NEW MEXICO
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures of elections in NEW MEXICO.
The information is grouped by three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review. It aims to be a go-to resource, especially when journalists must cover close, contested, and disputed elections. Today's voters have many questions about the fairness of elections. So, the Election Overtime project aims to inform media coverage of elections that helps explain how elections are grounded in the impartial rule of law. The brief focuses on structures that enable fairness and confidence, such as the role of poll watchers, rigorous verification procedures, and the evidentiary requirements of the courts for races that are contested.
The Election Reformers Network team stands ready to support journalists in deploying this content in your coverage.
The information is grouped by three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review. It aims to be a go-to resource, especially when journalists must cover close, contested, and disputed elections. Today's voters have many questions about the fairness of elections. So, the Election Overtime project aims to inform media coverage of elections that helps explain how elections are grounded in the impartial rule of law. The brief focuses on structures that enable fairness and confidence, such as the role of poll watchers, rigorous verification procedures, and the evidentiary requirements of the courts for races that are contested.
The Election Reformers Network team stands ready to support journalists in deploying this content in your coverage.
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, with a process as critical as elections, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
QUESTION 1: What are the roles of canvassing boards, challengers, and observers?
1.a. A hierarchy of election groups and people hold the New Mexico election process accountable and protect candidates.
County Clerks: In New Mexico, primary responsibility for election oversight falls to elected county clerks, who are the chief election officer, responsible for administration of elections for the county.
County Commissions: Unlike some states that have dedicated county election boards, New Mexico law assigns the role of certifying elections within the county to the county commission, comprised of three or five elected members. Each commission has the legal authority to delegate the responsibility to the county board of registration to serve as the canvassing board, but this practice is uncommon.
State Canvassing Board: Under New Mexico law, the three-member State Canvassing Board is comprised of the secretary of state, the governor, and the chief justice of the state’s supreme court. Their role is to accept the county canvasses after each election and certify the results statewide. This function requires a vote of at least two of them. After the county commission certifies the election, the county clerk transmits this certification to the secretary of state.
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CONTEXT: What is a canvass?
Throughout the nation, a final “canvass” is the culmination of data generated during an election cycle. Generally, the process aggregates and confirms that every valid ballot cast was counted, including mail, uniformed and overseas citizen, early voting, Election Day, and provisional ballots. New Mexico’s 2022 canvassing process was described in this summary released by its secretary of state.
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Challengers and Watchers: Designated representatives of the political parties may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes. New Mexico calls these people challengers, watchers, or county canvass observers depending on their specific roles. These individuals should not be confused with “election observers,” described below.
1.b. New Mexico establishes clear qualifications and restrictions for challenges, watchers, and observers.
State law establishes that challengers and watchers in New Mexico shall be voters of a precinct located in that county to which they are appointed. Challenges and watchers cannot be appointed if they are a candidate, family member of a candidate, or a local or state law enforcement. Challengers are appointed by the county chair of each political party. If more than one challenger is appointed to a polling location, the challengers shall be listed in ranking order. If any county chair fails to make such appointments, the state party chair may appoint in writing one challenger for the polling location.
1.c. New Mexico requires training for watchers and challengers.
State law requires that watchers and challengers attend a training session, which is designed by the secretary of state and administered by the county clerks. Best practices contemplated by the National Conference of State Legislators suggest that all types of observers be trained in their role and knowledgeable about election procedures. That preparation can help improve the credibility of their accounts if they observe problems.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions. Some states require training; many do not.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by signing a short online form.
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election monitors or the general public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. New Mexico provides nonpartisan monitors and researchers to observe election procedures.
As used in New Mexico’s election code, "election observer" means a person registered with the United States Department of State as an international election observer or registered with the secretary of state to perform research on elections and election processes. A new, formalized election observation program was launched in New Mexico in 2024. It requires participants to undergo training and sign a detailed code of conduct.
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CONTEXT: Titles can be confusing.
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. Note: this role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. New Mexico provides nonpartisan monitors and researchers to observe election procedures.
As used in New Mexico’s election code, "election observer" means a person registered with the United States Department of State as an international election observer or registered with the secretary of state to perform research on elections and election processes. A new, formalized election observation program was launched in New Mexico in 2024. It requires participants to undergo training and sign a detailed code of conduct.
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CONTEXT: Titles can be confusing.
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. Note: this role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are poll observers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to political party observation.
Party election challenges and watchers are allowed only in designated areas at the polling place, and are prohibited from handling the ballots, signature rosters, or checklists, nor can they interfere with the orderly conduct of the election or counting of ballots.
Party election challenges and watchers are allowed only in designated areas at the polling place, and are prohibited from handling the ballots, signature rosters, or checklists, nor can they interfere with the orderly conduct of the election or counting of ballots.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance including seal numbers on equipment, ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 4: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
4.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before voting.
Prior to every election, election officials test that tabulators accurately count actual paper ballots with a known outcome. Furthermore, according to election officials, they confirm that they properly handle over-vote and under-vote conditions. Then, the expected outcome is checked at every step in the process to verify that the sums at the county and state levels are accurate, as are the results that are displayed on the election results website.
This process is called “Logic and Accuracy” testing and can be observed by party and organization representatives, election observers and candidates. New Mexico’s testing, combined with the state’s audits, recounts, and other procedures, is structured to catch errors before election results are finalized.
4.b. No equipment used to count ballots is connected to the internet.
Any systems that count votes, aka tabulators, are prohibited from being joined to a computer network or the Internet. Systems that sum votes at the county level are prevented by law and process from being joined to a computer network or the Internet.
4.c. Any electronic devices used must produce a paper record, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
According to Verified Voting, two types of ballots are used in New Mexico: hand-marked paper ballots and electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs). On election day, the vast majority of ballots are hand-marked, with BMDs deployed only for people with disabilities. Most BMDs use a touch screen to collect the votes. They do not store voter selections, instead producing a reviewable paper ballot that is scanned into a tabulator.
Maintaining a verifiable paper trail, as all New Mexico counties voting do, is a recommended best practice for election administration. Having a paper trail allows officials to audit or recount the ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
4.d. Equipment is certified and the same across the state.
According to the Secretary of State, New Mexico’s voting equipment is uniform state-wide: Dominion Voting Systems Imagecast Evolution and Imagecast Precinct with an ADA-compliant BMD.
Prior to every election, election officials test that tabulators accurately count actual paper ballots with a known outcome. Furthermore, according to election officials, they confirm that they properly handle over-vote and under-vote conditions. Then, the expected outcome is checked at every step in the process to verify that the sums at the county and state levels are accurate, as are the results that are displayed on the election results website.
This process is called “Logic and Accuracy” testing and can be observed by party and organization representatives, election observers and candidates. New Mexico’s testing, combined with the state’s audits, recounts, and other procedures, is structured to catch errors before election results are finalized.
4.b. No equipment used to count ballots is connected to the internet.
Any systems that count votes, aka tabulators, are prohibited from being joined to a computer network or the Internet. Systems that sum votes at the county level are prevented by law and process from being joined to a computer network or the Internet.
4.c. Any electronic devices used must produce a paper record, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
According to Verified Voting, two types of ballots are used in New Mexico: hand-marked paper ballots and electronic ballot marking devices (BMDs). On election day, the vast majority of ballots are hand-marked, with BMDs deployed only for people with disabilities. Most BMDs use a touch screen to collect the votes. They do not store voter selections, instead producing a reviewable paper ballot that is scanned into a tabulator.
Maintaining a verifiable paper trail, as all New Mexico counties voting do, is a recommended best practice for election administration. Having a paper trail allows officials to audit or recount the ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
4.d. Equipment is certified and the same across the state.
According to the Secretary of State, New Mexico’s voting equipment is uniform state-wide: Dominion Voting Systems Imagecast Evolution and Imagecast Precinct with an ADA-compliant BMD.
QUESTION 5: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
5.a. Identification not required to vote in-person.
Identification is not required to vote in statewide elections in New Mexico. However, a copy of identification is required when registering to vote for the first time, and can take various forms that show the voter’s name and current address (such as photo ID, utility bill, bank statement, paycheck, student ID, and tribal ID). Registrants who fail to submit identification with their mailed-in, first-time registration, are required to present ID when voting in person or absentee.
Some municipal jurisdictions in New Mexico, such as the city of Rio Rancho, have ordinances in place that require voter id be presented to vote in city elections.
New Mexico is one of 14 states that do not require ID at the polls.
5.b. Vote by mail requires an ID.
New Mexico, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia has no-excuse vote-by-mail laws. Seven states conduct their entire election by mail-in ballot, according to MIT.
In New Mexico, voters must verify their identity to apply for an absentee ballot. When applying online this information includes their driver’s license number or state ID number, last digits of their social security number, and their date of birth. When applying through the mail it includes the voter's full name, mailing address, year of birth, and signature.
5.c. New Mexico officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that New Mexico, and every other state faces, is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. New Mexico is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (New Mexico retained its membership in ERIC, standing against what is widely considered by election officials to be misinformation about the program. In the last two years, nine states withdrew their membership and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
During the voter list maintenance process, New Mexico’s election administrators, as required by law, maintain and update their voter rolls continually — checking obituaries and probate records, receiving monthly reports from NM Vital Statistics about deceased individuals, and suspending or reinstating voters based on conviction or sentence-completion notices from the Department of Corrections. This is done in conjunction with the proactive measures already in place in New Mexico, such as automated voter registration, as well as online and same-day voter registration.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for non-voting, but a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter who fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
5.d. New Mexico law prohibits registration by noncitizens.
To register to vote in New Mexico, state law requires the registrant to be a U.S. citizen, a resident of New Mexico, and at least 18 years old on or before the day of the election. Citizenship papers are not required to register, and applicants must assert their citizenship status and other qualifications on the signed application form. Making false statements on a voter registration form is a state felony and is also federally unlawful. Doing so may result in prison time as well as deportation or denial of future immigration status.
Nationally, the Heritage Foundation has conducted research on a range of possible avenues for voter fraud. Their published national analysis of legal actions identified 24 instances of noncitizens voting between 2003 and 2023, across 50 states and millions of votes cast.
5.e. New Mexico allows limited challenges to voter eligibility and also opposes voter intimidation.
New Mexico law allows the Secretary of State to challenge in court a person’s qualifications to vote. State practice asks individuals who question a voter’s eligibility, who witness voter intimidation, or who have reason to believe that violations of election ethics have occurred to report the incident to the Secretary of State’s office, county clerk, or county district attorney.
The New Mexico Secretary of State’s Office is charged with investigating complaints related to elections and ethics under New Mexico law. Concerns may be submitted by mail or email, using this complaint form. The offices does not process or investigate anonymous complaints.
Identification is not required to vote in statewide elections in New Mexico. However, a copy of identification is required when registering to vote for the first time, and can take various forms that show the voter’s name and current address (such as photo ID, utility bill, bank statement, paycheck, student ID, and tribal ID). Registrants who fail to submit identification with their mailed-in, first-time registration, are required to present ID when voting in person or absentee.
Some municipal jurisdictions in New Mexico, such as the city of Rio Rancho, have ordinances in place that require voter id be presented to vote in city elections.
New Mexico is one of 14 states that do not require ID at the polls.
5.b. Vote by mail requires an ID.
New Mexico, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia has no-excuse vote-by-mail laws. Seven states conduct their entire election by mail-in ballot, according to MIT.
In New Mexico, voters must verify their identity to apply for an absentee ballot. When applying online this information includes their driver’s license number or state ID number, last digits of their social security number, and their date of birth. When applying through the mail it includes the voter's full name, mailing address, year of birth, and signature.
5.c. New Mexico officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that New Mexico, and every other state faces, is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. New Mexico is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (New Mexico retained its membership in ERIC, standing against what is widely considered by election officials to be misinformation about the program. In the last two years, nine states withdrew their membership and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
During the voter list maintenance process, New Mexico’s election administrators, as required by law, maintain and update their voter rolls continually — checking obituaries and probate records, receiving monthly reports from NM Vital Statistics about deceased individuals, and suspending or reinstating voters based on conviction or sentence-completion notices from the Department of Corrections. This is done in conjunction with the proactive measures already in place in New Mexico, such as automated voter registration, as well as online and same-day voter registration.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for non-voting, but a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter who fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
5.d. New Mexico law prohibits registration by noncitizens.
To register to vote in New Mexico, state law requires the registrant to be a U.S. citizen, a resident of New Mexico, and at least 18 years old on or before the day of the election. Citizenship papers are not required to register, and applicants must assert their citizenship status and other qualifications on the signed application form. Making false statements on a voter registration form is a state felony and is also federally unlawful. Doing so may result in prison time as well as deportation or denial of future immigration status.
Nationally, the Heritage Foundation has conducted research on a range of possible avenues for voter fraud. Their published national analysis of legal actions identified 24 instances of noncitizens voting between 2003 and 2023, across 50 states and millions of votes cast.
5.e. New Mexico allows limited challenges to voter eligibility and also opposes voter intimidation.
New Mexico law allows the Secretary of State to challenge in court a person’s qualifications to vote. State practice asks individuals who question a voter’s eligibility, who witness voter intimidation, or who have reason to believe that violations of election ethics have occurred to report the incident to the Secretary of State’s office, county clerk, or county district attorney.
The New Mexico Secretary of State’s Office is charged with investigating complaints related to elections and ethics under New Mexico law. Concerns may be submitted by mail or email, using this complaint form. The offices does not process or investigate anonymous complaints.
QUESTION 6: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
6.a. New Mexico officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In New Mexico, mailed ballots can be processed before the election, including using a scanning device to prepare for tabulation on election day. Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scanning before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
6.b. The initial results are subject to best-practice confirmation testing and oversight.
The day after the polls close, the Secretary of State launches an audit of the machine vote counts for all federal offices, the contest for Governor, and one additional statewide office.
To start the process, an appointed auditor randomly selects a sample of precincts with a mix of vote types (such as early voting, Election Day, and absentee). This selection is done publicly using a random number generator. Next, county clerks compare a hand count of votes for each office with the electronic tallies at the close of the polls. County clerks must report their results to the auditor within 10 days. (New Mexico’s audit procedures can be compared with other states at Verified Voting)
New Mexico’s audit is similar to a risk-limiting audit. In this type of audit, instead of a sample size set by law, the number of ballots counted is determined by the margin of victory in the closest race. The closer the unofficial results the more ballots are counted, this provides mathematical confidence that the winner was accurately identified. If no federal or state races are close, a smaller sample is needed. This method is more efficient than full recounts and, in combination with automatica recounts in very close races, allows election authorities to be confident that the preliminary results have accurately identified the winner. In New Mexico, the audit must have a 90% chance of detecting errors that alter the outcome of the most narrowly won contest.
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CONTEXT: Official Results Come Later
In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night. But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted, audited, and certified. Today, lack of understanding of the audit and certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. New Mexico’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but research indicates that full hand counts would likely make elections slower and less accurate.
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CONTEXT: More on Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. The real risks are that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors and gives bad-faith actors more fodder. Generally speaking, Americans want teachers and police officers to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods. Many people believe the same should be true for election officials. In New Mexico, conducting hand-counted audits on a sample of ballots empowers officials to get voters results-verification in a timely and efficient manner.
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6.d. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the official recording and certification of the results on the county and then the state level. The canvass is a public event and requires documentation to ensure that appropriate election procedures were conducted, including audits and investigation of concerns. The county canvass must be completed within 10 days of the election (or 13 days for large counties). The results are transmitted to the Secretary of State and then the State Canvassing Board. The State Board must meet on the third Tuesday after the election (November 26, 2024) to certify the results.
6.e. Candidates in close elections may qualify for a recount.
Tracking of all contests in New Mexico that may qualify for a recount is required by state law. Automatic recounts are triggered when races are particularly close, and at different thresholds, depending on the type of race and the size of the county. A recount is triggered when the margin of outcome is less than the following percentages of the total votes cast for that office:
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change Outcomes
An analysis by Fairvote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. However, small discrepancies can happen. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts isn’t to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the winner of an election.
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In New Mexico, mailed ballots can be processed before the election, including using a scanning device to prepare for tabulation on election day. Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scanning before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
6.b. The initial results are subject to best-practice confirmation testing and oversight.
The day after the polls close, the Secretary of State launches an audit of the machine vote counts for all federal offices, the contest for Governor, and one additional statewide office.
To start the process, an appointed auditor randomly selects a sample of precincts with a mix of vote types (such as early voting, Election Day, and absentee). This selection is done publicly using a random number generator. Next, county clerks compare a hand count of votes for each office with the electronic tallies at the close of the polls. County clerks must report their results to the auditor within 10 days. (New Mexico’s audit procedures can be compared with other states at Verified Voting)
New Mexico’s audit is similar to a risk-limiting audit. In this type of audit, instead of a sample size set by law, the number of ballots counted is determined by the margin of victory in the closest race. The closer the unofficial results the more ballots are counted, this provides mathematical confidence that the winner was accurately identified. If no federal or state races are close, a smaller sample is needed. This method is more efficient than full recounts and, in combination with automatica recounts in very close races, allows election authorities to be confident that the preliminary results have accurately identified the winner. In New Mexico, the audit must have a 90% chance of detecting errors that alter the outcome of the most narrowly won contest.
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CONTEXT: Official Results Come Later
In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night. But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted, audited, and certified. Today, lack of understanding of the audit and certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.c. New Mexico’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but research indicates that full hand counts would likely make elections slower and less accurate.
—————
CONTEXT: More on Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. The real risks are that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors and gives bad-faith actors more fodder. Generally speaking, Americans want teachers and police officers to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods. Many people believe the same should be true for election officials. In New Mexico, conducting hand-counted audits on a sample of ballots empowers officials to get voters results-verification in a timely and efficient manner.
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6.d. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the official recording and certification of the results on the county and then the state level. The canvass is a public event and requires documentation to ensure that appropriate election procedures were conducted, including audits and investigation of concerns. The county canvass must be completed within 10 days of the election (or 13 days for large counties). The results are transmitted to the Secretary of State and then the State Canvassing Board. The State Board must meet on the third Tuesday after the election (November 26, 2024) to certify the results.
6.e. Candidates in close elections may qualify for a recount.
Tracking of all contests in New Mexico that may qualify for a recount is required by state law. Automatic recounts are triggered when races are particularly close, and at different thresholds, depending on the type of race and the size of the county. A recount is triggered when the margin of outcome is less than the following percentages of the total votes cast for that office:
- One fourth percent (.25%) for federal or statewide office
- One fourth percent (.25%) on a state ballot initiative
- One fourth percent (.25%) on a nonpartisan judicial retention election in the case of the supreme court or the court of appeals
- One half percent (.5%) for public education commissioner, district attorney or any office elected countywide in a county with more than 150,000 voters
- One half percent (.5%) on a local ballot initiative
- One half percent (.5%) on a nonpartisan judicial retention election in the case of a district court or the metropolitan court
- One percent (1%) for any other office
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change Outcomes
An analysis by Fairvote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. However, small discrepancies can happen. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts isn’t to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the winner of an election.
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QUESTION 7: Who certifies results in New Mexico, and what issues have arisen around certification?
7.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In New Mexico, certification happens at the county and state levels. As noted previously, county certification is the responsibility of each county’s board of commissioners, who also serve as the county canvassing board for the county. Boards of county commissioners have three or five members, elected in partisan elections. The boards have broad administrative responsibilities in the county, in addition to their narrow involvement in elections.
During certification, the boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information and affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. County-level certification must be completed between six and thirteen days after the election. The report of the canvass, signed by the members of the canvassing board includes “the final vote counts for each candidate contest and ballot question voted on by voters of the county separated by mailed ballots, early voting and election day voting,” and additional data such as a report of all provisional ballots accepted and rejected.
As previously noted, state-level certification is the responsibility of the state canvassing board, which comprises the secretary of state, the chief justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court, and the governor. The board is required to “approve the report of the canvass and declare the results” of the election on the third Tuesday after the election.
7.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” a required function, not an exercise of individual discretion or judgment.
A court can compel certification if the county or state canvassing boards refuse to certify. New Mexico case law illustrates that it is “quite well settled that [clerks and canvassing boards] act only ministerially, and not judicially,” and that “the power of the court to compel ministerial officers to act is without doubt.”
If a county board or the state board refused to certify, a court can mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
The county boards have limited powers to investigate and correct precinct returns. For example, the law provides that if “it appears that there is a discrepancy within the election returns” or “a discrepancy between the number of votes set forth in the certificate for any candidate and the number of electors voting,” the county canvassing board “shall immediately issue a summons directed to the precinct board, commanding them to forthwith appear and make the necessary corrections or supply omissions.”
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CONTEXT: Certification Processes Similar to Congressional Validation of the Presidential Election
The final counting of electoral votes in Congress during the Presidential election follows the same logic. (See ECRA section below.) Members of Congress can object to electoral votes only on extremely narrow grounds, such as if an elector voted to elect a president and vice president of the same state, which is not permitted by the Constitution.
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7.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in New Mexico have refused to certify results.
All such refusals have been resolved, in some cases by court orders. In previous elections, members of two county canvassing boards in New Mexico voted against certifying results. Each instance was resolved. In one case, the Secretary of State filed a legal action that led to a court mandating that the board members certify the results. In another, the canvassing board member who voted against certification was outvoted.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved by: courts compelling certification, the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
7.d. New Mexico law provides other, better-suited means to address challenges and concerns about the accuracy of results.
Candidates and political parties have the right to challenge election results in court after county and state certification. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. New Mexico law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. [See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results in New Mexico, and questions [9, 10, and 11] for information on audits and recounts.]
Strictly speaking, therefore, the results certified by the county and state canvass boards may be subject to change (see note “Certificate of election furnishes prima facie right to office only”) until any recounts and court challenges are completed. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A recent study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the US, by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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In New Mexico, certification happens at the county and state levels. As noted previously, county certification is the responsibility of each county’s board of commissioners, who also serve as the county canvassing board for the county. Boards of county commissioners have three or five members, elected in partisan elections. The boards have broad administrative responsibilities in the county, in addition to their narrow involvement in elections.
During certification, the boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information and affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. County-level certification must be completed between six and thirteen days after the election. The report of the canvass, signed by the members of the canvassing board includes “the final vote counts for each candidate contest and ballot question voted on by voters of the county separated by mailed ballots, early voting and election day voting,” and additional data such as a report of all provisional ballots accepted and rejected.
As previously noted, state-level certification is the responsibility of the state canvassing board, which comprises the secretary of state, the chief justice of the New Mexico Supreme Court, and the governor. The board is required to “approve the report of the canvass and declare the results” of the election on the third Tuesday after the election.
7.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” a required function, not an exercise of individual discretion or judgment.
A court can compel certification if the county or state canvassing boards refuse to certify. New Mexico case law illustrates that it is “quite well settled that [clerks and canvassing boards] act only ministerially, and not judicially,” and that “the power of the court to compel ministerial officers to act is without doubt.”
If a county board or the state board refused to certify, a court can mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
The county boards have limited powers to investigate and correct precinct returns. For example, the law provides that if “it appears that there is a discrepancy within the election returns” or “a discrepancy between the number of votes set forth in the certificate for any candidate and the number of electors voting,” the county canvassing board “shall immediately issue a summons directed to the precinct board, commanding them to forthwith appear and make the necessary corrections or supply omissions.”
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CONTEXT: Certification Processes Similar to Congressional Validation of the Presidential Election
The final counting of electoral votes in Congress during the Presidential election follows the same logic. (See ECRA section below.) Members of Congress can object to electoral votes only on extremely narrow grounds, such as if an elector voted to elect a president and vice president of the same state, which is not permitted by the Constitution.
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7.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in New Mexico have refused to certify results.
All such refusals have been resolved, in some cases by court orders. In previous elections, members of two county canvassing boards in New Mexico voted against certifying results. Each instance was resolved. In one case, the Secretary of State filed a legal action that led to a court mandating that the board members certify the results. In another, the canvassing board member who voted against certification was outvoted.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved by: courts compelling certification, the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
7.d. New Mexico law provides other, better-suited means to address challenges and concerns about the accuracy of results.
Candidates and political parties have the right to challenge election results in court after county and state certification. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. New Mexico law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. [See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results in New Mexico, and questions [9, 10, and 11] for information on audits and recounts.]
Strictly speaking, therefore, the results certified by the county and state canvass boards may be subject to change (see note “Certificate of election furnishes prima facie right to office only”) until any recounts and court challenges are completed. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
—————
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A recent study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the US, by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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QUESTION 8: What's changed since 2020 about how Congress concludes the presidential election process?
8.a. In 2022, Congress passed the bipartisan Electoral Count Reform Act (ECRA), replacing an outdated law from 1887.
The new federal law addresses vulnerabilities in the presidential election process that were exposed by events following the 2020 election. ECRA clarified several procedures that had been ambiguous under federal law, including that the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes is “solely ministerial.” Because the presidential election is administered by the states, ECRA also impacted aspects of state law (described below).
8.b. ECRA aims to prevent unsanctioned electors and related problems with presidential elections by clarifying details about the official submission to Congress of each state’s presidential electoral count.
Under ECRA, the governor must issue a state’s Certificate of Ascertainment of Appointment of Electors, unless state law explicitly delegates that duty to another executive official. ECRA also specifies that each certificate must contain:
Then, when those electors hold their official meeting, they sign and submit a different certificate of votes delineating the electoral college votes for President and Vice President.
In addition to these federal requirements, 33 states have passed laws prohibiting unsanctioned or “faithless” electors in the presidential election process. New Mexico is not among them. Such legislation was introduced in New Mexico in January 2024 but died in committee.
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CONTEXT: 2020 “fake electors” highlighted the need for ECRA
In 2020, after it became clear that former President Donald Trump’s multiple lawsuits contesting the election results lacked evidentiary merit to alter the outcome, he and allies assembled their own slates of presidential electors in seven states where Trump did not win. Those unsanctioned electors met the same day as the legitimate electors, cast votes for Trump, and submitted to Congress competing Certificates of Ascertainment. President Trump began a pressure campaign to urge then-Vice President Mike Pence to discard the actual results from those seven states, and instead accept the fraudulent ones during the January 6, 2021 vote counting hearing. Had the Vice President done so, and had enough members of Congress gone along, President Joe Biden would have fallen short of the 270-vote Electoral College majority.
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8.c. ECRA clarifies the timeline for the presidential post-election process, with implications for states.
This timeline includes a new mandatory deadline for issuing the Certificate of Ascertainment, a new deadline for court intervention, and an updated date for the electors to meet and cast their votes. As a result, many intermediate state deadlines (such as vote counting, recounts, and audits) may need to be updated to comply with the new mandatory deadlines. Some states have updated their laws to reflect this timeline. Although New Mexico is not among them, federal law should generally preempt state law where there is overlap.
8.d. Legislatures cannot change the rules after Election Day.
ECRA requires that elections be administered according to the state laws in place prior to Election Day, including laws governing presidential electors, voting emergencies, and related provisions. Importantly, ECRA also removed language from the old law pertaining to "failed elections" that bad-faith actors relied upon to argue that federal law allowed state legislatures to step in after the election was over and to appoint their own presidential electors, potentially overturning the will of the voters.
8.e. ECRA strengthens the role of courts.
The new law gives the courts the last word over disputes regarding a state's presidential election results, including any needed changes to the state's Certificate of Ascertainment. It also establishes a process for aggrieved presidential or vice-presidential candidates to bring cases before three-judge federal district courts.
—————
CONTEXT: Do Americans vote for the President, or for the electors?
Actually, under the somewhat convoluted provisions of the Electoral College, Americans technically vote for the electors, who in turn vote for the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Most states deploy a “winner takes all” approach in which all the Electoral College votes are awarded to the ticket that won the popular vote in that state. Two states (Maine and Nebraska) split a portion of their electoral votes by congressional district.
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The new federal law addresses vulnerabilities in the presidential election process that were exposed by events following the 2020 election. ECRA clarified several procedures that had been ambiguous under federal law, including that the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes is “solely ministerial.” Because the presidential election is administered by the states, ECRA also impacted aspects of state law (described below).
8.b. ECRA aims to prevent unsanctioned electors and related problems with presidential elections by clarifying details about the official submission to Congress of each state’s presidential electoral count.
Under ECRA, the governor must issue a state’s Certificate of Ascertainment of Appointment of Electors, unless state law explicitly delegates that duty to another executive official. ECRA also specifies that each certificate must contain:
- The names of the state’s electors
- The number of popular votes won in that state by each of the presidential candidates’ electors (see below, “Do Americans vote for the President, or the electors?”)
- Authenticity elements, such as the seal of the State and at least one security feature
Then, when those electors hold their official meeting, they sign and submit a different certificate of votes delineating the electoral college votes for President and Vice President.
In addition to these federal requirements, 33 states have passed laws prohibiting unsanctioned or “faithless” electors in the presidential election process. New Mexico is not among them. Such legislation was introduced in New Mexico in January 2024 but died in committee.
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CONTEXT: 2020 “fake electors” highlighted the need for ECRA
In 2020, after it became clear that former President Donald Trump’s multiple lawsuits contesting the election results lacked evidentiary merit to alter the outcome, he and allies assembled their own slates of presidential electors in seven states where Trump did not win. Those unsanctioned electors met the same day as the legitimate electors, cast votes for Trump, and submitted to Congress competing Certificates of Ascertainment. President Trump began a pressure campaign to urge then-Vice President Mike Pence to discard the actual results from those seven states, and instead accept the fraudulent ones during the January 6, 2021 vote counting hearing. Had the Vice President done so, and had enough members of Congress gone along, President Joe Biden would have fallen short of the 270-vote Electoral College majority.
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8.c. ECRA clarifies the timeline for the presidential post-election process, with implications for states.
This timeline includes a new mandatory deadline for issuing the Certificate of Ascertainment, a new deadline for court intervention, and an updated date for the electors to meet and cast their votes. As a result, many intermediate state deadlines (such as vote counting, recounts, and audits) may need to be updated to comply with the new mandatory deadlines. Some states have updated their laws to reflect this timeline. Although New Mexico is not among them, federal law should generally preempt state law where there is overlap.
8.d. Legislatures cannot change the rules after Election Day.
ECRA requires that elections be administered according to the state laws in place prior to Election Day, including laws governing presidential electors, voting emergencies, and related provisions. Importantly, ECRA also removed language from the old law pertaining to "failed elections" that bad-faith actors relied upon to argue that federal law allowed state legislatures to step in after the election was over and to appoint their own presidential electors, potentially overturning the will of the voters.
8.e. ECRA strengthens the role of courts.
The new law gives the courts the last word over disputes regarding a state's presidential election results, including any needed changes to the state's Certificate of Ascertainment. It also establishes a process for aggrieved presidential or vice-presidential candidates to bring cases before three-judge federal district courts.
—————
CONTEXT: Do Americans vote for the President, or for the electors?
Actually, under the somewhat convoluted provisions of the Electoral College, Americans technically vote for the electors, who in turn vote for the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Most states deploy a “winner takes all” approach in which all the Electoral College votes are awarded to the ticket that won the popular vote in that state. Two states (Maine and Nebraska) split a portion of their electoral votes by congressional district.
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PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in election is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was inconsistent, and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was inconsistent, and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
QUESTION 9: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
9.a. Unsuccessful candidates can protest the results in state court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest some election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court. The contest must be filed in district court within 30 days after issuance of the certificate of nomination.
Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that don’t affect the outcome of the election.
Challengers have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: They may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest some election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court. The contest must be filed in district court within 30 days after issuance of the certificate of nomination.
Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that don’t affect the outcome of the election.
Challengers have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: They may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 10: What’s required of plaintiffs and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
10.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
10.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts and expedited contests.
In expedited contests, the plaintiff’s allegations must be sufficient to warrant potentially overturning the election results. However, challenges do not always focus on challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
10.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
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CONTEXT: Fraud is Not Fraud Without Proof
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
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10.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery or fraud involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not change the outcome of the election but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved. In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome.
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CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and petitioners, and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
10.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts and expedited contests.
In expedited contests, the plaintiff’s allegations must be sufficient to warrant potentially overturning the election results. However, challenges do not always focus on challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
10.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
—————
CONTEXT: Fraud is Not Fraud Without Proof
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
—————
10.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery or fraud involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not change the outcome of the election but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved. In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome.
—————
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and petitioners, and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
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QUESTION 11: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
11.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power or authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Statement of a claim: There may be insufficient evidence to warrant a trial, or the allegations of the plaintiff may not even describe a violation of law.
- Unreasonable delays (also known as "Laches"): A suit may challenge the rules after the election when it should, instead, have challenged those rules well in advance.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
- A voter from one state attempts to challenge an election result in a different state.
- A case brought on the theory that voting equipment could have been connected to the internet but provides no evidence that the equipment ever was, in fact, connected to the internet.
- A challenge calls for overturning an election won by 10,000 votes, based on evidence of errors only affecting one polling station of 100 voters.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
QUESTION 12: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
12.a. The timelines are tight.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections. The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021. Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and that can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
12.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implication of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the contestants’ claims are far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press lawyers to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on in order translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections. The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021. Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and that can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
12.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implication of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the contestants’ claims are far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press lawyers to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on in order translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Experts
Heather W. Balas, Former Executive Director, New Mexico First; Vice President of ERN
Hannah Burlling, President, League of Women Voters of NM
Ben Ginsberg, Pillars of the Community Co-Chair (national expert)
Carmen Lopez, Co-Lead of Observe New Mexico Elections a project of the Carter Center
Rashad Mahmood, Executive Director, New Mexico Local News Fund
Jennifer Morrell, The Elections Group CEO & Co-Founder (national expert)
Kim Wyman, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow (national expert)
Hannah Burlling, President, League of Women Voters of NM
Ben Ginsberg, Pillars of the Community Co-Chair (national expert)
Carmen Lopez, Co-Lead of Observe New Mexico Elections a project of the Carter Center
Rashad Mahmood, Executive Director, New Mexico Local News Fund
Jennifer Morrell, The Elections Group CEO & Co-Founder (national expert)
Kim Wyman, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow (national expert)
New Mexico Guides and Laws
New Mexico Election Code
New Mexico Administrative Code
Secretary of State’s Website
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
New Mexico Administrative Code
Secretary of State’s Website
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Stay tuned for an events schedule, coming soon.
Date |
New Mexico Election Activity |
11/11/24 |
County canvass may begin. |
11/15/24 |
Deadline to complete county canvass and certification in most counties. |
11/18/24 |
Deadline to complete county canvass and certification in Bernalillo County. (Counties with over 150,000 voters.) |
11/21/24 |
Last possible day for county-level recount request in most counties. |
11/24/24 |
Last possible day for county-level recount request in Bernalillo County. |
11/26/24 |
State Canvassing Board meets to approve the report of the canvass and declare the results of the election |
11/26/24 |
Determination of need for multi-county or state-level automatic recounts. (Upon completion of canvass.) |
11/27/24 |
Last day for clerks to report their results to the auditor within ten audits to be completed. |
12/02/24 |
Last day to file a multi-county or state-level recount request. |
12/11/24 |
Federal deadline to issue certificates of ascertainment officially appointing the state's presidential electors |
12/17/24 |
Meeting of the Electoral College Meeting of the Electoral College |
01/05/24 |
Last possible day for filing of election contests |
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
