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MICHIGAN
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures governing elections in Michigan.
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Chapter 168 of the Michigan Compiled Laws are abbreviated "MCL"
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Chapter 168 of the Michigan Compiled Laws are abbreviated "MCL"
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
QUESTION 1: What are the roles of election boards, poll workers, and observers?
1.a. A hierarchy of institutions and officials oversee elections in Michigan.
State law provides for bipartisan input and oversight by Democrats and Republicans. Key roles include:
Secretary of State: The Secretary of State oversees election administration across the state by issuing instructions and directions describing the proper conduct of elections (MCL §168.21). The current Secretary of State is Jocelyn Benson.
2026 Firewall Policy: Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson is a candidate for governor in 2026. The Department of State has established a firewall policy under which Benson will recuse herself from specified tasks that could affect the gubernatorial race. Those responsibilities are delegated to the Director of Elections where the firewall applies. The bipartisan Board of State Canvassers retains responsibility for certifying statewide and federal election results.
Board of State Canvassers: The Board of State Canvassers approves voting equipment and oversees multi-county elections, including federal and state elections, through canvass, certification, and recount. According to state law, the four-member board must have two Republicans and two Democrats (MCL §168.22, §168.841).
Boards of County Canvassers: The Board of County Canvassers counts the votes cast within the county and certifies election results for all offices (with the exception that it does not certify congressional, state senate, and state house races that span multiple counties). Under the authority of the Board of State Canvassers, county boards also oversee recounts. According to state law, the four-member boards must have two Republicans and two Democrats (MCL §168.24a).
City and Township Election Commissions: Local Election Commissions are responsible for certain election administration duties, such as appointing election inspectors (poll workers) and providing election supplies. Generally, these commissions are made up of existing officials such as, in the case of a city, the city clerk, the city attorney, and the city assessor (MCL §168.25, §168.719).
Boards of Inspectors of Elections: Inspectors of Elections are poll workers appointed/hired by election commissions. Inspectors can also challenge voters for “good reason” (MCL §168.727). Commissions must appoint an equal number of inspectors from each major political party (to the extent possible) with input from the local political parties who can nominate and object to candidates (MCL §168.674, §168.727).
Election Challengers: Challengers are non-governmental election observers appointed by political parties or other organizations qualified under Michigan law (in other states, this type of role may be called a poll watcher or observer).
Challengers may question a voter's eligibility to cast a ballot only if they have good reason to believe the voter is ineligible because the person is not registered to vote, is under 18 on Election Day, is not a U.S. citizen, or has not lived in the city or township where they are attempting to vote for at least 30 days before the election. The challenger must identify the specific reason for the challenge and explain the basis for that belief (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
Challengers may also challenge an election process they believe is being performed improperly, but must identify the specific part of the process at issue and explain the basis for the challenge.
Political parties may directly credential challengers. Other qualified organizations must apply for approval from the clerk of each county, city, or township in which they intend to field challengers; approval by a county clerk allows the organization to appoint challengers throughout that county. Credentialing organizations must also train their challengers using state guidance, and challengers must have completed the required training within the previous two calendar years.
Challengers have specific rights and responsibilities, including observing election procedures, challenging voter eligibility or election processes, and notifying election officials of perceived violations of election law. One challenger per group can observe the issuance and receipt of absentee voter ballots; up to two challengers from each credentialing organization may be present at an Election Day precinct or early voting site, although only one of the two may be designated to make challenges at a time. The number of challengers permitted at absent voter ballot processing facilities depends on the facility's organization and staffing. During processing and tabulation before Election Day, each credentialing organization generally may have one challenger for every eight election inspectors, with additional rules governing facilities with multiple absentee voter counting boards (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
Poll Watchers: Poll watchers in Michigan are members of the public who wish to observe elections. Poll watchers may observe elections at polling places, early voting sites, and absentee voter ballot processing facilities. Poll watchers do not have the same rights as credentialed challengers and must remain in the designated public viewing area (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
1.b. Michigan sets eligibility and training requirements for election challengers.
Who can serve as a challenger: Challengers must be registered to vote in Michigan, receive the necessary credentials, and complete the required training (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
Who cannot serve as a challenger: A person cannot serve as a challenger while also serving as an election inspector in the same election. A person running for office also cannot serve as a challenger, except that a candidate for precinct delegate may serve as a challenger at a precinct other than the one in which the candidate is running.
To compare these procedures with other states, visit the Poll Watchers and Challengers resource from the National Conference of State Legislatures.
1.c. Credentialing organizations are responsible for training and managing the challengers they appoint.
Michigan requires credentialing organizations to train their challengers in the “basic aspects of election administration” and the “rights and duties of challengers,” using guidance provided by the Secretary of State. Challengers must also be given training relevant to the specific types of election procedures they will be observing, such as absentee ballot processing or in-person voting. Credentialing organizations must also designate a point of contact who is available to election officials while their challengers are serving.
Before issuing challenger credentials, each person responsible for issuing credentials on behalf of an organization must also complete training provided by the Secretary of State. For 2026, this requirement is satisfied by reviewing the state's challenger and poll watcher manual and submitting a signed acknowledgment to the Secretary of State (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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State law provides for bipartisan input and oversight by Democrats and Republicans. Key roles include:
Secretary of State: The Secretary of State oversees election administration across the state by issuing instructions and directions describing the proper conduct of elections (MCL §168.21). The current Secretary of State is Jocelyn Benson.
2026 Firewall Policy: Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson is a candidate for governor in 2026. The Department of State has established a firewall policy under which Benson will recuse herself from specified tasks that could affect the gubernatorial race. Those responsibilities are delegated to the Director of Elections where the firewall applies. The bipartisan Board of State Canvassers retains responsibility for certifying statewide and federal election results.
Board of State Canvassers: The Board of State Canvassers approves voting equipment and oversees multi-county elections, including federal and state elections, through canvass, certification, and recount. According to state law, the four-member board must have two Republicans and two Democrats (MCL §168.22, §168.841).
Boards of County Canvassers: The Board of County Canvassers counts the votes cast within the county and certifies election results for all offices (with the exception that it does not certify congressional, state senate, and state house races that span multiple counties). Under the authority of the Board of State Canvassers, county boards also oversee recounts. According to state law, the four-member boards must have two Republicans and two Democrats (MCL §168.24a).
City and Township Election Commissions: Local Election Commissions are responsible for certain election administration duties, such as appointing election inspectors (poll workers) and providing election supplies. Generally, these commissions are made up of existing officials such as, in the case of a city, the city clerk, the city attorney, and the city assessor (MCL §168.25, §168.719).
Boards of Inspectors of Elections: Inspectors of Elections are poll workers appointed/hired by election commissions. Inspectors can also challenge voters for “good reason” (MCL §168.727). Commissions must appoint an equal number of inspectors from each major political party (to the extent possible) with input from the local political parties who can nominate and object to candidates (MCL §168.674, §168.727).
Election Challengers: Challengers are non-governmental election observers appointed by political parties or other organizations qualified under Michigan law (in other states, this type of role may be called a poll watcher or observer).
Challengers may question a voter's eligibility to cast a ballot only if they have good reason to believe the voter is ineligible because the person is not registered to vote, is under 18 on Election Day, is not a U.S. citizen, or has not lived in the city or township where they are attempting to vote for at least 30 days before the election. The challenger must identify the specific reason for the challenge and explain the basis for that belief (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
Challengers may also challenge an election process they believe is being performed improperly, but must identify the specific part of the process at issue and explain the basis for the challenge.
Political parties may directly credential challengers. Other qualified organizations must apply for approval from the clerk of each county, city, or township in which they intend to field challengers; approval by a county clerk allows the organization to appoint challengers throughout that county. Credentialing organizations must also train their challengers using state guidance, and challengers must have completed the required training within the previous two calendar years.
Challengers have specific rights and responsibilities, including observing election procedures, challenging voter eligibility or election processes, and notifying election officials of perceived violations of election law. One challenger per group can observe the issuance and receipt of absentee voter ballots; up to two challengers from each credentialing organization may be present at an Election Day precinct or early voting site, although only one of the two may be designated to make challenges at a time. The number of challengers permitted at absent voter ballot processing facilities depends on the facility's organization and staffing. During processing and tabulation before Election Day, each credentialing organization generally may have one challenger for every eight election inspectors, with additional rules governing facilities with multiple absentee voter counting boards (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
Poll Watchers: Poll watchers in Michigan are members of the public who wish to observe elections. Poll watchers may observe elections at polling places, early voting sites, and absentee voter ballot processing facilities. Poll watchers do not have the same rights as credentialed challengers and must remain in the designated public viewing area (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
1.b. Michigan sets eligibility and training requirements for election challengers.
Who can serve as a challenger: Challengers must be registered to vote in Michigan, receive the necessary credentials, and complete the required training (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
Who cannot serve as a challenger: A person cannot serve as a challenger while also serving as an election inspector in the same election. A person running for office also cannot serve as a challenger, except that a candidate for precinct delegate may serve as a challenger at a precinct other than the one in which the candidate is running.
To compare these procedures with other states, visit the Poll Watchers and Challengers resource from the National Conference of State Legislatures.
1.c. Credentialing organizations are responsible for training and managing the challengers they appoint.
Michigan requires credentialing organizations to train their challengers in the “basic aspects of election administration” and the “rights and duties of challengers,” using guidance provided by the Secretary of State. Challengers must also be given training relevant to the specific types of election procedures they will be observing, such as absentee ballot processing or in-person voting. Credentialing organizations must also designate a point of contact who is available to election officials while their challengers are serving.
Before issuing challenger credentials, each person responsible for issuing credentials on behalf of an organization must also complete training provided by the Secretary of State. For 2026, this requirement is satisfied by reviewing the state's challenger and poll watcher manual and submitting a signed acknowledgment to the Secretary of State (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election monitors or the general public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are challengers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to observation from party representatives.
Challengers are allowed in most areas and can view registration and voting-related documents at the polls and absentee ballot processing centers. However, challengers cannot interact or interfere with voters, election procedures, or staff. They can only communicate with the challenger liaison (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
Challengers are allowed in most areas and can view registration and voting-related documents at the polls and absentee ballot processing centers. However, challengers cannot interact or interfere with voters, election procedures, or staff. They can only communicate with the challenger liaison (MI 2026 Election Challengers and Poll Watchers Guidance).
QUESTION 4: What other forms of challenge are available before and during the election?
4.a. Michigan allows citizens to challenge voter eligibility.
In Michigan, a person’s qualifications to vote can be challenged by any elector of the same municipality at least 30 days before the election (MCL §168.512). During in-person voting, a voter registered in the same precinct can raise a challenge, as can a credentialed challenger or an election inspector (MCL §168.727).
There is no limit to the number of challenges that can be made by any one person. However, challenges can only be made against one voter at a time, and the person challenging must sign an oath and have their challenge notarized. Those who file indiscriminately and without good cause may be found guilty of a misdemeanor (MCL §168.512).
According to a report by Protect Democracy, the vast majority of challenges happening across the country are dismissed, but they have the effect of distracting administrators with (potentially unnecessary) work during busy election seasons and may dissuade challenged voters from participating in the democratic process.
In Michigan, a person’s qualifications to vote can be challenged by any elector of the same municipality at least 30 days before the election (MCL §168.512). During in-person voting, a voter registered in the same precinct can raise a challenge, as can a credentialed challenger or an election inspector (MCL §168.727).
There is no limit to the number of challenges that can be made by any one person. However, challenges can only be made against one voter at a time, and the person challenging must sign an oath and have their challenge notarized. Those who file indiscriminately and without good cause may be found guilty of a misdemeanor (MCL §168.512).
According to a report by Protect Democracy, the vast majority of challenges happening across the country are dismissed, but they have the effect of distracting administrators with (potentially unnecessary) work during busy election seasons and may dissuade challenged voters from participating in the democratic process.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance, including seal numbers on equipment, the number of ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 5: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
5.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before voting begins.
Vote counting in Michigan is generally done with the use of scanners that read voters’ electronic or hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. Absentee ballots that are mailed or submitted at voting centers are scanned under the supervision of local election officials and in locations viewable by the public. Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated correctly by each scanner (MCL §168.798). This process is often called a “logic and accuracy” test.
Before they can be used for voting, local commissions must conduct a preliminary test on all tabulators and voter assist terminals (which must be available for voters with disabilities). A sample of the tabulators is publicly tested. Observers of the public tests may even contribute their own votes on a test ballot to ensure the tabulator counts them accurately. The logic and accuracy test is designed to prevent and catch potential errors in equipment operation before it is used to tabulate actual election results (MI Election Officials Manual, Chapter 10). Audits, recounts, and other procedures provide a multi-layered process to catch potential errors through every stage of the election process.
Michigan's multi-layered verification process worked in real-time during the 2020 election in Antrim County. Last-minute changes to the county’s ballot design initially led voting equipment to show a victory for President Biden in the county. The mistake was caught and corrected by election officials before certification and a follow-up investigation produced recommendations for process improvements.
5.b. According to state law, tabulators must not be connected to the internet during the election.
From the time of the logic and accuracy test until tabulation has concluded, Michigan law calls for equipment to be isolated from external connections, including the internet. After polls have closed, some counties will send unofficial results to the county clerk electronically while also bringing a hard copy of the paper tally to ensure all vote counts remain accurate. Other counties use flash drives to submit results.
In Michigan, tampering with voting equipment is a felony (MCL §168.932).
5.c. Any electronic voting devices must produce a paper record, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
Michigan law requires electronic voting systems to produce a physical paper ballot for tabulation purposes (MCL §168.795). This paper trail allows officials to conduct post-election audits and recounts if there are concerns about the results. This requirement ensures that all votes cast in Michigan have a physical paper backup, enhancing the security and verifiability of the election process.
In Michigan, all voting takes place either with paper ballots marked by hand by the voter or with ballot marking devices (BMDs), which are assistive devices like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator. These devices do not store information; the only record generated by the BMD is the printout.
According to Verified Voting, on Election Day the state uses hand-marked paper ballots statewide, along with optical scanners to record the votes. BMDs with accessibility features must also be available. (A detailed list of all voting equipment used in the state is available from the Michigan Department of State.)
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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5.d. Equipment is certified by the Board of State Canvassers.
In Michigan, the Board of State Canvassers approves voting systems for use statewide, ensuring uniformity across counties (MCL §168.795). Only pre-approved systems can be used, including tabulators and BMDs. Equipment must come from a list of technology that is certified by the Board and meets standards laid out in state law (MCL §168.795a). For example, the standards require that equipment be certified by an independent testing authority accredited by the National Association of State Election Directors, or in the absence of such authority, is certified by the manufacturer of the voting system as meeting or exceeding the state’s requirements.
A list of approved systems is available on the Department of State's website.
Vote counting in Michigan is generally done with the use of scanners that read voters’ electronic or hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. Absentee ballots that are mailed or submitted at voting centers are scanned under the supervision of local election officials and in locations viewable by the public. Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated correctly by each scanner (MCL §168.798). This process is often called a “logic and accuracy” test.
Before they can be used for voting, local commissions must conduct a preliminary test on all tabulators and voter assist terminals (which must be available for voters with disabilities). A sample of the tabulators is publicly tested. Observers of the public tests may even contribute their own votes on a test ballot to ensure the tabulator counts them accurately. The logic and accuracy test is designed to prevent and catch potential errors in equipment operation before it is used to tabulate actual election results (MI Election Officials Manual, Chapter 10). Audits, recounts, and other procedures provide a multi-layered process to catch potential errors through every stage of the election process.
Michigan's multi-layered verification process worked in real-time during the 2020 election in Antrim County. Last-minute changes to the county’s ballot design initially led voting equipment to show a victory for President Biden in the county. The mistake was caught and corrected by election officials before certification and a follow-up investigation produced recommendations for process improvements.
5.b. According to state law, tabulators must not be connected to the internet during the election.
From the time of the logic and accuracy test until tabulation has concluded, Michigan law calls for equipment to be isolated from external connections, including the internet. After polls have closed, some counties will send unofficial results to the county clerk electronically while also bringing a hard copy of the paper tally to ensure all vote counts remain accurate. Other counties use flash drives to submit results.
In Michigan, tampering with voting equipment is a felony (MCL §168.932).
5.c. Any electronic voting devices must produce a paper record, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
Michigan law requires electronic voting systems to produce a physical paper ballot for tabulation purposes (MCL §168.795). This paper trail allows officials to conduct post-election audits and recounts if there are concerns about the results. This requirement ensures that all votes cast in Michigan have a physical paper backup, enhancing the security and verifiability of the election process.
In Michigan, all voting takes place either with paper ballots marked by hand by the voter or with ballot marking devices (BMDs), which are assistive devices like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator. These devices do not store information; the only record generated by the BMD is the printout.
According to Verified Voting, on Election Day the state uses hand-marked paper ballots statewide, along with optical scanners to record the votes. BMDs with accessibility features must also be available. (A detailed list of all voting equipment used in the state is available from the Michigan Department of State.)
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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5.d. Equipment is certified by the Board of State Canvassers.
In Michigan, the Board of State Canvassers approves voting systems for use statewide, ensuring uniformity across counties (MCL §168.795). Only pre-approved systems can be used, including tabulators and BMDs. Equipment must come from a list of technology that is certified by the Board and meets standards laid out in state law (MCL §168.795a). For example, the standards require that equipment be certified by an independent testing authority accredited by the National Association of State Election Directors, or in the absence of such authority, is certified by the manufacturer of the voting system as meeting or exceeding the state’s requirements.
A list of approved systems is available on the Department of State's website.
QUESTION 6: How do officials verify registration and the validity of individual votes?
6.a. Michigan officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Michigan, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. This concern led the Republican National Committee to launch a series of lawsuits, including in Michigan, to force election officials to trim voter rolls. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Michigan is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, Michigan officials also draw on other data to update voter rolls, including death records (MCL §168.510).
Michigan offers automatic voter registration when residents obtain or update their driving licenses or state identification cards (MCL 168.493a). Residents can check their registration status online, ensuring they can vote on Election Day.
6.b. The law prevents registration by noncitizens.
Michigan law prohibits knowingly providing false information in connection with voter registration (MCL §168.499). Federal law separately makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
6.c. Photo ID is requested when voting in-person, but it is not required.
All in-person voters in Michigan are asked to show a photo ID to vote (MCL §168.523). Those who do not have appropriate ID or forgot to bring one can still vote a regular ballot by signing an affidavit stating they are not in possession of a photo ID (MCL §168.523a).
6.d. Voting by mail is signature verified.
Michigan permits no-excuse vote-by-mail. Voters do not need to provide a copy of a photo ID to vote by mail. However, they must sign the absentee ballot return envelope, which is then verified against the signature on their voter registration record. In addition, voters must provide a driver’s license number and the last four digits of their Social Security number when requesting their absentee ballot (MCL §168.759). Ballots can be mailed or returned at the local clerk's office or a designated drop box (MCL §168.761d).
A challenge that Michigan, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. This concern led the Republican National Committee to launch a series of lawsuits, including in Michigan, to force election officials to trim voter rolls. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Michigan is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, Michigan officials also draw on other data to update voter rolls, including death records (MCL §168.510).
Michigan offers automatic voter registration when residents obtain or update their driving licenses or state identification cards (MCL 168.493a). Residents can check their registration status online, ensuring they can vote on Election Day.
6.b. The law prevents registration by noncitizens.
Michigan law prohibits knowingly providing false information in connection with voter registration (MCL §168.499). Federal law separately makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
6.c. Photo ID is requested when voting in-person, but it is not required.
All in-person voters in Michigan are asked to show a photo ID to vote (MCL §168.523). Those who do not have appropriate ID or forgot to bring one can still vote a regular ballot by signing an affidavit stating they are not in possession of a photo ID (MCL §168.523a).
6.d. Voting by mail is signature verified.
Michigan permits no-excuse vote-by-mail. Voters do not need to provide a copy of a photo ID to vote by mail. However, they must sign the absentee ballot return envelope, which is then verified against the signature on their voter registration record. In addition, voters must provide a driver’s license number and the last four digits of their Social Security number when requesting their absentee ballot (MCL §168.759). Ballots can be mailed or returned at the local clerk's office or a designated drop box (MCL §168.761d).
QUESTION 7: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
7.a. Officials can pre-process and scan some absentee ballots before Election Day.
In cities and townships with over 5,000 residents, absentee voter counting boards (comprised of election inspectors who are designated to process absentee ballots) are allowed to open, verify, and scan ballots for tabulation during the eight days prior to the election, and all cities and townships can do this starting on the Monday before Election Day (MCL §168.765a). No results can be generated until the polls close on Election Day. In all jurisdictions, officials can still verify the voter's signature prior to Election Day (MCL §168.765). Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan them before Election Day is a best practice that greatly improves officials’ ability to provide timely unofficial results.
———--
CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
———--
7.b. The election results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight. Michigan conducts several types of post-election audits, including procedural audits and risk-limiting audits (MCL §168.31a).
Procedural audits are conducted in randomly selected precincts throughout the state to examine election records and confirm that required procedures were followed before, on, and after Election Day. Auditors also conduct a hand count of all ballots for one statewide race in each selected precinct to confirm that the tabulators correctly counted the votes.
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) use statistical methods to examine a random sample of ballots statewide to test whether the reported outcome is supported by the paper record. In RLAs, officials compare a random sample of votes cast across the state in one or more races to the actual results to affirm the accuracy of the initial outcome.
Post-election audits are distinct from recounts. Audits examine election procedures and/or the accuracy of reported results; recounts retabulate ballots under the circumstances established by Michigan law.
7.c. Some close elections are automatically recounted after certification, and candidates and certain other parties may petition for a recount.
A recount is a retabulation of ballots rather than a general investigation or audit of the conduct of an election. Recounts may occur after certification of the results in a few scenarios (MCL §168.878).
First, a full recount must take place for any statewide race in which a candidate won by 0.1% or less. Automatic recounts also apply to state senate general elections decided by 75 votes or fewer and state house general elections decided by 25 votes or fewer. These automatic recounts ensure an extra check on close races, where potential errors lead to heightened concern. Losing candidates may waive the automatic recount within 48 hours of certification (MCL §168.880a).
Second, a candidate may petition for a recount if the candidate believes that, but for error, a different candidate would have been elected. In a state senate race decided by 500 votes or fewer or a state house race decided by 200 votes or fewer, the chair of a state political party may petition for a recount on behalf of a candidate (MCL §168.879). Individual voters cannot request recounts through the petition process.
In the case of state and federal offices, the recount request must arrive at the Board of State Canvassers no later than 5 p.m. on the second day after the election is certified (MCL §168.879). In the case of local offices, requests must arrive at the relevant board of county canvassers within 48 hours of county certification. Recount petitioners must submit a deposit for each precinct requested for recount, with the amount determined under state law based on the type and margin of the contest. If the recount is conducted and does not result in a change in the election outcome, the deposit is retained by the county (MCL §168.881).
Recounts are conducted in public. Candidates, ballot question committees, and other interested parties may have authorized representatives present in accordance with Michigan's recount rules. When a recount occurs, the Board of State Canvassers compiles the returns and certifies the result for the relevant race. The result of the recount is adopted as the final result (MCL §168.892).
———--
CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
———--
In cities and townships with over 5,000 residents, absentee voter counting boards (comprised of election inspectors who are designated to process absentee ballots) are allowed to open, verify, and scan ballots for tabulation during the eight days prior to the election, and all cities and townships can do this starting on the Monday before Election Day (MCL §168.765a). No results can be generated until the polls close on Election Day. In all jurisdictions, officials can still verify the voter's signature prior to Election Day (MCL §168.765). Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan them before Election Day is a best practice that greatly improves officials’ ability to provide timely unofficial results.
———--
CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
———--
7.b. The election results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight. Michigan conducts several types of post-election audits, including procedural audits and risk-limiting audits (MCL §168.31a).
Procedural audits are conducted in randomly selected precincts throughout the state to examine election records and confirm that required procedures were followed before, on, and after Election Day. Auditors also conduct a hand count of all ballots for one statewide race in each selected precinct to confirm that the tabulators correctly counted the votes.
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) use statistical methods to examine a random sample of ballots statewide to test whether the reported outcome is supported by the paper record. In RLAs, officials compare a random sample of votes cast across the state in one or more races to the actual results to affirm the accuracy of the initial outcome.
Post-election audits are distinct from recounts. Audits examine election procedures and/or the accuracy of reported results; recounts retabulate ballots under the circumstances established by Michigan law.
7.c. Some close elections are automatically recounted after certification, and candidates and certain other parties may petition for a recount.
A recount is a retabulation of ballots rather than a general investigation or audit of the conduct of an election. Recounts may occur after certification of the results in a few scenarios (MCL §168.878).
First, a full recount must take place for any statewide race in which a candidate won by 0.1% or less. Automatic recounts also apply to state senate general elections decided by 75 votes or fewer and state house general elections decided by 25 votes or fewer. These automatic recounts ensure an extra check on close races, where potential errors lead to heightened concern. Losing candidates may waive the automatic recount within 48 hours of certification (MCL §168.880a).
Second, a candidate may petition for a recount if the candidate believes that, but for error, a different candidate would have been elected. In a state senate race decided by 500 votes or fewer or a state house race decided by 200 votes or fewer, the chair of a state political party may petition for a recount on behalf of a candidate (MCL §168.879). Individual voters cannot request recounts through the petition process.
In the case of state and federal offices, the recount request must arrive at the Board of State Canvassers no later than 5 p.m. on the second day after the election is certified (MCL §168.879). In the case of local offices, requests must arrive at the relevant board of county canvassers within 48 hours of county certification. Recount petitioners must submit a deposit for each precinct requested for recount, with the amount determined under state law based on the type and margin of the contest. If the recount is conducted and does not result in a change in the election outcome, the deposit is retained by the county (MCL §168.881).
Recounts are conducted in public. Candidates, ballot question committees, and other interested parties may have authorized representatives present in accordance with Michigan's recount rules. When a recount occurs, the Board of State Canvassers compiles the returns and certifies the result for the relevant race. The result of the recount is adopted as the final result (MCL §168.892).
———--
CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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QUESTION 8: Who certifies results in Michigan, and what issues have arisen around certification?
8.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In Michigan, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the boards of county canvassers, entities that have a narrow set of election responsibilities and no other county administrative roles (MCL §168.24a). These boards are composed of four members who are nominated by the two major parties’ county committees. The boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. State law requires the boards to canvass and certify the results “at the earliest possible time” and “no later than the fourteenth day after the election” (MCL §168.822).
County reports are submitted to the Board of State Canvassers, which is responsible for certifying the results for all statewide elections, elections for legislative districts that cross county lines, most judicial offices, and state-level ballot proposals (MCL §168.842). The Board likewise has four members, equally divided between the two major parties (MCL §168.22a). The Board must meet “as soon as practicable” and complete the canvass “not later than the 20th day after the election” (MCL §168.842).
8.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” meaning it is non-discretionary and a required function.
Michigan law makes clear that certification is not optional or discretionary. The Michigan Constitution states: “It shall be the ministerial, clerical, nondiscretionary duty of a board of canvassers, and of each individual member thereof, to certify election results based solely on: (1) certified statements of votes from counties; or (2) in the case of boards of county canvassers, statements of returns from the precincts and absent voter counting boards in the county and any corrected returns” (MI Const. II §7). These duties are also clearly set forth in law (MCL §168.842).
The boards of county canvassers can correct “obvious mathematical errors in the tallies and returns,” but questions and concerns about the accuracy of the results are addressed by recounts (MCL §168.823).
If a county board of canvassers refuses to certify, Michigan law requires that the Board of State Canvassers receive all appropriate materials and certify in its place (MCL §168.822). In addition, Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson has indicated that board members who refuse to certify may be guilty of a misdemeanor. Across the U.S., a court can also mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law.
8.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Michigan refused to certify results.
In recent elections, Michigan has faced several instances where officials initially refused to certify election results. For example, in 2020 two members of the Wayne County Board of Canvassers initially refused to certify results but ultimately voted to do so. And, in May 2024, two Delta County canvassers refused to certify the results of a special recall election. The canvassers complied after intervention by the Michigan Director of Elections, who is also Secretary of the Board of State Canvassers.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
8.d. Michigan law provides other means to address challenges and concerns about election results.
Candidates, political parties, voters, and other parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results in state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and applicable law. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Michigan law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the state and county boards of canvassers may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
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CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming the results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results
QUESTION 9: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
9.a. The only way to challenge an election in Michigan is to contest the election in the court system.
Candidates, voters, and other eligible parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results through state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and the applicable law.
Candidates, voters, and other eligible parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results through state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and the applicable law.
QUESTION 10: What is required of plaintiffs, and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
10.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
10.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
10.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
———--
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
———--
10.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
———--
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
———--
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
10.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
10.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
———--
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
———--
10.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
———--
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
———--
QUESTION 11: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
11.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Failure to State a Claim: The plaintiff’s allegations may not contain a legally recognizable claim that can be adjudicated by the courts.
- Unreasonable Delays (also known as "Laches"): A case may be dismissed if a party unreasonably delays bringing it, and if that delay causes prejudice.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
QUESTION 12: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
12.a. The timelines are tight.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
12.b. The legal system generally is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
12.b. The legal system generally is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Timeline of Michigan Election Procedures
Michigan Election Code
Michigan Administrative Election Code
Department of State Elections Website
State’s Voter Education Videos
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters
Michigan Election Code
Michigan Administrative Election Code
Department of State Elections Website
State’s Voter Education Videos
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters
Date |
Election Activity |
11/3/26 |
Election Day |
11/5/26 |
Deadline for Boards of County Canvassers to meet to canvass election. |
11/6/26 |
Deadline for voters to cure signature on absentee ballot return envelope. |
11/17/2026 |
Deadline for Boards of County Canvassers to complete canvass; must forward results to Secretary of State within 24 hours. |
11/23/2026 |
Deadline for Board of State Canvassers to meet to canvass election. |
11/25/2026 |
Deadline to petition Board of State Canvassers for a recount. (Must happen within 48 hours of completion of state canvass.) |
11/30/26 |
Deadline to file counter petition or objection to state recount. (Must happen within 48 hours of recount petition; deadline extended due to Thanksgiving holiday.) |
12/30/26 |
Deadline to complete recounts. (Must happen within 30 days of deadline for counter petitions.) |
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
