important reasons for acceptance and trust on all sides.
This judicial role gives competing parties and candidates the opportunity to bring challenges that ensure elections are conducted under procedures established by law. Conversely, parties and candidates that question the legitimacy of election results but fail to provide evidence to support their position should not be provided an unchecked platform for amplifying unsubstantiated claims.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was minimal, inconsistent, and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
Fortunately, this era – when the protection of courts sometimes stopped at the polling station door – has largely come to an end. State and federal courts now provide a critical check against the vast majority of unlawful activities that could impact results. But our political culture hasn’t fully caught up. Overviews of election procedures usually don’t include judicial review as a step in the process, when, arguably it provides one of the most important reasons for acceptance and trust on all sides.
This judicial role gives competing parties and candidates the opportunity to bring challenges that ensure elections are conducted under procedures established by law. Conversely, parties and candidates that question the legitimacy of election results but fail to provide evidence to support their position should not be provided an unchecked platform for amplifying unsubstantiated claims.
QUESTION 6: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
6.a. The only way for a candidate or individual citizen in Arizona to challenge an election is to contest the election in the court system.
This process is different from automatic recounts. Automatic recounts are provided by Arizona law and no individual can request one.[1]
6.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest some election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court. Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that don’t affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: They may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
This process is different from automatic recounts. Automatic recounts are provided by Arizona law and no individual can request one.[1]
6.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest some election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court. Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that don’t affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: They may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 7: What’s required of plaintiffs and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
7.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
7.b. To utilize Arizona’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must make specific accusations of wrongdoing and work within a narrow timeline.
Elections can be contested in Arizona courts on the following grounds:[2]
7.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state-legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
7.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
The person bringing the lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
7.b. To utilize Arizona’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must make specific accusations of wrongdoing and work within a narrow timeline.
Elections can be contested in Arizona courts on the following grounds:[2]
- Misconduct by election officials and officers
- Candidate eligibility
- Bribery
- Illegal votes
- Erroneous count of votes
7.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state-legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
7.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike. [Possible expert quote, or keep as our language]
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike. [Possible expert quote, or keep as our language]
7.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
In an expedited election contest, the central question is whether “it appears that a person other than the contestee has the highest number of legal votes.”[4] This question will be central to other forms of litigation over the election results as well, if a plaintiff is requesting a remedy such as annulling an election or certifying a different winner.
In an expedited election contest, the central question is whether “it appears that a person other than the contestee has the highest number of legal votes.”[4] This question will be central to other forms of litigation over the election results as well, if a plaintiff is requesting a remedy such as annulling an election or certifying a different winner.
- If a plaintiff brings credible and reliable evidence, and if they prove that the election result was wrong, then a court may annul the election and order a new one or may declare a different winner.
- If an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation that, if true, may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
- In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, including expedited election contests, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
Do the math.
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. If a plaintiff requests that a judge change an election result based on 1000 voters being improperly turned away from polling stations, but the election was won by over 2000 votes, the results of the election will stand even if the judge rules against the election authority.
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. If a plaintiff requests that a judge change an election result based on 1000 voters being improperly turned away from polling stations, but the election was won by over 2000 votes, the results of the election will stand even if the judge rules against the election authority.
QUESTION 8: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
8.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
A voter from one state attempts to challenge an election result in a different state.
A case brought on the theory that voting equipment could have been connected to the internet but provides no evidence that the equipment ever was, in fact, connected to the internet.
A challenge calls for overturning an election result with a margin of 10,000 votes based on evidence of errors only affecting one polling station of 100 voters.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Statement of a claim: There may be insufficient evidence to warrant a trial, or the allegations of the plaintiff may not even describe a violation of law.
A voter from one state attempts to challenge an election result in a different state.
A case brought on the theory that voting equipment could have been connected to the internet but provides no evidence that the equipment ever was, in fact, connected to the internet.
A challenge calls for overturning an election result with a margin of 10,000 votes based on evidence of errors only affecting one polling station of 100 voters.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
QUESTION 9: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
9.a. The timelines are tight.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections.[5] Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and that can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
9.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implications of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the contestants’ claims are so far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” to be able to translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections.[5] Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and that can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
9.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implications of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the contestants’ claims are so far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” to be able to translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Pillar 3 endnotes
[1] “A third party may not request a recount as a matter of right.” Arizona Secretary of State. (2023). Election Procedure Manual. (p.255)
[2] Arizona Revised Statutes § https://www.leg.gov/ars/16/00672.htm
[3] https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00678.htm
[4] “If in an election contest it appears that a person other than the contestee has the highest number of legal votes, the court shall declare that person elected and that the certificate of election of the person whose office is contested is of no further legal force or effect.” Arizona Revised Statutes § 16-676.
[5] The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021.
[2] Arizona Revised Statutes § https://www.leg.gov/ars/16/00672.htm
[3] https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00678.htm
[4] “If in an election contest it appears that a person other than the contestee has the highest number of legal votes, the court shall declare that person elected and that the certificate of election of the person whose office is contested is of no further legal force or effect.” Arizona Revised Statutes § 16-676.
[5] The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021.
Experts
To come
External Resources
To come