NORTH CAROLINA
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures governing elections in North Carolina.
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Chapter 163 of the North Carolina General Statutes are abbreviated "NCGS"
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Chapter 163 of the North Carolina General Statutes are abbreviated "NCGS"
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
QUESTION 1: What are the roles of election boards, poll workers, and observers?
1.a. A hierarchy of institutions and officials oversee elections in North Carolina.
State Board of Elections: The State Board of Elections has general authority over elections, including overseeing the work of local officials, investigating election matters, and adopting rules and regulations. The five-member State Board is appointed by the State Auditor from lists of nominees submitted by the chairs of the two political parties with the highest number of registered affiliates (NCGS §163-19). No more than three members may belong to the same political party.
County Boards of Elections: County boards oversee election administration within each county and certify county election results. Each board consists of five registered voters from the county. Four members are appointed by the State Board of Elections—two from each of the two political parties with the highest number of registered members—and the State Auditor appoints the fifth member, who serves as chair (NCGS §163-30).
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CONTEXT: State and County Board Composition
North Carolina changed the appointment structure of its election boards after the 2024 election. Under legislation enacted in 2024, the State Auditor—not the Governor—now appoints the five members of the State Board of Elections and the chairs of county boards. The new structure took effect in 2025 and has been the subject of litigation.
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Precinct Officials: Precinct Officials are poll workers appointed by county election boards. In each precinct, there is one chief judge and two judges who oversee operations; only one judge in each precinct can belong to the same political party as the chief judge (NCGS §163-41). The judges maintain the voter registration list at the polling place, consider challenges to voter eligibility, and count the votes cast in the precinct (NCGS §163-47). Assistants who support the judges are appointed by the county election board on recommendation of each party chair in the county (NCGS §163-42).
Observers: Observers are designated representatives of the political parties who may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes (NCGS §163-45.1). Parties with a candidate on the ballot can designate up to two observers per precinct and ten at-large observers across the county. State party leadership can also designate 100 observers statewide. However, there may only be three observers from the same party physically present at a precinct at the same time. Unaffiliated candidates may also designate two observers per precinct.
1.b. North Carolina places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan poll observer.
Who can observe: Observers appointed by the county party chair must be registered voters in the county; observers appointed by the state party must be registered voters in the state.
Who cannot observe: Candidates and election officials may not serve as observers (NCGS §163-45.1). Beyond the statutory requirements for appointment, North Carolina places relatively few restrictions on who may serve as an observer. For example, state law does not prohibit family members of candidates from serving as observers. County boards of elections and chief judges may, however, challenge an observer’s appointment for “good cause,” including evidence that the observer could affect the conduct of the election.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll observers.
North Carolina does not require training to become a poll observer. However, observers should understand their role and be familiar with election procedures so they can effectively represent the parties that appoint them. Appropriate training can also help ensure that observers accurately identify and credibly report potential problems.
In some states, the state election department supports observer training. Regardless of state requirements, parties have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand election procedures, the boundaries of their role, and the importance of observing without interfering with the election process.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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State Board of Elections: The State Board of Elections has general authority over elections, including overseeing the work of local officials, investigating election matters, and adopting rules and regulations. The five-member State Board is appointed by the State Auditor from lists of nominees submitted by the chairs of the two political parties with the highest number of registered affiliates (NCGS §163-19). No more than three members may belong to the same political party.
County Boards of Elections: County boards oversee election administration within each county and certify county election results. Each board consists of five registered voters from the county. Four members are appointed by the State Board of Elections—two from each of the two political parties with the highest number of registered members—and the State Auditor appoints the fifth member, who serves as chair (NCGS §163-30).
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CONTEXT: State and County Board Composition
North Carolina changed the appointment structure of its election boards after the 2024 election. Under legislation enacted in 2024, the State Auditor—not the Governor—now appoints the five members of the State Board of Elections and the chairs of county boards. The new structure took effect in 2025 and has been the subject of litigation.
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Precinct Officials: Precinct Officials are poll workers appointed by county election boards. In each precinct, there is one chief judge and two judges who oversee operations; only one judge in each precinct can belong to the same political party as the chief judge (NCGS §163-41). The judges maintain the voter registration list at the polling place, consider challenges to voter eligibility, and count the votes cast in the precinct (NCGS §163-47). Assistants who support the judges are appointed by the county election board on recommendation of each party chair in the county (NCGS §163-42).
Observers: Observers are designated representatives of the political parties who may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes (NCGS §163-45.1). Parties with a candidate on the ballot can designate up to two observers per precinct and ten at-large observers across the county. State party leadership can also designate 100 observers statewide. However, there may only be three observers from the same party physically present at a precinct at the same time. Unaffiliated candidates may also designate two observers per precinct.
1.b. North Carolina places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan poll observer.
Who can observe: Observers appointed by the county party chair must be registered voters in the county; observers appointed by the state party must be registered voters in the state.
Who cannot observe: Candidates and election officials may not serve as observers (NCGS §163-45.1). Beyond the statutory requirements for appointment, North Carolina places relatively few restrictions on who may serve as an observer. For example, state law does not prohibit family members of candidates from serving as observers. County boards of elections and chief judges may, however, challenge an observer’s appointment for “good cause,” including evidence that the observer could affect the conduct of the election.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll observers.
North Carolina does not require training to become a poll observer. However, observers should understand their role and be familiar with election procedures so they can effectively represent the parties that appoint them. Appropriate training can also help ensure that observers accurately identify and credibly report potential problems.
In some states, the state election department supports observer training. Regardless of state requirements, parties have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand election procedures, the boundaries of their role, and the importance of observing without interfering with the election process.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election monitors or the general public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. North Carolina provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
North Carolina does not provide a general right for nonpartisan monitors or members of the public to observe voting from inside polling places. Only observers appointed by political parties may enter polling places for that purpose. Other election procedures, including canvasses, audits, and recounts, provide opportunities for public observation.
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. North Carolina provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
North Carolina does not provide a general right for nonpartisan monitors or members of the public to observe voting from inside polling places. Only observers appointed by political parties may enter polling places for that purpose. Other election procedures, including canvasses, audits, and recounts, provide opportunities for public observation.
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are poll observers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to political party observation.
Observers may move around the voting place to observe the voting process, take notes, listen to non-private conversations between voters and election officials, observe curbside voting, and witness opening and closing procedures (NCGS §163-45.1). They may not interfere with voters or election officials, compromise ballot secrecy, engage in electioneering, or make audio or video recordings while voting is underway. Observers who engage in prohibited behaviors may be removed by the chief judge.
Observers may move around the voting place to observe the voting process, take notes, listen to non-private conversations between voters and election officials, observe curbside voting, and witness opening and closing procedures (NCGS §163-45.1). They may not interfere with voters or election officials, compromise ballot secrecy, engage in electioneering, or make audio or video recordings while voting is underway. Observers who engage in prohibited behaviors may be removed by the chief judge.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance, including seal numbers on equipment, the number of ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 4: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
4.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before voting.
Vote counting in North Carolina is generally done with scanners that read voters’ electronic or hand-marked ballots and total the votes when the ballots are entered. Absentee ballots that are mailed or submitted at voting centers are scanned under the supervision of the county board of elections and in a location viewable by the public.
Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated by a randomly sampled set of scanners (NCGS §163-33.2). This process is called “logic and accuracy” testing and can be observed by the public. North Carolina’s pre-election equipment testing, combined with post-election audits, recounts, and other procedures, is designed to catch errors before election results are finalized.
4.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Tabulation and other voting equipment must be physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections and internet connections (NCGS §163-165.7).
4.c. Any electronic devices used must produce a paper record, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
According to Verified Voting, two types of ballots are used in North Carolina: hand-marked paper ballots and electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs). State law permits county authorities to decide which type of ballot to use (NCGS §163-165.8). Approximately 85% of registered voters live in counties that primarily use hand-marked ballots on Election Day; in most counties, the use of BMDs on Election Day is limited to voters with disabilities.
Maintaining a verifiable paper trail, as all North Carolina counties do, is required by law and is considered a best practice for election administration (NCGS §163-165.7). Having a paper trail allows officials to audit or recount the ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
North Carolina’s State Board of Elections maintains a directory of Election Day voting equipment used in each county.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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4.d. Equipment is certified by the State Board of Elections.
Only voting systems certified by the State Board of Elections may be used in North Carolina elections (NCGS §163-165.7). State law requires certified systems to comply with applicable federal requirements, and electronic poll books are subject to a separate State Board certification process. Counties select their voting systems from those approved by the State Board: the county board of elections recommends a system after required demonstrations and testing, and the county board of commissioners approves its acquisition (NCGS §163-165.9).
Vote counting in North Carolina is generally done with scanners that read voters’ electronic or hand-marked ballots and total the votes when the ballots are entered. Absentee ballots that are mailed or submitted at voting centers are scanned under the supervision of the county board of elections and in a location viewable by the public.
Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated by a randomly sampled set of scanners (NCGS §163-33.2). This process is called “logic and accuracy” testing and can be observed by the public. North Carolina’s pre-election equipment testing, combined with post-election audits, recounts, and other procedures, is designed to catch errors before election results are finalized.
4.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Tabulation and other voting equipment must be physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections and internet connections (NCGS §163-165.7).
4.c. Any electronic devices used must produce a paper record, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
According to Verified Voting, two types of ballots are used in North Carolina: hand-marked paper ballots and electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs). State law permits county authorities to decide which type of ballot to use (NCGS §163-165.8). Approximately 85% of registered voters live in counties that primarily use hand-marked ballots on Election Day; in most counties, the use of BMDs on Election Day is limited to voters with disabilities.
Maintaining a verifiable paper trail, as all North Carolina counties do, is required by law and is considered a best practice for election administration (NCGS §163-165.7). Having a paper trail allows officials to audit or recount the ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
North Carolina’s State Board of Elections maintains a directory of Election Day voting equipment used in each county.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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4.d. Equipment is certified by the State Board of Elections.
Only voting systems certified by the State Board of Elections may be used in North Carolina elections (NCGS §163-165.7). State law requires certified systems to comply with applicable federal requirements, and electronic poll books are subject to a separate State Board certification process. Counties select their voting systems from those approved by the State Board: the county board of elections recommends a system after required demonstrations and testing, and the county board of commissioners approves its acquisition (NCGS §163-165.9).
QUESTION 5: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
5.a. Voters must show photo identification when voting in person.
North Carolina voters are asked to show an acceptable photo ID when voting in person (NCGS §163-166.16). A voter who does not have an acceptable ID at the polls may cast a provisional ballot on Election Day and present acceptable identification to the county board of elections by noon on the fifth business day after Election Day. State law recognizes several exceptions to the photo-ID requirement, including certain religious objections, reasonable impediments, and qualifying natural disasters.
5.b. Vote by mail requires a photo ID.
In North Carolina, most voters must provide a copy of a photo ID to vote by mail and must also include the signatures of two witnesses or a notary (NCGS §163-230.1). Ballots can be mailed or returned at the voter’s county election office or early voting site (NCGS §163-231).
5.c. North Carolina officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that North Carolina, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
Voter registration is cross-referenced with state and national databases, including the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles. North Carolina does not participate in the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states.
5.d. North Carolina law prohibits registration by noncitizens.
To vote in North Carolina, a person must be a U.S. citizen and generally must have resided in the county where they are registering for at least 30 days before Election Day (NCGS §163-55).
Registrants must assert their citizenship status and other qualifications on the signed application form. Making false statements on a registration form in order to become registered to vote is a felony under state law (NCGS §163-275). Federal law separately makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
5.e. North Carolina allows challenges to voter eligibility.
North Carolina law allows registered voters to challenge another voter’s eligibility in the same county (NCGS §163-85; §163-87; §163-89). Challenges may be made before an election through the county board of elections, when a voter appears to vote during early voting or on Election Day, or against a voter’s absentee ballot. Pre-election challenges must be submitted separately, in writing and under oath, and the challenger bears the burden of proof. Challenges must be based on grounds specified in law, such as the voter’s residency, age, citizenship, or felony status (NCGS §163-85). Separate procedures and deadlines apply to challenges made during voting and to absentee ballots.
North Carolina voters are asked to show an acceptable photo ID when voting in person (NCGS §163-166.16). A voter who does not have an acceptable ID at the polls may cast a provisional ballot on Election Day and present acceptable identification to the county board of elections by noon on the fifth business day after Election Day. State law recognizes several exceptions to the photo-ID requirement, including certain religious objections, reasonable impediments, and qualifying natural disasters.
5.b. Vote by mail requires a photo ID.
In North Carolina, most voters must provide a copy of a photo ID to vote by mail and must also include the signatures of two witnesses or a notary (NCGS §163-230.1). Ballots can be mailed or returned at the voter’s county election office or early voting site (NCGS §163-231).
5.c. North Carolina officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that North Carolina, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
Voter registration is cross-referenced with state and national databases, including the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles. North Carolina does not participate in the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states.
5.d. North Carolina law prohibits registration by noncitizens.
To vote in North Carolina, a person must be a U.S. citizen and generally must have resided in the county where they are registering for at least 30 days before Election Day (NCGS §163-55).
Registrants must assert their citizenship status and other qualifications on the signed application form. Making false statements on a registration form in order to become registered to vote is a felony under state law (NCGS §163-275). Federal law separately makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
5.e. North Carolina allows challenges to voter eligibility.
North Carolina law allows registered voters to challenge another voter’s eligibility in the same county (NCGS §163-85; §163-87; §163-89). Challenges may be made before an election through the county board of elections, when a voter appears to vote during early voting or on Election Day, or against a voter’s absentee ballot. Pre-election challenges must be submitted separately, in writing and under oath, and the challenger bears the burden of proof. Challenges must be based on grounds specified in law, such as the voter’s residency, age, citizenship, or felony status (NCGS §163-85). Separate procedures and deadlines apply to challenges made during voting and to absentee ballots.
QUESTION 6: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
6.a. North Carolina officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
North Carolina allows election officials to process mailed ballots before Election Day, including opening approved ballot envelopes and scanning ballots without producing vote totals. Counties begin counting these ballots on Election Day at a time between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. established in advance by the county board of elections, but results cannot be revealed until the polls close (NCGS §163-234, as amended by S.L. 2026-60). Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan them before Election Day is a best practice that greatly improves officials’ ability to provide timely unofficial results.
6.b. The initial results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
The day after the polls close, the State Board of Elections publicly selects two groups of ballots in each county for a sample hand-to-eye audit of a designated contest (NCGS §163-182.1). The groups may consist of all ballots cast at an Election Day precinct, an early voting site, or the county’s absentee-by-mail ballots. The audit covers the statewide race at the top of the ticket. Bipartisan teams hand count the ballots and compare the results with the machine-tabulated totals. Each county reports the hand and machine counts to the State Board and explains any discrepancies. State law requires the sample units to be randomly selected and requires a complete hand-to-eye count if a significant discrepancy is found (NCGS §163-182.1).
Election night results remain unofficial until the canvass process is complete. County boards of elections must complete their canvass at 11 a.m. on the tenth day after the election, and must review the sample hand-to-eye audit as part of that process (NCGS §163-182.5). The State Board conducts its canvass on the third Tuesday after Election Day.
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. North Carolina’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. North Carolina and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
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CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods.
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6.d. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the process of determining that votes have been counted and tabulated correctly and authenticating the official results (NCGS §163-182.5). County boards generally meet on the tenth day after the election. The State Board meets on the Tuesday three weeks after Election Day to canvass contests within its jurisdiction.
6.e. Candidates in close elections can request recounts.
The recount option applies to elections for most offices and ensures that close races, where wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern, are closely checked. Both the county and state boards may at their discretion conduct a full recount of any race prior to completing their canvass of the election (NCGS §163-182.7).
After the canvass has taken place, the runner-up in a close election may request a recount. Recounts may be requested under several conditions (NCGS §163-182.7):
These procedures are in place to ensure that if any errors in the original vote count occurred, they did not happen on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election.
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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6.f. Any registered voter can protest the results of the election.
Separate from a recount, state law allows anyone registered to vote to protest the results of a race that appeared on their ballot (NCGS §163-182.9). The protester must make specific allegations regarding a defect in the way votes were counted or results tabulated, or an allegation regarding a violation of election law, irregularity, or misconduct so significant as to potentially cast doubt on the results (NCGS §163-182.10). Protests over vote counting and tabulation typically must be submitted before the county board canvasses the results, while other protests may be filed two days after completion of the canvass by 5 p.m. (NCGS §163-182.9). Protests are heard by county boards and can be appealed to the state board (NCGS §163-182.10; §163-182.11). If they agree with the protest, the county and state boards have discretion in how to respond, including ordering a recount or changing the outcome of the election.
In addition, any losing candidate in a race for a state executive office (i.e., “Council of State”) can challenge the qualifications of the winner or the validity of the election results by bringing a formal contest directly to the North Carolina General Assembly (NCGS §163-182.13A).
North Carolina allows election officials to process mailed ballots before Election Day, including opening approved ballot envelopes and scanning ballots without producing vote totals. Counties begin counting these ballots on Election Day at a time between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. established in advance by the county board of elections, but results cannot be revealed until the polls close (NCGS §163-234, as amended by S.L. 2026-60). Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan them before Election Day is a best practice that greatly improves officials’ ability to provide timely unofficial results.
6.b. The initial results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
The day after the polls close, the State Board of Elections publicly selects two groups of ballots in each county for a sample hand-to-eye audit of a designated contest (NCGS §163-182.1). The groups may consist of all ballots cast at an Election Day precinct, an early voting site, or the county’s absentee-by-mail ballots. The audit covers the statewide race at the top of the ticket. Bipartisan teams hand count the ballots and compare the results with the machine-tabulated totals. Each county reports the hand and machine counts to the State Board and explains any discrepancies. State law requires the sample units to be randomly selected and requires a complete hand-to-eye count if a significant discrepancy is found (NCGS §163-182.1).
Election night results remain unofficial until the canvass process is complete. County boards of elections must complete their canvass at 11 a.m. on the tenth day after the election, and must review the sample hand-to-eye audit as part of that process (NCGS §163-182.5). The State Board conducts its canvass on the third Tuesday after Election Day.
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. North Carolina’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. North Carolina and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
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CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods.
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6.d. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the process of determining that votes have been counted and tabulated correctly and authenticating the official results (NCGS §163-182.5). County boards generally meet on the tenth day after the election. The State Board meets on the Tuesday three weeks after Election Day to canvass contests within its jurisdiction.
6.e. Candidates in close elections can request recounts.
The recount option applies to elections for most offices and ensures that close races, where wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern, are closely checked. Both the county and state boards may at their discretion conduct a full recount of any race prior to completing their canvass of the election (NCGS §163-182.7).
After the canvass has taken place, the runner-up in a close election may request a recount. Recounts may be requested under several conditions (NCGS §163-182.7):
- For races under the county board’s jurisdiction, recounts may be requested if the winning margin is less than 1%; recount requests must be made by 5 p.m. on the first business day after completion of the county canvass.
- For nonstatewide races under the state board’s jurisdiction, recounts may be requested if the winning margin is less than 1%; recount requests must be made by noon on the second business day after completion of the county canvass.
- For statewide races under the state board’s jurisdiction, recounts may be requested if the winning margin is less than 0.5% or 10,000 votes, whichever is less; recount requests must be made by noon on the second business day after completion of the county canvass.
These procedures are in place to ensure that if any errors in the original vote count occurred, they did not happen on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election.
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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6.f. Any registered voter can protest the results of the election.
Separate from a recount, state law allows anyone registered to vote to protest the results of a race that appeared on their ballot (NCGS §163-182.9). The protester must make specific allegations regarding a defect in the way votes were counted or results tabulated, or an allegation regarding a violation of election law, irregularity, or misconduct so significant as to potentially cast doubt on the results (NCGS §163-182.10). Protests over vote counting and tabulation typically must be submitted before the county board canvasses the results, while other protests may be filed two days after completion of the canvass by 5 p.m. (NCGS §163-182.9). Protests are heard by county boards and can be appealed to the state board (NCGS §163-182.10; §163-182.11). If they agree with the protest, the county and state boards have discretion in how to respond, including ordering a recount or changing the outcome of the election.
In addition, any losing candidate in a race for a state executive office (i.e., “Council of State”) can challenge the qualifications of the winner or the validity of the election results by bringing a formal contest directly to the North Carolina General Assembly (NCGS §163-182.13A).
QUESTION 7: Who certifies results in North Carolina, and what issues have arisen around certification?
7.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In North Carolina, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the county boards of election, entities that have broad election responsibilities and have no other county administrative roles. The boards are composed of five members: two from each major party appointed by the State Board of Elections and a fifth member appointed by the State Auditor (NCGS §163-30).
The boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials and “authenticate the count in every ballot item in the county by determining that the votes have been counted and tabulated correctly” (NCGS §163-182.5). The canvass and certification take place on the tenth day after the election, or a “reasonable time thereafter” if the initial counting of all votes has not been completed in time (NCGS §163-182.5).
The canvass reports of the county boards are transmitted to the State Board of Elections, which is composed of five members appointed by the State Auditor from lists of nominees submitted by the two largest parties. The State Board meets on the Tuesday three weeks after the election to likewise “authenticate the count in every ballot item” of elections under its jurisdiction and “issue certificates of nomination and election” (NCGS §163-182.4).
7.b. The canvassing process includes powers of review, including conducting hearings of claims regarding results.
North Carolina is unusual among states in that it gives significant roles to county boards of elections to consider potential irregularities and concerns regarding elections. State law provides that the county boards have the “authority to send for papers and persons and to examine them and pass upon the legality of disputed ballots” (NCGS §163-182.5).
County boards may also conduct hearings regarding challenges (called “protests” in North Carolina law) about the “manner in which the votes were counted or the results tabulated” (NCGS §163-182.10). In conducting these hearings, the boards can subpoena witnesses or documents. The county boards can conclude that the canvass must be corrected and new results declared. County board rulings are appealable to the State Board of Elections (NCGS §163-182.11).
The county boards operate under “expansive supervisory authority” of the State Board. The State Board “may intervene and take jurisdiction over protests pending before a county board” (NCGS §163-182.12). Consideration by the boards of any protest “shall not delay the completion of the canvass for more than three days unless approved by the State Board of Elections” and “shall not delay the canvass of ballot items unaffected by the protest” (NCGS §163-182.10).
7.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in North Carolina have refused to certify results.
In 2020 and 2022, members of two county boards of elections refused to certify results to protest election procedures with which they disagreed. Their reasons were unrelated to the board’s authority as provided in state law. The members who refused to certify were outvoted by other board members, and all election procedure deadlines were still met.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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In North Carolina, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the county boards of election, entities that have broad election responsibilities and have no other county administrative roles. The boards are composed of five members: two from each major party appointed by the State Board of Elections and a fifth member appointed by the State Auditor (NCGS §163-30).
The boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials and “authenticate the count in every ballot item in the county by determining that the votes have been counted and tabulated correctly” (NCGS §163-182.5). The canvass and certification take place on the tenth day after the election, or a “reasonable time thereafter” if the initial counting of all votes has not been completed in time (NCGS §163-182.5).
The canvass reports of the county boards are transmitted to the State Board of Elections, which is composed of five members appointed by the State Auditor from lists of nominees submitted by the two largest parties. The State Board meets on the Tuesday three weeks after the election to likewise “authenticate the count in every ballot item” of elections under its jurisdiction and “issue certificates of nomination and election” (NCGS §163-182.4).
7.b. The canvassing process includes powers of review, including conducting hearings of claims regarding results.
North Carolina is unusual among states in that it gives significant roles to county boards of elections to consider potential irregularities and concerns regarding elections. State law provides that the county boards have the “authority to send for papers and persons and to examine them and pass upon the legality of disputed ballots” (NCGS §163-182.5).
County boards may also conduct hearings regarding challenges (called “protests” in North Carolina law) about the “manner in which the votes were counted or the results tabulated” (NCGS §163-182.10). In conducting these hearings, the boards can subpoena witnesses or documents. The county boards can conclude that the canvass must be corrected and new results declared. County board rulings are appealable to the State Board of Elections (NCGS §163-182.11).
The county boards operate under “expansive supervisory authority” of the State Board. The State Board “may intervene and take jurisdiction over protests pending before a county board” (NCGS §163-182.12). Consideration by the boards of any protest “shall not delay the completion of the canvass for more than three days unless approved by the State Board of Elections” and “shall not delay the canvass of ballot items unaffected by the protest” (NCGS §163-182.10).
7.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in North Carolina have refused to certify results.
In 2020 and 2022, members of two county boards of elections refused to certify results to protest election procedures with which they disagreed. Their reasons were unrelated to the board’s authority as provided in state law. The members who refused to certify were outvoted by other board members, and all election procedure deadlines were still met.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming the results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
QUESTION 8: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
8.a. Election protests can be appealed to the courts.
The right to challenge election results is broadly available to voters and candidates in North Carolina, including through the court system. In all circumstances, solid evidence is necessary. Challenges lacking any evidence create burdens for the court system and can result in penalties for repeated abuse.
State law also provides the opportunity for registered voters to protest the results of elections through the State Board of Elections. In the case of federal, judicial, and local elections, the decision of the State Board can be appealed to the Superior Court of Wake County or the county in which the protester lives (NCGS §163-22, as amended by S.B. 2026-60).
Protest appeals focus on whether there is sufficient evidence to question the results of an election. However, voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues and remedies that do not affect the outcome of the election. People or entities challenging elections in court have similar rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
The right to challenge election results is broadly available to voters and candidates in North Carolina, including through the court system. In all circumstances, solid evidence is necessary. Challenges lacking any evidence create burdens for the court system and can result in penalties for repeated abuse.
State law also provides the opportunity for registered voters to protest the results of elections through the State Board of Elections. In the case of federal, judicial, and local elections, the decision of the State Board can be appealed to the Superior Court of Wake County or the county in which the protester lives (NCGS §163-22, as amended by S.B. 2026-60).
Protest appeals focus on whether there is sufficient evidence to question the results of an election. However, voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues and remedies that do not affect the outcome of the election. People or entities challenging elections in court have similar rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 9: What is required of plaintiffs, and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
9.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
9.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts and protests.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
9.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
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CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
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9.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
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CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
9.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts and protests.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
9.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
———--
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
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9.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
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CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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QUESTION 10: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
10.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Failure to State a Claim: The plaintiff’s allegations may not contain a legally recognizable claim that can be adjudicated by the courts.
- Unreasonable Delays (also known as "Laches"): A case may be dismissed if a party unreasonably delays bringing it, and if that delay causes prejudice.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
QUESTION 11: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
11.a. The timelines are tight.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
11.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
11.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Timeline of North Carolina Election Procedures
North Carolina Election Code
North Carolina Administrative Election Code
State Board of Elections Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
North Carolina Election Code
North Carolina Administrative Election Code
State Board of Elections Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Date |
Election Activity |
11/3/26 |
Election Day |
11/6/26 |
Deadline to cure absentee ballots. |
11/13/26 |
Deadline for election protests concerning vote count or tabulation. |
11/13/26 |
Deadline for County Boards of Election to canvass and certify results. |
11/16/26 |
Deadline to petition County Board of Elections for recount (for races under the sole authority of the county board). |
11/16/26 |
Deadline for election protests concerning vote count or tabulation, if good cause for delay. |
11/17/26 |
Deadline to petition State Board of Elections for recount (for statewide and multi-county races). |
11/24/26 |
Deadline for State Board of Elections to canvass and certify results. |
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
