NORTH CAROLINA
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures of elections in NORTH CAROLINA.
The information is grouped by three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review. It aims to be a go-to resource, especially when journalists must cover close, contested, and disputed elections. Today's voters have many questions about the fairness of elections. So, the Election Overtime project aims to inform media coverage of elections that helps explain how elections are grounded in the impartial rule of law. The brief focuses on structures that enable fairness and confidence, such as the role of poll watchers, rigorous verification procedures, and the evidentiary requirements of the courts for races that are contested.
The Election Reformers Network team stands ready to support journalists in deploying this content in your coverage.
The information is grouped by three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review. It aims to be a go-to resource, especially when journalists must cover close, contested, and disputed elections. Today's voters have many questions about the fairness of elections. So, the Election Overtime project aims to inform media coverage of elections that helps explain how elections are grounded in the impartial rule of law. The brief focuses on structures that enable fairness and confidence, such as the role of poll watchers, rigorous verification procedures, and the evidentiary requirements of the courts for races that are contested.
The Election Reformers Network team stands ready to support journalists in deploying this content in your coverage.
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, with a process as critical as elections, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
QUESTION 1: What are the roles of election boards, poll workers, and observers?
1.a. A hierarchy of election groups and people hold the North Carolina election process accountable and protect candidates.
State Board of Elections: Under North Carolina law, the State Board of Elections has general authority over elections including overseeing the work of local officials; investigating if needed; and setting rules and regulations. Currently, the state board is composed of five members appointed by the Governor from lists of nominees submitted by the Democrat and Republican state party chairs. There can be no more than three members from the same political party on the board. The current board consists of three Democrats and two Republicans.
County Boards of Elections: The County Boards of Elections, also established by state law, oversee election administration within each county and are the key certification authorities for county votes. These local boards are each composed of five members who are registered voters in that county. Four members are appointed by the State Board from lists of nominees submitted by the state party chairs. Two of these appointments must be Republicans and two must be Democrats. The fifth member serves as the chair and is appointed by the Governor.
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CONTEXT: State and County Boards Composition.
Legislation passed by the General Assembly in 2019, and again in similar form in 2023, calls for an eight-member State Board and four-member county boards appointed directly by the General Assembly with input from legislative leaders from both parties. The 2023 law is currently being challenged in court and has not been implemented.
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Precinct Officials: Precinct Officials are poll workers appointed/hired by the county boards. These officials may also challenge and hear challenges on the eligibility of voters in the precinct in which they are assigned. Political parties may submit a list of qualified persons to be considered as precinct officials, including for judges and assistants.
In each precinct there are three judges who oversee operations, including one chief judge, per state law. Only one judge in each precinct can belong to the same political party as the chief judge. For example, if the chief judge in the precinct is a Republican, one additional judge may be a Republican and the other must be a Democrat. Similarly, assistants who support the work of judges at the polls are appointed by the county board with input, if provided, from political parties.
Observers: Observers are designated representatives of the political parties who may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes. Parties with a candidate on the relevant ballot can designate up to two observers per precinct and ten at-large observers. State party leadership can also designate 100 observers statewide. However, at any time there can only be three observers from the same party physically at a precinct.
1.b. North Carolina places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan poll observer.
Who can observe: Observers must be registered to vote in the jurisdiction they are serving and must be officially designated by the parties and registered with the appropriate election boards and precincts. Nonpartisan candidates may also appoint observers in a precinct in which they appear on the ballot.
Who cannot observe: Neither candidates nor election officials may serve as observers, and observers must have “good moral character.” However, beyond this basic requirement there are very few limits on who can serve. Unlike some other states – including New Mexico, Georgia, or Pennsylvania – North Carolina allows immediate family members of candidates to serve as poll watchers. However, county boards and chief judges may challenge the appointment of an observer for "good cause" if they have evidence that the observer could impact the conduct of the election. In addition, no more than three observers from a political party can be assigned to work in a precinct at the same time.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll observers.
North Carolina does not require any training to become a poll observer. To be useful to the parties they are representing, observers should be trained in their role and knowledgeable about election procedures. That can help ensure credibility of their accounts if they observe problems.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process. Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions. Some states require training; many do not.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by signing a short online form.
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State Board of Elections: Under North Carolina law, the State Board of Elections has general authority over elections including overseeing the work of local officials; investigating if needed; and setting rules and regulations. Currently, the state board is composed of five members appointed by the Governor from lists of nominees submitted by the Democrat and Republican state party chairs. There can be no more than three members from the same political party on the board. The current board consists of three Democrats and two Republicans.
County Boards of Elections: The County Boards of Elections, also established by state law, oversee election administration within each county and are the key certification authorities for county votes. These local boards are each composed of five members who are registered voters in that county. Four members are appointed by the State Board from lists of nominees submitted by the state party chairs. Two of these appointments must be Republicans and two must be Democrats. The fifth member serves as the chair and is appointed by the Governor.
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CONTEXT: State and County Boards Composition.
Legislation passed by the General Assembly in 2019, and again in similar form in 2023, calls for an eight-member State Board and four-member county boards appointed directly by the General Assembly with input from legislative leaders from both parties. The 2023 law is currently being challenged in court and has not been implemented.
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Precinct Officials: Precinct Officials are poll workers appointed/hired by the county boards. These officials may also challenge and hear challenges on the eligibility of voters in the precinct in which they are assigned. Political parties may submit a list of qualified persons to be considered as precinct officials, including for judges and assistants.
In each precinct there are three judges who oversee operations, including one chief judge, per state law. Only one judge in each precinct can belong to the same political party as the chief judge. For example, if the chief judge in the precinct is a Republican, one additional judge may be a Republican and the other must be a Democrat. Similarly, assistants who support the work of judges at the polls are appointed by the county board with input, if provided, from political parties.
Observers: Observers are designated representatives of the political parties who may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes. Parties with a candidate on the relevant ballot can designate up to two observers per precinct and ten at-large observers. State party leadership can also designate 100 observers statewide. However, at any time there can only be three observers from the same party physically at a precinct.
1.b. North Carolina places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan poll observer.
Who can observe: Observers must be registered to vote in the jurisdiction they are serving and must be officially designated by the parties and registered with the appropriate election boards and precincts. Nonpartisan candidates may also appoint observers in a precinct in which they appear on the ballot.
Who cannot observe: Neither candidates nor election officials may serve as observers, and observers must have “good moral character.” However, beyond this basic requirement there are very few limits on who can serve. Unlike some other states – including New Mexico, Georgia, or Pennsylvania – North Carolina allows immediate family members of candidates to serve as poll watchers. However, county boards and chief judges may challenge the appointment of an observer for "good cause" if they have evidence that the observer could impact the conduct of the election. In addition, no more than three observers from a political party can be assigned to work in a precinct at the same time.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll observers.
North Carolina does not require any training to become a poll observer. To be useful to the parties they are representing, observers should be trained in their role and knowledgeable about election procedures. That can help ensure credibility of their accounts if they observe problems.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process. Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions. Some states require training; many do not.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by signing a short online form.
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election monitors or the general public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. North Carolina provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Based on North Carolina’s election code, the state does not appear to explicitly provide opportunities for nonpartisan monitors or the general public to observe most election procedures. This lack of opportunity presents an opportunity for potential future election reform.
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CONTEXT: Titles can be confusing.
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. Note: this role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. North Carolina provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Based on North Carolina’s election code, the state does not appear to explicitly provide opportunities for nonpartisan monitors or the general public to observe most election procedures. This lack of opportunity presents an opportunity for potential future election reform.
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CONTEXT: Titles can be confusing.
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. Note: this role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are poll observers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to political party observation.
Party observers are allowed in designated areas at the polling place. Observers cannot interfere with or impede the election procedures or staff, and they can be asked to leave if they do so. Any member of the public can view the vote count.
Party observers are allowed in designated areas at the polling place. Observers cannot interfere with or impede the election procedures or staff, and they can be asked to leave if they do so. Any member of the public can view the vote count.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance including seal numbers on equipment, ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 4: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
4.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before voting.
Vote counting in North Carolina is generally done with scanners that read voters’ electronic or hand-marked ballots and total the votes when the ballots are entered. Absentee ballots that are mailed or submitted at voting centers are scanned under the supervision of the County Board of Elections and in a location viewable by the public. Per the state’s summarized election procedures, election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated by each scanner.
This process is called “Logic and Accuracy” testing and, per state law, can be observed by the public. North Carolina’s testing, combined with the state’s audits, recounts, and other procedures, is structured to catch errors before election results are finalized. However, it is worth noting that the state placed 30th in a national ranking of logic and accuracy testing. Researchers observed that the state meets best practices for procedural criteria such as conducting tests in public, but it likely fails to meet functional criteria such as ensuring that some ballots are randomly marked.
4.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Tabulation and other voting equipment is physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections and internet connections, per state law.
4.c. Any electronic devices used must produce a paper record, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
According to Verified Voting, two types of ballots are used in North Carolina: hand-marked paper ballots and electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs). State law leaves that decision to county authorities. In most North Carolina counties, on election day the use of BMDs is limited to voters with disabilities. In seven counties (out of 100 counties total) BMDs are used for all voters. This combination of practices means that a large majority of voters (87%) live in counties that primarily use hand-marked ballots on election day.
Most BMDs use a touch screen to collect the votes, including the ExpressVote systems used in North Carolina. They do not store voter selections, instead producing a reviewable printout that is scanned into a tabulator.
Maintaining a verifiable paper-trail, as all North Carolina counties voting using BMDs do, is a recommended best practice for election administration. Furthermore, it is mandated by state law. Having a paper trail allows officials to audit or recount the ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
A voting equipment summary, broken out by county, is provided online by North Carolina’s State Board of Elections.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, doesn’t take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
To compare the different types of voting technology, visit MIT’s election data lab.
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4.d. Equipment is certified by the State Board of Elections.
Only pre-approved equipment can be used in elections including the poll books and BMDs. Equipment must come from a list of technology certified by the State Board of Elections, and state law requires that it be in compliance with federal security requirements. Statute further requires that equipment is adopted by county commissioners after approval by the county’s election board.
Vote counting in North Carolina is generally done with scanners that read voters’ electronic or hand-marked ballots and total the votes when the ballots are entered. Absentee ballots that are mailed or submitted at voting centers are scanned under the supervision of the County Board of Elections and in a location viewable by the public. Per the state’s summarized election procedures, election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated by each scanner.
This process is called “Logic and Accuracy” testing and, per state law, can be observed by the public. North Carolina’s testing, combined with the state’s audits, recounts, and other procedures, is structured to catch errors before election results are finalized. However, it is worth noting that the state placed 30th in a national ranking of logic and accuracy testing. Researchers observed that the state meets best practices for procedural criteria such as conducting tests in public, but it likely fails to meet functional criteria such as ensuring that some ballots are randomly marked.
4.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Tabulation and other voting equipment is physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections and internet connections, per state law.
4.c. Any electronic devices used must produce a paper record, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
According to Verified Voting, two types of ballots are used in North Carolina: hand-marked paper ballots and electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs). State law leaves that decision to county authorities. In most North Carolina counties, on election day the use of BMDs is limited to voters with disabilities. In seven counties (out of 100 counties total) BMDs are used for all voters. This combination of practices means that a large majority of voters (87%) live in counties that primarily use hand-marked ballots on election day.
Most BMDs use a touch screen to collect the votes, including the ExpressVote systems used in North Carolina. They do not store voter selections, instead producing a reviewable printout that is scanned into a tabulator.
Maintaining a verifiable paper-trail, as all North Carolina counties voting using BMDs do, is a recommended best practice for election administration. Furthermore, it is mandated by state law. Having a paper trail allows officials to audit or recount the ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
A voting equipment summary, broken out by county, is provided online by North Carolina’s State Board of Elections.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, doesn’t take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
To compare the different types of voting technology, visit MIT’s election data lab.
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4.d. Equipment is certified by the State Board of Elections.
Only pre-approved equipment can be used in elections including the poll books and BMDs. Equipment must come from a list of technology certified by the State Board of Elections, and state law requires that it be in compliance with federal security requirements. Statute further requires that equipment is adopted by county commissioners after approval by the county’s election board.
QUESTION 5: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
5.a. Identification required to vote in-person.
To vote in-person in North Carolina, the voter must be a U.S. citizen, be a legal resident of North Carolina, and show identification at the polls. For most voters, that is a photo ID. However, under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), first-time voters can instead present an alternative document that shows their address (i.e., utility bill, bank statement, paycheck). Citizens who do not have appropriate ID are given a provisional ballot, which is isolated and only counted if the voter brings ID to the county board by November 14, the day before the county canvas is finished and the results are certified. North Carolina's current ID law was implemented for the first time in 2023. State law accounts for limited circumstances in which voters may vote a provisional ballot without providing an ID. For example, if the voter has a religious objection to being photographed, she or he may sign an affidavit stating the objection.
While 36 states require or request photo ID at the polls, North Carolina’s provisions make it one of the 9 states ranked the strictest.
5.b. Vote by mail requires a photo ID.
North Carolina, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia has no-excuse vote-by-mail laws. Seven states conduct their entire election by mail-in ballot, according to MIT.
In North Carolina, most voters must provide a copy of a photo ID to vote by mail and must also include the signatures of two witnesses or a notary. Ballots can be mailed or returned at the voter’s county election office or early voting site.
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CONTEXT: Military Voting
After a setback in 2020, North Carolina has returned to being one of the nation’s leaders in military and overseas voting. In 2022, 82% of military and overseas ballots were returned – compared with the national average of 63%.
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5.c. North Carolina officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that North Carolina, and every other state faces, is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression. The North Carolina Republican party filed two lawsuits in August 2024 to remove up to 225,000 voters from the rolls, asserting that non-citizens are registered to vote. Opponents of the lawsuits assert that the purges would violate federal law.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for non-voting, but a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter who fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
Voter registration is cross-referenced with other state and national databases and sources including the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles. North Carolina does not participate in ERIC, a group of member states that share and match voter registration information help to maintain accurate voter rolls.
5.d. North Carolina law prohibits registration by noncitizens.
To register to vote in North Carolina, state law requires the registrant to be an adult U.S. citizen, as well as a resident for more than 30 days in the county where they plan to vote. Citizenship papers are not required to register, and applicants must assert their citizenship status and other qualifications on the signed application form. Making false statements on a registration form in order to become registered to vote is a state felony and is also federally unlawful. Doing so may result in prison time as well as deportation or denial of future immigration status.
Nationally, the Heritage Foundation has conducted research on a range of possible avenues for voter fraud. Their published national analysis of legal actions identified 24 cases of noncitizens voting between 2003 and 2023, across 50 states and millions of votes cast.
5.e. North Carolina allows challenges to voter eligibility.
North Carolina law allows a person’s qualifications to vote to be challenged by any elector (i.e. a qualified voter) of the same county. The challenge can happen three ways: 1) through the county board of elections; 2) at the polling station when the registrant in question is attempting to vote; or 3) based on the registrant’s absentee ballot. Although there is no limit to the number of challenges any one person can make, each challenge must be submitted separately under oath and the burden of proof is on the challenger. Challenges must be based on specific reasons provided in law such as residence or citizenship status.
To vote in-person in North Carolina, the voter must be a U.S. citizen, be a legal resident of North Carolina, and show identification at the polls. For most voters, that is a photo ID. However, under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), first-time voters can instead present an alternative document that shows their address (i.e., utility bill, bank statement, paycheck). Citizens who do not have appropriate ID are given a provisional ballot, which is isolated and only counted if the voter brings ID to the county board by November 14, the day before the county canvas is finished and the results are certified. North Carolina's current ID law was implemented for the first time in 2023. State law accounts for limited circumstances in which voters may vote a provisional ballot without providing an ID. For example, if the voter has a religious objection to being photographed, she or he may sign an affidavit stating the objection.
While 36 states require or request photo ID at the polls, North Carolina’s provisions make it one of the 9 states ranked the strictest.
5.b. Vote by mail requires a photo ID.
North Carolina, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia has no-excuse vote-by-mail laws. Seven states conduct their entire election by mail-in ballot, according to MIT.
In North Carolina, most voters must provide a copy of a photo ID to vote by mail and must also include the signatures of two witnesses or a notary. Ballots can be mailed or returned at the voter’s county election office or early voting site.
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CONTEXT: Military Voting
After a setback in 2020, North Carolina has returned to being one of the nation’s leaders in military and overseas voting. In 2022, 82% of military and overseas ballots were returned – compared with the national average of 63%.
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5.c. North Carolina officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that North Carolina, and every other state faces, is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression. The North Carolina Republican party filed two lawsuits in August 2024 to remove up to 225,000 voters from the rolls, asserting that non-citizens are registered to vote. Opponents of the lawsuits assert that the purges would violate federal law.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for non-voting, but a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter who fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
Voter registration is cross-referenced with other state and national databases and sources including the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles. North Carolina does not participate in ERIC, a group of member states that share and match voter registration information help to maintain accurate voter rolls.
5.d. North Carolina law prohibits registration by noncitizens.
To register to vote in North Carolina, state law requires the registrant to be an adult U.S. citizen, as well as a resident for more than 30 days in the county where they plan to vote. Citizenship papers are not required to register, and applicants must assert their citizenship status and other qualifications on the signed application form. Making false statements on a registration form in order to become registered to vote is a state felony and is also federally unlawful. Doing so may result in prison time as well as deportation or denial of future immigration status.
Nationally, the Heritage Foundation has conducted research on a range of possible avenues for voter fraud. Their published national analysis of legal actions identified 24 cases of noncitizens voting between 2003 and 2023, across 50 states and millions of votes cast.
5.e. North Carolina allows challenges to voter eligibility.
North Carolina law allows a person’s qualifications to vote to be challenged by any elector (i.e. a qualified voter) of the same county. The challenge can happen three ways: 1) through the county board of elections; 2) at the polling station when the registrant in question is attempting to vote; or 3) based on the registrant’s absentee ballot. Although there is no limit to the number of challenges any one person can make, each challenge must be submitted separately under oath and the burden of proof is on the challenger. Challenges must be based on specific reasons provided in law such as residence or citizenship status.
QUESTION 6: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
6.a. North Carolina officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In North Carolina, the absentee law also details processing. Mailed ballots can be processed before the election, including using an optical scanning device to prepare for tabulation on election day. Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scanning before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
6.b. The initial results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
The day after the polls close, the State Board of Elections launches an audit of the presidential race by publicly selecting two groups of ballots at random in each county in the state. Then, in each county, bipartisan teams of trained volunteers follow the state law’s parameters and count the selected ballots by hand. Officials compare the hand-counted results with the results counted by the voting machines and note any differences. Each county board sends the machine counts and hand counts to the state with an explanation for any discrepancies. (North Carolina audit procedures can be compared with other states at Verified Voting)
Election results do not become official until ballots are reviewed and processed, and until the auditing process is complete. According to state law, the official county canvass and signoff on results cannot happen until at least November 11, which is ten days after voting ends. North Carolina’s “master election schedule” shows that final state certification for relevant offices comes a few weeks later with the canvass meeting occurring on November 26 followed by the issuing of certificates on December 2.
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CONTEXT: Official Results Come Later
In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night. But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted, audited, and certified. Today, lack of understanding of the audit and certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. North Carolina’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but research indicates that full hand counts would likely make elections slower and less accurate.
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CONTEXT: More on Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. The real risks are that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors and gives bad-faith actors more fodder. Generally speaking, Americans want teachers and police officers to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods. Many people believe the same should be true for election officials. In North Carolina, conducting primarily machine-counted audits empowers officials to get voters results-verification in a timely and efficient manner.
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6.d. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the official recording and certification of the results on the county and then the state level. Per state law, the canvass is a public event and requires documentation to ensure that appropriate election procedures are conducted, including audits and investigation of concerns. County boards will conduct their canvasses on November 11, 2024 with exceptions for significant operational delays. The State Board of Elections must then canvass the results on November 26, 2024, followed by the issuing of certificates on December 2.
6.e. Candidates in close elections can request recounts.
The recount option applies to elections for most offices and ensures that close races, where wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern, are triple checked. Both the county and state boards may at their discretion conduct a full recount of any race prior to completing their canvass of the election.
In addition, after the canvass has taken place, state law allows the runner-up in a close election to request a recount. For county, state, and federal district races, this option applies to elections won by less than 1% of the votes. (Ex: The runner up in a race which saw 200,000 votes cast can request a recount if they lost by 2,000 votes or less.) For statewide races, the margin must be under .5% or 10,000 votes, whichever is less.
The recount process is overseen by bipartisan teams and is largely the same as the original count procedures, which use electronic technology. However, after an electronic recount, the losing party may further request a hand count of a sample of ballots from across the relevant jurisdictions.
These procedures are in place to ensure that if any errors in the original vote count occurred, they did not happen on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election.
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change Outcomes
An analysis by Fairvote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. However, small discrepancies can happen. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts isn’t to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the winner of an election.
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6.f. Any registered voter can protest the results of the election.
Separate from a recount, state law allows anyone registered to vote to protest the results of a race that appeared on the ballot for their district. Using steps outlined by the State Board of Elections, the protestor must make specific allegations regarding a defect in the way votes were counted or results tabulated, or an allegation regarding a violation of election law, irregularity, or misconduct. In either case the issue must be so significant that it casts doubt on the results of the election.
The protestor must also provide factual allegations and evidence in support of their protest. Protests are heard by county boards and can be appealed to the state board. If they agree with the protest, the county and state boards have discretion in how to respond, including ordering a recount or changing the outcome of the election.
Like recounts, these protests are narrowly focused on whether the person who received the most votes won the election. Mismanagement or wrongdoing that did not affect the results of the election is not considered as part of this process, but such allegations can be brought to state or federal court, as described below under Pillar 3.
In addition, any losing candidate in a race for a state executive (i.e. “Council of State”) or legislative seat can challenge the qualifications of the winner or the validity of the election results by bringing a formal contest directly to North Carolina’s General Assembly.
In North Carolina, the absentee law also details processing. Mailed ballots can be processed before the election, including using an optical scanning device to prepare for tabulation on election day. Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scanning before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
6.b. The initial results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
The day after the polls close, the State Board of Elections launches an audit of the presidential race by publicly selecting two groups of ballots at random in each county in the state. Then, in each county, bipartisan teams of trained volunteers follow the state law’s parameters and count the selected ballots by hand. Officials compare the hand-counted results with the results counted by the voting machines and note any differences. Each county board sends the machine counts and hand counts to the state with an explanation for any discrepancies. (North Carolina audit procedures can be compared with other states at Verified Voting)
Election results do not become official until ballots are reviewed and processed, and until the auditing process is complete. According to state law, the official county canvass and signoff on results cannot happen until at least November 11, which is ten days after voting ends. North Carolina’s “master election schedule” shows that final state certification for relevant offices comes a few weeks later with the canvass meeting occurring on November 26 followed by the issuing of certificates on December 2.
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CONTEXT: Official Results Come Later
In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night. But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted, audited, and certified. Today, lack of understanding of the audit and certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. North Carolina’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but research indicates that full hand counts would likely make elections slower and less accurate.
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CONTEXT: More on Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. The real risks are that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors and gives bad-faith actors more fodder. Generally speaking, Americans want teachers and police officers to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods. Many people believe the same should be true for election officials. In North Carolina, conducting primarily machine-counted audits empowers officials to get voters results-verification in a timely and efficient manner.
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6.d. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the official recording and certification of the results on the county and then the state level. Per state law, the canvass is a public event and requires documentation to ensure that appropriate election procedures are conducted, including audits and investigation of concerns. County boards will conduct their canvasses on November 11, 2024 with exceptions for significant operational delays. The State Board of Elections must then canvass the results on November 26, 2024, followed by the issuing of certificates on December 2.
6.e. Candidates in close elections can request recounts.
The recount option applies to elections for most offices and ensures that close races, where wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern, are triple checked. Both the county and state boards may at their discretion conduct a full recount of any race prior to completing their canvass of the election.
In addition, after the canvass has taken place, state law allows the runner-up in a close election to request a recount. For county, state, and federal district races, this option applies to elections won by less than 1% of the votes. (Ex: The runner up in a race which saw 200,000 votes cast can request a recount if they lost by 2,000 votes or less.) For statewide races, the margin must be under .5% or 10,000 votes, whichever is less.
The recount process is overseen by bipartisan teams and is largely the same as the original count procedures, which use electronic technology. However, after an electronic recount, the losing party may further request a hand count of a sample of ballots from across the relevant jurisdictions.
These procedures are in place to ensure that if any errors in the original vote count occurred, they did not happen on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election.
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change Outcomes
An analysis by Fairvote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. However, small discrepancies can happen. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts isn’t to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the winner of an election.
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6.f. Any registered voter can protest the results of the election.
Separate from a recount, state law allows anyone registered to vote to protest the results of a race that appeared on the ballot for their district. Using steps outlined by the State Board of Elections, the protestor must make specific allegations regarding a defect in the way votes were counted or results tabulated, or an allegation regarding a violation of election law, irregularity, or misconduct. In either case the issue must be so significant that it casts doubt on the results of the election.
The protestor must also provide factual allegations and evidence in support of their protest. Protests are heard by county boards and can be appealed to the state board. If they agree with the protest, the county and state boards have discretion in how to respond, including ordering a recount or changing the outcome of the election.
Like recounts, these protests are narrowly focused on whether the person who received the most votes won the election. Mismanagement or wrongdoing that did not affect the results of the election is not considered as part of this process, but such allegations can be brought to state or federal court, as described below under Pillar 3.
In addition, any losing candidate in a race for a state executive (i.e. “Council of State”) or legislative seat can challenge the qualifications of the winner or the validity of the election results by bringing a formal contest directly to North Carolina’s General Assembly.
QUESTION 7: Who certifies results in North Carolina, and what issues have arisen around certification?
7.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In North Carolina, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification in North Carolina is the responsibility of the county boards of election, entities that have broad election responsibilities and are dedicated solely to elections. They have no other county administrative roles. The boards are currently composed of five members: two from each major party appointed by the State Board of Elections and a fifth appointed by the Governor. A new law passed in 2023 that would change the five-member board to four, with members picked by legislative leaders of the two parties. The law was challenged, is under court review, and not in effect for at least this election,
The boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials and “authenticate the count in every ballot item in the county by determining that the votes have been counted and tabulated correctly.” The canvass and certification take place on the 10th day after the election, or a “reasonable time thereafter” if the initial counting of all votes has not been completed in time.
The reports of the county boards are transmitted to the State Board of Elections, which is composed of five members appointed by the Governor from lists of nominees submitted by the two largest parties. The State Board meets on the Tuesday three weeks after the election to likewise “authenticate the count in every ballot item” of elections under its jurisdiction and “issue certificates of nomination and election.” (The new law under review mentioned above would change the composition to eight members selected by legislative leaders, a change not in effect.)
7.b. The canvassing process includes powers of review, including conducting hearings of claims regarding results.
North Carolina is unusual among states in that it gives significant roles to county boards of elections to consider potential irregularities and concerns in the elections, within the context of supervisory authority by the State Board. State law provides that the county boards have the “authority to send for papers and persons and to examine them and pass upon the legality of disputed ballots.”
The county boards also conduct any hearings regarding challenges (called “protests” in North Carolina law) about the “manner in which the votes were counted or the results tabulated.” In conducting these hearings, the boards can subpoena witnesses or documents. The county boards can conclude that the canvass must be corrected, and new results declared. County board rulings are appealable to the State Election Board.
The county boards operate under “expansive supervisory authority” of the State Board. The State Board “may intervene and take jurisdiction over protests pending before a county board.” Consideration by the boards of any protest “shall not delay the completion of the canvass for more than three days unless approved by the State Board of Elections” and “shall not delay the canvass of ballot items unaffected by the protest.”
7.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in North Carolina have refused to certify results for reasons unconnected to their role.
All refusers were outvoted.In 2020 and 2022, members of two county boards of elections refused to certify results to protest election procedures with which they disagreed. Their reasons were unrelated to the board’s authority as provided in state law. The members who refused to certify were outvoted by other board members, and all election procedure deadlines were still met.
Across the county in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved by either: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A recent study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the US, by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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In North Carolina, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification in North Carolina is the responsibility of the county boards of election, entities that have broad election responsibilities and are dedicated solely to elections. They have no other county administrative roles. The boards are currently composed of five members: two from each major party appointed by the State Board of Elections and a fifth appointed by the Governor. A new law passed in 2023 that would change the five-member board to four, with members picked by legislative leaders of the two parties. The law was challenged, is under court review, and not in effect for at least this election,
The boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials and “authenticate the count in every ballot item in the county by determining that the votes have been counted and tabulated correctly.” The canvass and certification take place on the 10th day after the election, or a “reasonable time thereafter” if the initial counting of all votes has not been completed in time.
The reports of the county boards are transmitted to the State Board of Elections, which is composed of five members appointed by the Governor from lists of nominees submitted by the two largest parties. The State Board meets on the Tuesday three weeks after the election to likewise “authenticate the count in every ballot item” of elections under its jurisdiction and “issue certificates of nomination and election.” (The new law under review mentioned above would change the composition to eight members selected by legislative leaders, a change not in effect.)
7.b. The canvassing process includes powers of review, including conducting hearings of claims regarding results.
North Carolina is unusual among states in that it gives significant roles to county boards of elections to consider potential irregularities and concerns in the elections, within the context of supervisory authority by the State Board. State law provides that the county boards have the “authority to send for papers and persons and to examine them and pass upon the legality of disputed ballots.”
The county boards also conduct any hearings regarding challenges (called “protests” in North Carolina law) about the “manner in which the votes were counted or the results tabulated.” In conducting these hearings, the boards can subpoena witnesses or documents. The county boards can conclude that the canvass must be corrected, and new results declared. County board rulings are appealable to the State Election Board.
The county boards operate under “expansive supervisory authority” of the State Board. The State Board “may intervene and take jurisdiction over protests pending before a county board.” Consideration by the boards of any protest “shall not delay the completion of the canvass for more than three days unless approved by the State Board of Elections” and “shall not delay the canvass of ballot items unaffected by the protest.”
7.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in North Carolina have refused to certify results for reasons unconnected to their role.
All refusers were outvoted.In 2020 and 2022, members of two county boards of elections refused to certify results to protest election procedures with which they disagreed. Their reasons were unrelated to the board’s authority as provided in state law. The members who refused to certify were outvoted by other board members, and all election procedure deadlines were still met.
Across the county in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved by either: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A recent study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the US, by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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QUESTION 8: What's changed since 2020 about how Congress concludes the presidential election process?
8.a. In 2022, Congress passed the bipartisan Electoral Count Reform Act (ECRA), replacing an outdated law from 1887.
The new federal law addresses vulnerabilities in the presidential election process that were exposed by events following the 2020 election. ECRA clarified several procedures that had been ambiguous under federal law, including that the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes is “solely ministerial.” Because the presidential election is administered by the states, ECRA also impacted aspects of state law (described below).
8.b. ECRA aims to prevent unsanctioned electors and related problems with presidential elections by clarifying details about the official submission to Congress of each state’s presidential electoral count.
Under ECRA, the governor must issue a state’s Certificate of Ascertainment of Appointment of Electors, unless state law explicitly delegates that duty to another executive official. ECRA also specifies that each certificate must contain:
Then, when those electors hold their official meeting, they sign and submit a different certificate of votes delineating the electoral college votes for President and Vice President.
In addition to these federal requirements, 33 states including Arizona have passed laws prohibiting unsanctioned or “faithless” electors in the presidential election process.
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CONTEXT: 2020 “fake electors” highlighted the need for ECRA
In 2020, after it became clear that former President Donald Trump’s multiple lawsuits contesting the election results lacked evidentiary merit to alter the outcome, he and his allies assembled their own slates of presidential electors in seven states where Trump did not win. Those unsanctioned electors met the same day as the legitimate electors, cast votes for Trump, and submitted to Congress competing Certificates of Ascertainment. President Trump began a pressure campaign to urge then-Vice President Mike Pence to discard the actual results from those seven states, and instead accept the fraudulent ones during the January 6, 2021, vote counting hearing. Had the Vice President done so, and had enough members of Congress gone along, President Joe Biden would have fallen short of the 270-vote Electoral College majority.
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8.c. ECRA clarifies the timeline for the presidential post-election process, with implications for states.
This timeline includes a new mandatory deadline for issuing the Certificate of Ascertainment, a new deadline for court intervention, and an updated date for the electors to meet and cast their votes. As a result, many intermediate state deadlines (such as vote counting, recounts, and audits) may need to be updated to comply with the new mandatory deadlines. Some states including Arizona have updated their laws to reflect this timeline.
8.d. Legislatures cannot change the rules after Election Day.
ECRA requires that elections be administered according to the state laws in place prior to Election Day, including laws governing presidential electors, voting emergencies, and related provisions. Importantly, ECRA also removed language from the old law pertaining to "failed elections" that bad-faith actors relied upon to argue that federal law allowed state legislatures to step in after the election was over and to appoint their own presidential electors, potentially overturning the will of the voters.
8.e. ECRA strengthens the role of courts.
The new law gives the courts the last word over disputes regarding a state's presidential election results, including any needed changes to the state's Certificate of Ascertainment. It also establishes a process for aggrieved presidential or vice-presidential candidates to bring cases before three-judge federal district courts.
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CONTEXT: Do Americans vote for the President, or for the electors?
Actually, under the somewhat convoluted provisions of the Electoral College, Americans technically vote for the electors, who in turn vote for the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Most states deploy a “winner takes all” approach in which all the Electoral College votes are awarded to the ticket that won the popular vote in that state. Two states (Maine and Nebraska) split a portion of their electoral votes by congressional district.
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The new federal law addresses vulnerabilities in the presidential election process that were exposed by events following the 2020 election. ECRA clarified several procedures that had been ambiguous under federal law, including that the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes is “solely ministerial.” Because the presidential election is administered by the states, ECRA also impacted aspects of state law (described below).
8.b. ECRA aims to prevent unsanctioned electors and related problems with presidential elections by clarifying details about the official submission to Congress of each state’s presidential electoral count.
Under ECRA, the governor must issue a state’s Certificate of Ascertainment of Appointment of Electors, unless state law explicitly delegates that duty to another executive official. ECRA also specifies that each certificate must contain:
- The names of the state’s electors
- The number of popular votes won in that state by each of the presidential candidates’ electors (see below, “Do Americans vote for the President, or the electors?”)
- Authenticity elements, such as the seal of the State and at least one security feature
Then, when those electors hold their official meeting, they sign and submit a different certificate of votes delineating the electoral college votes for President and Vice President.
In addition to these federal requirements, 33 states including Arizona have passed laws prohibiting unsanctioned or “faithless” electors in the presidential election process.
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CONTEXT: 2020 “fake electors” highlighted the need for ECRA
In 2020, after it became clear that former President Donald Trump’s multiple lawsuits contesting the election results lacked evidentiary merit to alter the outcome, he and his allies assembled their own slates of presidential electors in seven states where Trump did not win. Those unsanctioned electors met the same day as the legitimate electors, cast votes for Trump, and submitted to Congress competing Certificates of Ascertainment. President Trump began a pressure campaign to urge then-Vice President Mike Pence to discard the actual results from those seven states, and instead accept the fraudulent ones during the January 6, 2021, vote counting hearing. Had the Vice President done so, and had enough members of Congress gone along, President Joe Biden would have fallen short of the 270-vote Electoral College majority.
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8.c. ECRA clarifies the timeline for the presidential post-election process, with implications for states.
This timeline includes a new mandatory deadline for issuing the Certificate of Ascertainment, a new deadline for court intervention, and an updated date for the electors to meet and cast their votes. As a result, many intermediate state deadlines (such as vote counting, recounts, and audits) may need to be updated to comply with the new mandatory deadlines. Some states including Arizona have updated their laws to reflect this timeline.
8.d. Legislatures cannot change the rules after Election Day.
ECRA requires that elections be administered according to the state laws in place prior to Election Day, including laws governing presidential electors, voting emergencies, and related provisions. Importantly, ECRA also removed language from the old law pertaining to "failed elections" that bad-faith actors relied upon to argue that federal law allowed state legislatures to step in after the election was over and to appoint their own presidential electors, potentially overturning the will of the voters.
8.e. ECRA strengthens the role of courts.
The new law gives the courts the last word over disputes regarding a state's presidential election results, including any needed changes to the state's Certificate of Ascertainment. It also establishes a process for aggrieved presidential or vice-presidential candidates to bring cases before three-judge federal district courts.
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CONTEXT: Do Americans vote for the President, or for the electors?
Actually, under the somewhat convoluted provisions of the Electoral College, Americans technically vote for the electors, who in turn vote for the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Most states deploy a “winner takes all” approach in which all the Electoral College votes are awarded to the ticket that won the popular vote in that state. Two states (Maine and Nebraska) split a portion of their electoral votes by congressional district.
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PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was inconsistent and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was inconsistent and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
QUESTION 9: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
9.a. Election protests can be appealed to the Superior Court of Wake County.
The right to challenge election results is broadly available to voters and candidates in North Carolina, including through the court system. In all circumstances, solid evidence is necessary. Challenges lacking any evidence create burdens for the court system and can result in penalties for repeated abuse.
As noted previously, state law also provides the opportunity for registered voters to protest the results of elections through the State Board of Elections. In the case of federal, judicial, and local elections, the decision of the State Board can be appealed to the Superior Court of Wake County. The appeal must be made within 10 days of the State Board’s notification to parties of its final decision. In the case of state executive and legislative races, the appeal goes to the General Assembly.
Protests appeals focus on whether there is sufficient problems and evidence to overturn the results of an election. However, voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues and remedies that don’t affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections in court have similar rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
The right to challenge election results is broadly available to voters and candidates in North Carolina, including through the court system. In all circumstances, solid evidence is necessary. Challenges lacking any evidence create burdens for the court system and can result in penalties for repeated abuse.
As noted previously, state law also provides the opportunity for registered voters to protest the results of elections through the State Board of Elections. In the case of federal, judicial, and local elections, the decision of the State Board can be appealed to the Superior Court of Wake County. The appeal must be made within 10 days of the State Board’s notification to parties of its final decision. In the case of state executive and legislative races, the appeal goes to the General Assembly.
Protests appeals focus on whether there is sufficient problems and evidence to overturn the results of an election. However, voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues and remedies that don’t affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections in court have similar rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 10: What’s required of plaintiffs and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
10.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
10.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts and protests.
Challenges do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
10.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
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CONTEXT: Fraud is Not Fraud Without Proof
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
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10.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery or fraud involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not change the outcome of the election but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved. In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome.
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CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and petitioners, and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election that was won by 4000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
10.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts and protests.
Challenges do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
10.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
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CONTEXT: Fraud is Not Fraud Without Proof
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
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10.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery or fraud involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not change the outcome of the election but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved. In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome.
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CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and petitioners, and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election that was won by 4000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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QUESTION 11: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
11.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.) Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power or authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
Statement of a claim: There may be insufficient evidence to warrant a trial, or the allegations of the plaintiff may not even describe a violation of law.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
- A voter from one state attempts to challenge an election result in a different state.
- A case brought on the theory that voting equipment could have been connected to the internet but provides no evidence that the equipment ever was, in fact, connected to the internet.
A challenge calls for overturning an election won by 10,000 votes, based on evidence of errors only affecting one polling station of 100 voters.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.) Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power or authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Statement of a claim: There may be insufficient evidence to warrant a trial, or the allegations of the plaintiff may not even describe a violation of law.
- Unreasonable delays (also known as "Laches"): A suit may challenge the rules after the election when it should, instead, have challenged those rules well in advance.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
- A voter from one state attempts to challenge an election result in a different state.
- A case brought on the theory that voting equipment could have been connected to the internet but provides no evidence that the equipment ever was, in fact, connected to the internet.
- A challenge calls for overturning an election won by 10,000 votes, based on evidence of errors only affecting one polling station of 100 voters.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
QUESTION 12: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
12.a. The timelines are tight.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections. The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021. Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
12.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implication of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the plaintiff’s claims are far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press lawyers to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on in order translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections. The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021. Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
12.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implication of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the plaintiff’s claims are far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press lawyers to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on in order translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Experts
Damon Circosta, Former Chair of NC State Board of Elections, Executive Director & Vice President of the A.J. Fletcher Foundation
Veronica Degraffenreid, Senior manager in the Elections and Government Program at the Brennan Center; Former director of election operations for the North Carolina State Board of Elections
Towanna Dixon, Elections Director, Moore County, NC
Ben Ginsberg, Pillars of the Community Co-Chair (national expert)
James Martin, Governor of North Carolina from 1985 to 1993; U.S. Representative for North Carolina's 9th district from 1973 to 1985
Jennifer Morrell, The Elections Group CEO & Co-Founder (national expert)
Robert Orr, Former North Carolina State Supreme Court Justice; senior advisor to the North Carolina Network for Fair, Safe, and Secure Elections
David Price, U.S. Representative for North Carolina's 4th congressional district from 1997 to 2023
Jennifer Watson Roberts, Former Mayor of Charlotte; senior advisor to the North Carolina Network for Fair, Safe, and Secure Elections
Tom Ross, Former State Superior Court Judge and Former President of the University of North Carolina
Kim Wyman, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow (national expert)
Veronica Degraffenreid, Senior manager in the Elections and Government Program at the Brennan Center; Former director of election operations for the North Carolina State Board of Elections
Towanna Dixon, Elections Director, Moore County, NC
Ben Ginsberg, Pillars of the Community Co-Chair (national expert)
James Martin, Governor of North Carolina from 1985 to 1993; U.S. Representative for North Carolina's 9th district from 1973 to 1985
Jennifer Morrell, The Elections Group CEO & Co-Founder (national expert)
Robert Orr, Former North Carolina State Supreme Court Justice; senior advisor to the North Carolina Network for Fair, Safe, and Secure Elections
David Price, U.S. Representative for North Carolina's 4th congressional district from 1997 to 2023
Jennifer Watson Roberts, Former Mayor of Charlotte; senior advisor to the North Carolina Network for Fair, Safe, and Secure Elections
Tom Ross, Former State Superior Court Judge and Former President of the University of North Carolina
Kim Wyman, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow (national expert)
External Resources
Election Code
North Carolina Administrative Election Code
State Board of Elections Website
Information for North Carolina voters affected by Helene
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
North Carolina Administrative Election Code
State Board of Elections Website
Information for North Carolina voters affected by Helene
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Event |
Audience and Purpose |
Date or Target Week Times |
National press briefing #1 |
Pre-election: Launch the series. Orient to the project, resources, and expected priorities for coverage nationally. |
9/16/24* |
NC pre-election press briefing |
Pre-election, in-state reporters |
10/3/24 or 10/4/2 |
National press briefing #2 |
Pre-election, all reporters, all states: Summary the state briefings, what we are hearing in the key states, what to watch for. |
10/21/24* |
National press briefing #3 |
Post-election, all reporters, all states: What we saw this week. States where judicial review may be called on. |
11/7/24 ** |
In-state briefings as needed |
Post-election, state specific: We may, or may not, need the chance to put forward our in-state experts, depending on what happens in each state. |
11/6/24 or 11/12/24 |
National press briefing #4 |
Post-election: Electoral Count Reform Act in action. Certificates of Ascertainment to be issued the next day. Our legal team briefs reporters on the next month of deadlines. |
12/10/24 ** |
National press briefing #5 |
Post-election: Congress meets tomorrow to accept electoral votes. ERN’s team of commentators will brief reporters on what’s expected. |
1/5/25 ** |
Date |
Time |
Activity |
11/06/24 |
Precincts selected for audit |
|
11/14/24 |
5:00 PM |
Last day for voters to cure timely submitted absentee ballots and provisional ballots requiring ID verification. |
11/15/24 |
Deadline for election protest concerning votes counted or tabulation of results. |
|
11/15/24 |
11:00 AM |
County Canvass |
11/18/24 |
5:00 PM |
Deadline to Request a Recount for Contests Within the Jurisdiction of the County Board |
11/19/24 |
12 noon |
Deadline to Request a Recount for Contests Within the Jurisdiction of the State Board |
11/19/24 |
5:00 PM |
Deadline to file election protest concerning any irregularity other than votes or tabulation of results. |
11/19/24 |
5:00 PM |
Deadline to file election protest concerning manner in which votes were counted or results were tabulated and there is good cause for delay in filing |
11/20/24 |
County board considers recount requests and protests |
|
11/21/24 |
County Boards of Election issues certificates if no protest is pending |
|
11/26/24 |
11:00 AM |
State Canvass |
12/02/24 |
SBE issues certificates if no protest is pending |
|
12/02/24 |
||
12/11/24 |
Federal deadline to issue certificates of ascertainment officially appointing the state's presidential electors |
|
12/17/24 |
Meeting of the Electoral College |
For More Dates See the North Carolina State Board of Elections' Calendar
Edits:
10/28/2024, 5.a, added, "North Carolina's current ID law was implemented for the first time in 2023."
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
10/28/2024, 5.a, added, "North Carolina's current ID law was implemented for the first time in 2023."
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
