PENNSYLVANIA
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures governing elections in Pennsylvania.
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Title 25 of the Pennsylvania Unconsolidated Statutes are abbreviated "25 PS"
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Title 25 of the Pennsylvania Unconsolidated Statutes are abbreviated "25 PS"
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
QUESTION 1: Who can observe elections?
1.a. A hierarchy of institutions and officials oversee elections in Pennsylvania.
County Board of Elections: Pennsylvania elections are administered primarily at the county level. Each county has a county board of elections responsible for conducting elections within the county, including overseeing polling places, election equipment and election officers, canvassing returns, and certifying county results (25 PS §2641). In most counties, the elected county commissioners serve ex officio as the county board of elections, although Pennsylvania law and some county governance structures provide exceptions.
Poll Workers (District Election Board): Each election district has a district election board consisting of a judge of election, a majority inspector, and a minority inspector. These officials are generally elected to four-year terms, with the candidate receiving the highest number of votes becoming majority inspector and the candidate receiving the second-highest number becoming minority inspector (25 PS §2671). This structure can result in representation by different political parties on the district election board, although it is unusual in comparison to most states, where these tend to be appointed positions.
Observers: Candidates, political parties, and political bodies may appoint credentialed poll watchers to observe activity at polling places; candidates may appoint two watchers per election district while parties and political bodies may appoint three (25 PS §2687). Only one watcher from each candidate or party may be present during polling on Election Day and must stay outside of the enclosed space, but all watchers are permitted to attend the canvassing and other procedures conducted after polls close (25 PS §2687). During voting, watchers may challenge the qualifications of any person attempting to vote (25 PS §2687).
Pennsylvania law separately permits one authorized representative of each candidate and political party to observe the pre-canvass and canvass of absentee and mail-in ballots and provides observation rights during certain other county board proceedings (25 PS §3146.8).
1.b. Pennsylvania places few restrictions on who can serve as a poll watcher.
Who can observe: Poll watchers must be registered to vote in the county they are serving in and must be officially designated by the parties as documented by a certificate from the county election office (25 PS §2687). Pennsylvania does not explicitly provide other opportunities for nonpartisan observers or the public at large to view polling procedures. However, the general public may view the tabulation, audit, and other canvass proceedings at the county board (25 PS §3152, §3153).
Who cannot observe: Only registered voters with credentials proving their appointment can serve as a poll watcher. Candidates can appoint two poll watchers per district and parties can appoint three. However, only one of each is allowed in the polling location at a time (25 PS §2687). Similarly, each candidate and each party is allowed one “authorized representative” to observe canvassing procedures (25 PS §3146.8).
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll watchers.
Pennsylvania does not require poll watchers to complete state-mandated training before serving. Candidates and parties may provide training, and the Department of State publishes guidance explaining watchers' legal rights and restrictions.
Observers should understand their role and be familiar with election procedures so they can effectively represent the parties that appoint them. Appropriate training can also help ensure that observers accurately identify and credibly report potential problems. Parties have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand election procedures, the boundaries of their role, and the importance of observing without interfering with the election process.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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County Board of Elections: Pennsylvania elections are administered primarily at the county level. Each county has a county board of elections responsible for conducting elections within the county, including overseeing polling places, election equipment and election officers, canvassing returns, and certifying county results (25 PS §2641). In most counties, the elected county commissioners serve ex officio as the county board of elections, although Pennsylvania law and some county governance structures provide exceptions.
Poll Workers (District Election Board): Each election district has a district election board consisting of a judge of election, a majority inspector, and a minority inspector. These officials are generally elected to four-year terms, with the candidate receiving the highest number of votes becoming majority inspector and the candidate receiving the second-highest number becoming minority inspector (25 PS §2671). This structure can result in representation by different political parties on the district election board, although it is unusual in comparison to most states, where these tend to be appointed positions.
Observers: Candidates, political parties, and political bodies may appoint credentialed poll watchers to observe activity at polling places; candidates may appoint two watchers per election district while parties and political bodies may appoint three (25 PS §2687). Only one watcher from each candidate or party may be present during polling on Election Day and must stay outside of the enclosed space, but all watchers are permitted to attend the canvassing and other procedures conducted after polls close (25 PS §2687). During voting, watchers may challenge the qualifications of any person attempting to vote (25 PS §2687).
Pennsylvania law separately permits one authorized representative of each candidate and political party to observe the pre-canvass and canvass of absentee and mail-in ballots and provides observation rights during certain other county board proceedings (25 PS §3146.8).
1.b. Pennsylvania places few restrictions on who can serve as a poll watcher.
Who can observe: Poll watchers must be registered to vote in the county they are serving in and must be officially designated by the parties as documented by a certificate from the county election office (25 PS §2687). Pennsylvania does not explicitly provide other opportunities for nonpartisan observers or the public at large to view polling procedures. However, the general public may view the tabulation, audit, and other canvass proceedings at the county board (25 PS §3152, §3153).
Who cannot observe: Only registered voters with credentials proving their appointment can serve as a poll watcher. Candidates can appoint two poll watchers per district and parties can appoint three. However, only one of each is allowed in the polling location at a time (25 PS §2687). Similarly, each candidate and each party is allowed one “authorized representative” to observe canvassing procedures (25 PS §3146.8).
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll watchers.
Pennsylvania does not require poll watchers to complete state-mandated training before serving. Candidates and parties may provide training, and the Department of State publishes guidance explaining watchers' legal rights and restrictions.
Observers should understand their role and be familiar with election procedures so they can effectively represent the parties that appoint them. Appropriate training can also help ensure that observers accurately identify and credibly report potential problems. Parties have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand election procedures, the boundaries of their role, and the importance of observing without interfering with the election process.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election observers and the public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Pennsylvania provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Pennsylvania law provides public access to some election proceedings, including aspects of the county computation and canvass, but does not give nonpartisan observers the same comprehensive statutory status or access rights as credentialed poll watchers and authorized representatives (25 PS §3152, §3153).
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Pennsylvania provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Pennsylvania law provides public access to some election proceedings, including aspects of the county computation and canvass, but does not give nonpartisan observers the same comprehensive statutory status or access rights as credentialed poll watchers and authorized representatives (25 PS §3152, §3153).
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are poll watchers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to observation from party representatives.
Credentialed poll watchers may observe activity at polling places but they may not handle ballots, engage in campaigning, or interfere with the voting process (25 PS §2687). Candidates, parties, and political bodies also have observation rights during certain county board proceedings, while authorized representatives may observe the pre-canvass and canvass of absentee and mail-in ballots.
Credentialed poll watchers may observe activity at polling places but they may not handle ballots, engage in campaigning, or interfere with the voting process (25 PS §2687). Candidates, parties, and political bodies also have observation rights during certain county board proceedings, while authorized representatives may observe the pre-canvass and canvass of absentee and mail-in ballots.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance, including seal numbers on equipment, the number of ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 4: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
4.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before voting.
Pennsylvania counties differ in their methods for recording and tabulating votes (25 PS §3031.12). Some use hand-marked paper ballots, while others use ballot marking devices (BMDs), which are assistive devices like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator.
Regardless of which system is used, Pennsylvania performs rigorous testing of all voting machines (25 PS §3031.5). Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots was accurately recorded by each ballot marking device (BMD) and tabulated correctly by each scanner. This process is called “logic and accuracy” testing and is open to the public.
4.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
All voting machines are secured, sealed, and isolated from internet connections and external software. Under state law, inappropriately modifying voting equipment is a second-degree misdemeanor (25 PS §3518).
4.c. All votes cast create a paper record, available for audits or recounts.
Maintaining a verifiable paper trail, as all Pennsylvania counties do, is a recommended best practice for election administration. This paper trail allows officials to conduct post-election audits and recounts if there are concerns about the results. This requirement ensures that all votes cast in Pennsylvania have a physical paper backup, enhancing the security and verifiability of the election process.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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4.d. Equipment is certified by state authorities in compliance with federal standards.
Only pre-approved equipment can be used in elections, including electronic poll books and BMDs. Equipment must be certified by the Pennsylvania Department of State and comply with applicable federal standards (25 PS §3031.5). In addition, Pennsylvania voters may petition the state for a re-examination of certified voting machines (25 PS §3031.5).
Pennsylvania counties differ in their methods for recording and tabulating votes (25 PS §3031.12). Some use hand-marked paper ballots, while others use ballot marking devices (BMDs), which are assistive devices like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator.
Regardless of which system is used, Pennsylvania performs rigorous testing of all voting machines (25 PS §3031.5). Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots was accurately recorded by each ballot marking device (BMD) and tabulated correctly by each scanner. This process is called “logic and accuracy” testing and is open to the public.
4.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
All voting machines are secured, sealed, and isolated from internet connections and external software. Under state law, inappropriately modifying voting equipment is a second-degree misdemeanor (25 PS §3518).
4.c. All votes cast create a paper record, available for audits or recounts.
Maintaining a verifiable paper trail, as all Pennsylvania counties do, is a recommended best practice for election administration. This paper trail allows officials to conduct post-election audits and recounts if there are concerns about the results. This requirement ensures that all votes cast in Pennsylvania have a physical paper backup, enhancing the security and verifiability of the election process.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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4.d. Equipment is certified by state authorities in compliance with federal standards.
Only pre-approved equipment can be used in elections, including electronic poll books and BMDs. Equipment must be certified by the Pennsylvania Department of State and comply with applicable federal standards (25 PS §3031.5). In addition, Pennsylvania voters may petition the state for a re-examination of certified voting machines (25 PS §3031.5).
QUESTION 5: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
5.a. Pennsylvania officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Pennsylvania, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Pennsylvania is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, Pennsylvania's 67 county election offices maintain voter registration records through the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors (SURE) (25 PS §3150.1). Counties update voter records throughout the year using information about changes of address, deaths, and other changes in eligibility.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
Pennsylvania residents can check their registration status online, ensuring they can vote on Election Day.
A challenge that Pennsylvania, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Pennsylvania is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, Pennsylvania's 67 county election offices maintain voter registration records through the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors (SURE) (25 PS §3150.1). Counties update voter records throughout the year using information about changes of address, deaths, and other changes in eligibility.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
Pennsylvania residents can check their registration status online, ensuring they can vote on Election Day.
QUESTION 6: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
6.a. Pennsylvania officials cannot process early ballots until Election Day.
County boards may begin pre-canvassing absentee and mail-in ballots at 7 a.m. on Election Day (25 PS §3146.8). Results from that pre-canvass may not be disclosed before polls close. Because Pennsylvania counties cannot begin this work before Election Day, reporting complete unofficial mail-ballot results can take longer than in states that permit pre-election processing.
6.b. The initial results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
Local election officials conduct at least two sets of audits after polls close and before certification.
First, Pennsylvania counties conduct a statutorily required statistical recount after every election. The county board reviews a random sample of at least 2% of the votes cast or 2,000 votes, whichever is fewer, using a type of counting device different from the one used for the original tabulation (25 PS §3031.17).
Second, the state conducts a risk-limiting audit on a set of randomly selected races. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) use statistical methods to examine a random sample of ballots statewide to test whether the reported outcome is supported by the paper record. In RLAs, officials compare a random sample of votes cast across the state in one or more races to the actual results to affirm the accuracy of the initial outcome. Pennsylvania’s RLAs must be completed before counties canvass and certify the results, and no later than the third Monday after the election.
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. Pennsylvania’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. Georgia and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
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CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods.
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6.d. Pennsylvania certification cannot happen until all audits and recounts are complete.
Votes are recorded, audited, and recounted on the county level (25 PS §3154). County boards transmit unofficial returns to the Department of State by the Tuesday following the election; they then continue their canvass and address any recount requests, but must certify the results within five days, or no later than the third Monday after the election (25 PS §3154). The Secretary of the Commonwealth must then proceed to tabulate, canvass, and certify the results (25 PS §3159).
6.e. Nearly anyone who suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns can request recounts.
Recounts may happen in a number of scenarios. First, a partial recount must be done within election districts (precincts) if it appears there is a discrepancy in the returns that cannot be resolved. The county board is also legally allowed to order a partial district-level or full recount “of its own motion”(25 PS §3154).
Second, three qualified electors of an election district may petition for a judicial recount or recanvass under the Election Code. Judicial recount petitions are time-limited: they generally must be filed within five days after completion of the county's computational canvass and before certification if the recount is to affect the official returns (25 PS §3261, §3262, §3263).
Finally, the Secretary of the Commonwealth must order an automatic recount for any statewide races with a winning margin of 0.5% or less (25 PS §3154).
The use of automatic recounts for any statewide race with a close margin is a best practice that provides voters with assurance that recounts will happen where they matter the most.
These rules are in place to ensure that any discrepancies are found and investigated and do not occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election. Errors in tabulation identified by recounts are, in general, documented in the official record and corrected prior to certification of the results.
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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County boards may begin pre-canvassing absentee and mail-in ballots at 7 a.m. on Election Day (25 PS §3146.8). Results from that pre-canvass may not be disclosed before polls close. Because Pennsylvania counties cannot begin this work before Election Day, reporting complete unofficial mail-ballot results can take longer than in states that permit pre-election processing.
6.b. The initial results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
Local election officials conduct at least two sets of audits after polls close and before certification.
First, Pennsylvania counties conduct a statutorily required statistical recount after every election. The county board reviews a random sample of at least 2% of the votes cast or 2,000 votes, whichever is fewer, using a type of counting device different from the one used for the original tabulation (25 PS §3031.17).
Second, the state conducts a risk-limiting audit on a set of randomly selected races. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) use statistical methods to examine a random sample of ballots statewide to test whether the reported outcome is supported by the paper record. In RLAs, officials compare a random sample of votes cast across the state in one or more races to the actual results to affirm the accuracy of the initial outcome. Pennsylvania’s RLAs must be completed before counties canvass and certify the results, and no later than the third Monday after the election.
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. Pennsylvania’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. Georgia and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
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CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods.
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6.d. Pennsylvania certification cannot happen until all audits and recounts are complete.
Votes are recorded, audited, and recounted on the county level (25 PS §3154). County boards transmit unofficial returns to the Department of State by the Tuesday following the election; they then continue their canvass and address any recount requests, but must certify the results within five days, or no later than the third Monday after the election (25 PS §3154). The Secretary of the Commonwealth must then proceed to tabulate, canvass, and certify the results (25 PS §3159).
6.e. Nearly anyone who suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns can request recounts.
Recounts may happen in a number of scenarios. First, a partial recount must be done within election districts (precincts) if it appears there is a discrepancy in the returns that cannot be resolved. The county board is also legally allowed to order a partial district-level or full recount “of its own motion”(25 PS §3154).
Second, three qualified electors of an election district may petition for a judicial recount or recanvass under the Election Code. Judicial recount petitions are time-limited: they generally must be filed within five days after completion of the county's computational canvass and before certification if the recount is to affect the official returns (25 PS §3261, §3262, §3263).
Finally, the Secretary of the Commonwealth must order an automatic recount for any statewide races with a winning margin of 0.5% or less (25 PS §3154).
The use of automatic recounts for any statewide race with a close margin is a best practice that provides voters with assurance that recounts will happen where they matter the most.
These rules are in place to ensure that any discrepancies are found and investigated and do not occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election. Errors in tabulation identified by recounts are, in general, documented in the official record and corrected prior to certification of the results.
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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QUESTION 7: Who certifies results in Pennsylvania, and what issues have arisen around certification?
7.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In Pennsylvania, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of county boards of elections, which in most of the state consist of the three county commissioners, who are elected every four years in partisan elections. County commissioners have broad administrative responsibilities in addition to their election duties.
During certification, the boards of election receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information and affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. The boards are required to “tabulate the figures for the entire county and sign, announce and attest the same” (25 PS §3154). County-level certification must be completed 12 days after the election; in cases with recounts or court challenges, certification may be delayed no later than the third Monday after the election.
State level certification is the responsibility of the secretary of the commonwealth, who, upon receiving the certified results from the county boards, “shall forthwith proceed to tabulate, compute and canvass the votes cast for all candidates” (25 PS §3159).
7.b. Certifying results is ministerial, a non-discretionary, required function.
Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly described county boards' duties under the Election Code as ministerial rather than discretionary. In 2005, the Commonwealth Court found that a board's Election Code duties “are ministerial and allow for no exercise of discretion,” relying on an earlier Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision reaching the same conclusion.
If a county board or the secretary of the commonwealth refused to certify, a court can mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
The duty to certify does not prevent county boards from performing the review that the Election Code expressly requires. If the county board identifies specified discrepancies during the canvass, it is authorized to investigate records, examine election materials, conduct a recount or recanvass where appropriate, and correct returns before certification (25 PS §3154).
7.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Pennsylvania have refused to certify results.
In several Pennsylvania counties following recent elections, individual county board members voted against certification. In some instances they were outvoted; in others, litigation was used to enforce the board's statutory certification obligations.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
7.d. Pennsylvania law provides other means to address challenges and concerns about the accuracy of results.
Candidates, political parties, voters, and other parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results in state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and applicable law. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Pennsylvania law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the state and county boards of canvassers may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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In Pennsylvania, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of county boards of elections, which in most of the state consist of the three county commissioners, who are elected every four years in partisan elections. County commissioners have broad administrative responsibilities in addition to their election duties.
During certification, the boards of election receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information and affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. The boards are required to “tabulate the figures for the entire county and sign, announce and attest the same” (25 PS §3154). County-level certification must be completed 12 days after the election; in cases with recounts or court challenges, certification may be delayed no later than the third Monday after the election.
State level certification is the responsibility of the secretary of the commonwealth, who, upon receiving the certified results from the county boards, “shall forthwith proceed to tabulate, compute and canvass the votes cast for all candidates” (25 PS §3159).
7.b. Certifying results is ministerial, a non-discretionary, required function.
Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly described county boards' duties under the Election Code as ministerial rather than discretionary. In 2005, the Commonwealth Court found that a board's Election Code duties “are ministerial and allow for no exercise of discretion,” relying on an earlier Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision reaching the same conclusion.
If a county board or the secretary of the commonwealth refused to certify, a court can mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
The duty to certify does not prevent county boards from performing the review that the Election Code expressly requires. If the county board identifies specified discrepancies during the canvass, it is authorized to investigate records, examine election materials, conduct a recount or recanvass where appropriate, and correct returns before certification (25 PS §3154).
7.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Pennsylvania have refused to certify results.
In several Pennsylvania counties following recent elections, individual county board members voted against certification. In some instances they were outvoted; in others, litigation was used to enforce the board's statutory certification obligations.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
7.d. Pennsylvania law provides other means to address challenges and concerns about the accuracy of results.
Candidates, political parties, voters, and other parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results in state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and applicable law. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Pennsylvania law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the state and county boards of canvassers may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
———--
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming the results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
QUESTION 8: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
8.a. In addition to requesting a recount, voters in Pennsylvania can challenge an election through the court system.
Candidates, voters, and other eligible parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results through state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and the applicable law.
Additionally, as described in Question 6e, Pennsylvania law provides a specific process for a group of three voters to request a recount.
8.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest some election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court. Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that do not affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
Candidates, voters, and other eligible parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results through state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and the applicable law.
Additionally, as described in Question 6e, Pennsylvania law provides a specific process for a group of three voters to request a recount.
8.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest some election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court. Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that do not affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 9: What is required of plaintiffs, and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
9.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
9.b. To utilize Pennsylvania’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must attest to their belief that illegal activity occurred.
In Pennsylvania, the process and requirements for an expedited contest depend on the office involved (25 PS §3291).
To contest the outcome of statewide races, 100 individuals who voted in the race can submit a petition to a local chief judge (25 PS §3351). To contest the outcome of the races for Representatives in Congress and for Senators and Representatives in the General Assembly, 20 voters registered in the district can petition the Court of Common Pleas of the county where the winner lives (25 PS §3402).
In both cases, petitions must be filed within 20 days after the election (25 PS §3456). At least five petitioners must verify the petition as required by the Election Code, including attesting to their belief that the election was illegal or the return incorrect and that the contest is brought in good faith (25 PS §3457). Petitioners must also provide a bond covering the estimated cost of the contest (25 PS §3459), which is owed to the state if it’s determined that the complaint does not have probable cause (25 PS §3469).
Hearings in contested cases must start within 30 days of the petitions being received (25 PS §3460).
9.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
9.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
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CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
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9.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
In an expedited election contest, the court's task is to determine which candidate received the greatest number of legal votes and is entitled to the nomination or office. If the evidence establishes that a different candidate received the greatest number of legal votes, the court may declare that candidate the winner (25 PS §3352).
Pennsylvania law also provides circumstances in which a court may declare a nomination or election invalid rather than determine a different winner (25 PS §3472).
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
———--
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
9.b. To utilize Pennsylvania’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must attest to their belief that illegal activity occurred.
In Pennsylvania, the process and requirements for an expedited contest depend on the office involved (25 PS §3291).
To contest the outcome of statewide races, 100 individuals who voted in the race can submit a petition to a local chief judge (25 PS §3351). To contest the outcome of the races for Representatives in Congress and for Senators and Representatives in the General Assembly, 20 voters registered in the district can petition the Court of Common Pleas of the county where the winner lives (25 PS §3402).
In both cases, petitions must be filed within 20 days after the election (25 PS §3456). At least five petitioners must verify the petition as required by the Election Code, including attesting to their belief that the election was illegal or the return incorrect and that the contest is brought in good faith (25 PS §3457). Petitioners must also provide a bond covering the estimated cost of the contest (25 PS §3459), which is owed to the state if it’s determined that the complaint does not have probable cause (25 PS §3469).
Hearings in contested cases must start within 30 days of the petitions being received (25 PS §3460).
9.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
9.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
———--
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
———--
9.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
In an expedited election contest, the court's task is to determine which candidate received the greatest number of legal votes and is entitled to the nomination or office. If the evidence establishes that a different candidate received the greatest number of legal votes, the court may declare that candidate the winner (25 PS §3352).
Pennsylvania law also provides circumstances in which a court may declare a nomination or election invalid rather than determine a different winner (25 PS §3472).
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
———--
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
———--
QUESTION 10: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
10.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Failure to State a Claim: The plaintiff’s allegations may not contain a legally recognizable claim that can be adjudicated by the courts.
- Unreasonable Delays (also known as "Laches"): A case may be dismissed if a party unreasonably delays bringing it, and if that delay causes prejudice.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
QUESTION 12: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
11.a. The timelines are tight.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
11.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
11.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Timeline of Pennsylvania Election Procedures
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
Department of State Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice.
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
Department of State Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice.
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Date |
Election Activity |
11/3/26 |
Election Day |
11/9/26 |
Deadline to verify identification for absentee ballot. |
11/10/26 |
Deadline for County Boards of Elections to submit unofficial resyuts for statewde races to Secretary of the Commonwealth. |
11/12/26 |
Deadline for Secretary of the Commonwealth to order any required statewide recounts. |
11/23/26 |
Deadline for group of three voters to request recount in their district. (There is no deadline for completion.) |
11/23/26 |
Deadline for County Boards of Elections to finalize canvass and certify results. |
11/24/26 |
Deadline for any required statewide recount to be completed. |
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
