MICHIGAN
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures of elections in MICHIGAN.
The information is grouped by three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review. It aims to be a go-to resource, especially when journalists must cover close, contested, and disputed elections. Today's voters have many questions about the fairness of elections. So, the Election Overtime project aims to inform media coverage of elections that helps explain how elections are grounded in the impartial rule of law. The brief focuses on structures that enable fairness and confidence, such as the role of poll watchers, rigorous verification procedures, and the evidentiary requirements of the courts for races that are contested.
The Election Reformers Network team stands ready to support journalists in deploying this content in your coverage.
The information is grouped by three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review. It aims to be a go-to resource, especially when journalists must cover close, contested, and disputed elections. Today's voters have many questions about the fairness of elections. So, the Election Overtime project aims to inform media coverage of elections that helps explain how elections are grounded in the impartial rule of law. The brief focuses on structures that enable fairness and confidence, such as the role of poll watchers, rigorous verification procedures, and the evidentiary requirements of the courts for races that are contested.
The Election Reformers Network team stands ready to support journalists in deploying this content in your coverage.
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, with a process as critical as elections, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
QUESTION 1: What are the roles of election boards, poll workers, and observers?
,1.a. A hierarchy of election groups and people oversee elections in Michigan.
State law provides for bipartisan input and oversight by Democrats and Republicans. Key functions include:
Secretary of State: The Secretary of State oversees election administration across the state by issuing instructions and directions describing the proper conduct of elections. The current Secretary of State is Jocelyn Benson.
Board of State Canvassers: The Board of State Canvassers approves voting equipment and oversees multi-county elections, including federal and state, through canvass, certification, and recount. According to state law, the four-member board must have two Republicans and two Democrats.
Boards of County Canvassers: The Board of County Canvassers counts the votes cast within its county and certifies election results for all offices with the exception that it does not certify Congressional, state senate, and state house races that span multiple counties. Under the authority of the Board of State Canvassers, county boards also oversee recounts. According to state law, the four-member boards must have two Republicans and two Democrats.
City and Township Election Commissions: Local Election Commissions are responsible for certain election administration duties like the appointment of election inspectors (poll workers) and providing election supplies. Generally, these commissions are made up of existing officials such as, in the case of a city, the city clerk, the city attorney, and the city assessor.
Boards of Inspectors of Elections: Inspectors of Elections are poll workers appointed/hired by election commissioners. Inspectors can also challenge voters for “good reason.” Commissions must appoint an equal number from each major political party (to the extent possible) with input from the local political parties who can nominate and object to candidates.
Election Challengers: Challengers are non-governmental election observers appointed by political parties, special interest groups, or qualified organizations. In other states, this type of role may be called a poll watcher or observer. Challengers may question a voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot only if the challenger has a good reason to believe that the person in question is not a registered voter based on registration status, address, age, or citizenship and if they can provide support for their assertion. Challengers can also question voting operations in real time.
Political parties can directly credential challengers. Other groups and organizations must apply for credentials through a county clerk. Challengers have specific rights and responsibilities, such as observing the election procedure, challenging the voting rights of individuals, and bringing attention to any violations of election law or improper procedures. One challenger per group can observe the issuance and receipt of absentee voter ballots, two challengers from any one group may be present at a precinct or early voting site. Finally, during the processing and tabulation of absentee voters prior to Election Day, organizations are generally allowed 1 challenger per 8 election inspectors. (See state guide for more information)
Poll Watchers: Poll watchers in Michigan are members of the public who wish to observe elections. Poll watchers can be present in any polling place, early voting site, or an absent voter ballot processing facility strictly to observe. Poll watchers do not have the same rights as credentialed challengers and must remain in the designated public viewing area. This terminology is different from many other states, where the public-at-large does not have a designated title. (See state guide for more information)
1.b. Michigan places few restrictions on who can serve as a challenger.
Who can serve as a challenger: Challengers must be registered to vote in the state and have received the appropriate credentials.
Who cannot serve as a challenger: A person cannot serve as a challenger if the person is serving as an election inspector during the same election. Also, a person cannot serve as a challenger if the person is running for nomination or for office during the same election, except that precinct delegate candidates can serve as challengers in precincts other than the precinct in which they are running for office.
To compare these procedures with other states, visit this resource by the National Conference of State Legislatures.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of their election challengers.
Michigan recommends, but does not require, any training to become a challenger, according to its state guide for challenges and watcher. However, to be useful to the parties they are representing, challengers should be trained in their role and knowledgeable about election procedures, ensuring the credibility of their accounts if they observe problems.
Parties have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand their role and know not to interfere in any way with the election process. Some states require observers to be trained and in others, the state’s election department supports observer training.
————--
CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions. Some states require training; many do not.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by signing a short online form.
—————
State law provides for bipartisan input and oversight by Democrats and Republicans. Key functions include:
Secretary of State: The Secretary of State oversees election administration across the state by issuing instructions and directions describing the proper conduct of elections. The current Secretary of State is Jocelyn Benson.
Board of State Canvassers: The Board of State Canvassers approves voting equipment and oversees multi-county elections, including federal and state, through canvass, certification, and recount. According to state law, the four-member board must have two Republicans and two Democrats.
Boards of County Canvassers: The Board of County Canvassers counts the votes cast within its county and certifies election results for all offices with the exception that it does not certify Congressional, state senate, and state house races that span multiple counties. Under the authority of the Board of State Canvassers, county boards also oversee recounts. According to state law, the four-member boards must have two Republicans and two Democrats.
City and Township Election Commissions: Local Election Commissions are responsible for certain election administration duties like the appointment of election inspectors (poll workers) and providing election supplies. Generally, these commissions are made up of existing officials such as, in the case of a city, the city clerk, the city attorney, and the city assessor.
Boards of Inspectors of Elections: Inspectors of Elections are poll workers appointed/hired by election commissioners. Inspectors can also challenge voters for “good reason.” Commissions must appoint an equal number from each major political party (to the extent possible) with input from the local political parties who can nominate and object to candidates.
Election Challengers: Challengers are non-governmental election observers appointed by political parties, special interest groups, or qualified organizations. In other states, this type of role may be called a poll watcher or observer. Challengers may question a voter’s eligibility to cast a ballot only if the challenger has a good reason to believe that the person in question is not a registered voter based on registration status, address, age, or citizenship and if they can provide support for their assertion. Challengers can also question voting operations in real time.
Political parties can directly credential challengers. Other groups and organizations must apply for credentials through a county clerk. Challengers have specific rights and responsibilities, such as observing the election procedure, challenging the voting rights of individuals, and bringing attention to any violations of election law or improper procedures. One challenger per group can observe the issuance and receipt of absentee voter ballots, two challengers from any one group may be present at a precinct or early voting site. Finally, during the processing and tabulation of absentee voters prior to Election Day, organizations are generally allowed 1 challenger per 8 election inspectors. (See state guide for more information)
Poll Watchers: Poll watchers in Michigan are members of the public who wish to observe elections. Poll watchers can be present in any polling place, early voting site, or an absent voter ballot processing facility strictly to observe. Poll watchers do not have the same rights as credentialed challengers and must remain in the designated public viewing area. This terminology is different from many other states, where the public-at-large does not have a designated title. (See state guide for more information)
1.b. Michigan places few restrictions on who can serve as a challenger.
Who can serve as a challenger: Challengers must be registered to vote in the state and have received the appropriate credentials.
Who cannot serve as a challenger: A person cannot serve as a challenger if the person is serving as an election inspector during the same election. Also, a person cannot serve as a challenger if the person is running for nomination or for office during the same election, except that precinct delegate candidates can serve as challengers in precincts other than the precinct in which they are running for office.
To compare these procedures with other states, visit this resource by the National Conference of State Legislatures.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of their election challengers.
Michigan recommends, but does not require, any training to become a challenger, according to its state guide for challenges and watcher. However, to be useful to the parties they are representing, challengers should be trained in their role and knowledgeable about election procedures, ensuring the credibility of their accounts if they observe problems.
Parties have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand their role and know not to interfere in any way with the election process. Some states require observers to be trained and in others, the state’s election department supports observer training.
————--
CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions. Some states require training; many do not.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by signing a short online form.
—————
QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election monitors or the general public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
————--
CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. Note: this role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for school board races).
—————
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
————--
CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. Note: this role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for school board races).
—————
QUESTION 3: What are challengers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to observation from party representatives.
Challengers are allowed in most areas and can view registration and voting-related documents at the polls and absentee ballot processing centers. However, challengers cannot interact or interfere with voters, election procedures, or staff. They can only communicate with the challenger liaison.
Challengers are allowed in most areas and can view registration and voting-related documents at the polls and absentee ballot processing centers. However, challengers cannot interact or interfere with voters, election procedures, or staff. They can only communicate with the challenger liaison.
QUESTION 4: What other forms of challenge are available before and during the election?
4.a. Michigan allows citizens to challenge voter eligibility
In Michigan, a person’s qualifications to vote can be challenged by any elector of the same municipality at least 30 days before the election. During in-person voting, a voter registered to the same precinct can raise a challenge, in addition to a credentialed challenger or an election inspector.
There is no limit to the number of challenges that can be made by any one person. However, challenges can only be made against one voter at a time, and the person challenging must sign an oath and have their challenge notarized. Those who file indiscriminately and without good cause may be found guilty of a misdemeanor.
Despite these protections, in January 2024 Waterford Township improperly canceled over 1000 voter registrations in response to a bulk challenge based solely on USPS forwarding addresses. Following the incident, the Bureau of Elections advised clerks that they cannot immediately cancel a voter's registration based on another voter's challenge, unless the person making the challenge has first-hand knowledge of the ineligibility. The Bureau further clarified that "first-hand knowledge" does not include USPS forwarding information.
According to a report by Protect Democracy, the vast majority of challenges happening across the country are dismissed, but they have the effect of distracting administrators with (potentially unnecessary) work during busy electoral seasons and may dissuade challenged voters from participating in the state’s democratic process.
In Michigan, a person’s qualifications to vote can be challenged by any elector of the same municipality at least 30 days before the election. During in-person voting, a voter registered to the same precinct can raise a challenge, in addition to a credentialed challenger or an election inspector.
There is no limit to the number of challenges that can be made by any one person. However, challenges can only be made against one voter at a time, and the person challenging must sign an oath and have their challenge notarized. Those who file indiscriminately and without good cause may be found guilty of a misdemeanor.
Despite these protections, in January 2024 Waterford Township improperly canceled over 1000 voter registrations in response to a bulk challenge based solely on USPS forwarding addresses. Following the incident, the Bureau of Elections advised clerks that they cannot immediately cancel a voter's registration based on another voter's challenge, unless the person making the challenge has first-hand knowledge of the ineligibility. The Bureau further clarified that "first-hand knowledge" does not include USPS forwarding information.
According to a report by Protect Democracy, the vast majority of challenges happening across the country are dismissed, but they have the effect of distracting administrators with (potentially unnecessary) work during busy electoral seasons and may dissuade challenged voters from participating in the state’s democratic process.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance including seal numbers on equipment, ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 5: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
5.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before the voting.
Vote counting in Michigan is generally done with the use of scanners that read voters’ electronic or hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. Absentee ballots that are mailed or submitted at voting centers are scanned under the supervision of local election officials and in locations viewable by the public. Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated correctly by each scanner. This process is called a “Logic and Accuracy” test.
In Michigan, before they can be used for voting, local commissions must conduct a preliminary test on all tabulators and voter assist terminals (which must be available for voters with disabilities). A sample of the tabulators is publicly tested. Observers of the public tests may even contribute their own votes on a test ballot to ensure the tabulator counts them accurately. Michigan ranked seventh in a 2022 analysis of logic and accuracy tests around the country. The logic and accuracy test combined with the state’s audits, recounts, and other procedures, is designed to prevent and catch potential errors in equipment operation and in the election results.
One example of how Michigan's multi-layered process is helpful occurred in Antrim County. In 2020, an error in the county’s handling of a last-minute ballot design change caused the county to temporarily show President Biden as the winner in that locality. The mistake was caught and corrected by election officials before certification and a follow-up investigation by the state produced recommendations for process improvements.
5.b. According to state law, tabulators must not be connected to the internet during the election.
From the time of the logic and accuracy test until tabulation has concluded, Michigan law calls for equipment to be isolated from external connections including the internet. After polls have closed some counties will send unofficial results to the county clerk electronically while also bringing a hard copy of the paper tally to ensure all vote counts remain accurate. Another way to transmit results is the physical transportation of flash drives.
In Michigan, tampering with voting equipment is a felony.
5.c. Any electronic devices used must produce a paper ballot, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
Maintaining a verifiable paper record of all ballots, as Michigan law requires, is a recommended best practice for election administration. This paper trail allows officials to conduct post-election audits and recounts if there are concerns about the results. This requirement ensures that all votes cast in Michigan have a physical paper backup, enhancing the security and verifiability of the election process.
In Michigan, all voting takes place either with paper ballots marked by hand by the voter or with ballot marking devices (BMDs), which are assistive devices like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator. These devices do not store information; the only record generated by the BMD is the printout.
According to Verified Voting, on election day the state uses hand-marked paper ballots statewide, along with optical scanners to record the votes. BMDs with accessibility features must also be available. (For a detailed list of equipment used, also see the State’s Website.)
—————
CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, doesn’t take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
To compare the different types of voting technology, visit MIT’s election data lab.
—————
5.d. Equipment is certified by the Board of State Canvassers.
In Michigan, the Board of State Canvassers approves voting systems for use statewide, ensuring uniformity across counties. Only pre-approved systems can be used including tabulators and BMDs. Equipment must come from a list of technology that is certified by the Board and meets standards laid out in state law. (For example, the standards require that equipment be certified by an independent testing authority accredited by the National Association of State Election Directors or in the absence of such authority is certified by the manufacturer of the voting system as meeting or exceeding the state’s requirements.) A list of approved systems is available on the state’s website.
Vote counting in Michigan is generally done with the use of scanners that read voters’ electronic or hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. Absentee ballots that are mailed or submitted at voting centers are scanned under the supervision of local election officials and in locations viewable by the public. Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a varied set of test ballots is accurately scanned and tabulated correctly by each scanner. This process is called a “Logic and Accuracy” test.
In Michigan, before they can be used for voting, local commissions must conduct a preliminary test on all tabulators and voter assist terminals (which must be available for voters with disabilities). A sample of the tabulators is publicly tested. Observers of the public tests may even contribute their own votes on a test ballot to ensure the tabulator counts them accurately. Michigan ranked seventh in a 2022 analysis of logic and accuracy tests around the country. The logic and accuracy test combined with the state’s audits, recounts, and other procedures, is designed to prevent and catch potential errors in equipment operation and in the election results.
One example of how Michigan's multi-layered process is helpful occurred in Antrim County. In 2020, an error in the county’s handling of a last-minute ballot design change caused the county to temporarily show President Biden as the winner in that locality. The mistake was caught and corrected by election officials before certification and a follow-up investigation by the state produced recommendations for process improvements.
5.b. According to state law, tabulators must not be connected to the internet during the election.
From the time of the logic and accuracy test until tabulation has concluded, Michigan law calls for equipment to be isolated from external connections including the internet. After polls have closed some counties will send unofficial results to the county clerk electronically while also bringing a hard copy of the paper tally to ensure all vote counts remain accurate. Another way to transmit results is the physical transportation of flash drives.
In Michigan, tampering with voting equipment is a felony.
5.c. Any electronic devices used must produce a paper ballot, which is retained to be available for rechecking.
Maintaining a verifiable paper record of all ballots, as Michigan law requires, is a recommended best practice for election administration. This paper trail allows officials to conduct post-election audits and recounts if there are concerns about the results. This requirement ensures that all votes cast in Michigan have a physical paper backup, enhancing the security and verifiability of the election process.
In Michigan, all voting takes place either with paper ballots marked by hand by the voter or with ballot marking devices (BMDs), which are assistive devices like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator. These devices do not store information; the only record generated by the BMD is the printout.
According to Verified Voting, on election day the state uses hand-marked paper ballots statewide, along with optical scanners to record the votes. BMDs with accessibility features must also be available. (For a detailed list of equipment used, also see the State’s Website.)
—————
CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, doesn’t take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
To compare the different types of voting technology, visit MIT’s election data lab.
—————
5.d. Equipment is certified by the Board of State Canvassers.
In Michigan, the Board of State Canvassers approves voting systems for use statewide, ensuring uniformity across counties. Only pre-approved systems can be used including tabulators and BMDs. Equipment must come from a list of technology that is certified by the Board and meets standards laid out in state law. (For example, the standards require that equipment be certified by an independent testing authority accredited by the National Association of State Election Directors or in the absence of such authority is certified by the manufacturer of the voting system as meeting or exceeding the state’s requirements.) A list of approved systems is available on the state’s website.
QUESTION 6: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
6.a. Michigan officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Michigan, and every other state faces, is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. This concern led the Republican National Committee to launch a series of lawsuits, including in Michigan, to force election officials to trim voter rolls. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for non-voting. But, a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Michigan is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (Michigan has retained its membership in ERIC, standing against what is widely considered by election officials to be misinformation about the program. In the last two years, nine states withdrew their membership and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, Michigan officials can also draw on other automatic updates to the Department of State including lists of people who are deceased.
Michigan offers automatic voter registration when residents obtain or update their driving licenses or state identification cards. Residents can check their registration status online, ensuring they can vote on election day.
6.b. The law prevents registration by noncitizens
Improperly registering to vote using false statements or material is a misdemeanor in Michigan. Falsely claiming U.S. citizenship for the purpose of registering to vote may also result in prison time as well as deportation or denial of future immigration status.
The Heritage Foundation has conducted research on a range of possible avenues for voter fraud. Their published national analysis of legal actions identified 24 cases of noncitizens voting between 2003 and 2023, across 50 states and millions of votes cast.
6.c. Photo ID is requested when voting in-person, but it is not required.
All in-person voters in Michigan are asked to show a Photo ID to vote. Those who do not have appropriate ID or forgot to bring one can still vote a regular ballot by signing an affidavit stating they are not in possession of ID. Michigan is one of 36 states that have laws requesting or requiring voters to show some form of identification at the polls.
6.d. Voting by mail is signature verified.
As of 2023, Michigan, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia, have no-excuse vote-by-mail laws. Seven states conduct their entire election by mail-in ballot. In Michigan, voters do not need to provide a copy of a photo ID to vote by mail. However, they must sign the absentee ballot return envelope, which is then verified against the signature on their voter registration record. In addition, voters must provide a driver’s license or social security number. Those who request their ballot in person must show a photo ID. Ballots can be mailed or returned at the local clerk's office or a designated drop box.
A challenge that Michigan, and every other state faces, is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. This concern led the Republican National Committee to launch a series of lawsuits, including in Michigan, to force election officials to trim voter rolls. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for non-voting. But, a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Michigan is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (Michigan has retained its membership in ERIC, standing against what is widely considered by election officials to be misinformation about the program. In the last two years, nine states withdrew their membership and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, Michigan officials can also draw on other automatic updates to the Department of State including lists of people who are deceased.
Michigan offers automatic voter registration when residents obtain or update their driving licenses or state identification cards. Residents can check their registration status online, ensuring they can vote on election day.
6.b. The law prevents registration by noncitizens
Improperly registering to vote using false statements or material is a misdemeanor in Michigan. Falsely claiming U.S. citizenship for the purpose of registering to vote may also result in prison time as well as deportation or denial of future immigration status.
The Heritage Foundation has conducted research on a range of possible avenues for voter fraud. Their published national analysis of legal actions identified 24 cases of noncitizens voting between 2003 and 2023, across 50 states and millions of votes cast.
6.c. Photo ID is requested when voting in-person, but it is not required.
All in-person voters in Michigan are asked to show a Photo ID to vote. Those who do not have appropriate ID or forgot to bring one can still vote a regular ballot by signing an affidavit stating they are not in possession of ID. Michigan is one of 36 states that have laws requesting or requiring voters to show some form of identification at the polls.
6.d. Voting by mail is signature verified.
As of 2023, Michigan, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia, have no-excuse vote-by-mail laws. Seven states conduct their entire election by mail-in ballot. In Michigan, voters do not need to provide a copy of a photo ID to vote by mail. However, they must sign the absentee ballot return envelope, which is then verified against the signature on their voter registration record. In addition, voters must provide a driver’s license or social security number. Those who request their ballot in person must show a photo ID. Ballots can be mailed or returned at the local clerk's office or a designated drop box.
QUESTION 7: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
7.a. Officials in some jurisdictions can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In cities and townships with over 5,000 residents, absentee voter counting boards (election inspectors who are designated to process absentee ballots) are allowed to open, verify, and scan ballots for tabulation during the eight days prior to the election, and all cities and townships can do this on the Monday before Election Day. No results can be generated until the polls close on election day. In all jurisdictions, officials can still verify the voter's signature prior to Election Day. Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan them before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
__________
CONTEXT: Official Results Come Later In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted and certified.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
__________
7.b. The election results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
Michigan’s post-election audits happen after the election is certified and any requested recounts are completed. The audits include procedural audits and results audits.
The procedural audit is conducted in randomly-selected precincts throughout the state and is designed to ensure that local clerks and election workers followed the proper procedures before, on, and after Election Day. Auditors also conduct a hand count of all ballots for one statewide race in each selected precinct to confirm that the tabulators correctly counted the votes.
In addition to the procedural audits, Michigan has been piloting risk-limiting results audits. In risk-limiting audits, officials compare a random sample of votes cast across the state in one or more races, rather than a random grouping of precincts, to affirm the accuracy of the initial outcome. Other states that conduct risk-limiting audits include Georgia, Colorado, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Currently, Michigan’s risk-limiting audit pilot occurs after certification.
Audits, especially risk-limiting audits, are considered a best practice for election management. In risk-limiting audits ballots and races are randomly selected for counting. Then, instead of a sample size set by law, the number of ballots counted adjusts to the margin of victory in the preliminary results. To be confident that the person with the most votes was accurately declared the winner in a very close race, thousands of ballots may be reviewed. If the race is not close, a smaller sample is needed. In a race won by a landslide, officials may only need to check a few hundred votes to confirm the results. Michigan’s 2022 audit provided a risk limit of 10%, meaning that in the very rare situations that tabulators miscalculated, there’d be a more than 90% chance that the audit would identify that incorrect outcome.
7.c. Close elections are automatically subject to a recount after certification, and losing candidates in any race can request one.
Recounts happen after certification of the results in a few scenarios. First, a full recount must take place for any statewide race in which a candidate won by 2,000 votes or less. These automatic recounts ensure an extra check on close races, where error or wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern. Second, any losing candidate can request a recount of all or some precincts based on an allegation of fraud or a mistake in the canvassing of votes if they have good reason to believe the count if conducted appropriately, would have delivered them a win. Individual voters cannot request recounts through the petition process.
A request for a recount does not need to contain specific evidence. In the case of state and federal offices, the recount request must arrive at the Board of State Canvassers no later than 48 hours following completion of the canvass. In the case of local offices, requests must arrive at the relevant board of county canvassers on or by the sixth day following the completion of the county canvass. Petitioning candidates also submit a deposit for each precinct in the request, the deposit for closer races is lower than races with a large spread between the runner-up and the winner. If the recount is conducted and does not result in a change in the election or ballot question’s outcome, the deposit is retained by the county.
Recounts are conducted in public and all interested parties, such as the winning and losing candidates or their representatives must be present. When a recount occurs, the Board of State Canvassers compiles the returns and re-certifies the result for the relevant race. The result of the recount is adopted as the final result, even in the, unlikely, scenario that it conflicts with the previously certified election outcome.
When a recount occurs, the Board of State Canvassers compiles the returns and re-certifies the result for the relevant race. The result of the recount is adopted as the final result, even in the, unlikely, scenario that it conflicts with the previously certified election outcome.
_________
CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by Fairvote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
—————
In cities and townships with over 5,000 residents, absentee voter counting boards (election inspectors who are designated to process absentee ballots) are allowed to open, verify, and scan ballots for tabulation during the eight days prior to the election, and all cities and townships can do this on the Monday before Election Day. No results can be generated until the polls close on election day. In all jurisdictions, officials can still verify the voter's signature prior to Election Day. Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan them before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
__________
CONTEXT: Official Results Come Later In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted and certified.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
__________
7.b. The election results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
Michigan’s post-election audits happen after the election is certified and any requested recounts are completed. The audits include procedural audits and results audits.
The procedural audit is conducted in randomly-selected precincts throughout the state and is designed to ensure that local clerks and election workers followed the proper procedures before, on, and after Election Day. Auditors also conduct a hand count of all ballots for one statewide race in each selected precinct to confirm that the tabulators correctly counted the votes.
In addition to the procedural audits, Michigan has been piloting risk-limiting results audits. In risk-limiting audits, officials compare a random sample of votes cast across the state in one or more races, rather than a random grouping of precincts, to affirm the accuracy of the initial outcome. Other states that conduct risk-limiting audits include Georgia, Colorado, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Currently, Michigan’s risk-limiting audit pilot occurs after certification.
Audits, especially risk-limiting audits, are considered a best practice for election management. In risk-limiting audits ballots and races are randomly selected for counting. Then, instead of a sample size set by law, the number of ballots counted adjusts to the margin of victory in the preliminary results. To be confident that the person with the most votes was accurately declared the winner in a very close race, thousands of ballots may be reviewed. If the race is not close, a smaller sample is needed. In a race won by a landslide, officials may only need to check a few hundred votes to confirm the results. Michigan’s 2022 audit provided a risk limit of 10%, meaning that in the very rare situations that tabulators miscalculated, there’d be a more than 90% chance that the audit would identify that incorrect outcome.
7.c. Close elections are automatically subject to a recount after certification, and losing candidates in any race can request one.
Recounts happen after certification of the results in a few scenarios. First, a full recount must take place for any statewide race in which a candidate won by 2,000 votes or less. These automatic recounts ensure an extra check on close races, where error or wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern. Second, any losing candidate can request a recount of all or some precincts based on an allegation of fraud or a mistake in the canvassing of votes if they have good reason to believe the count if conducted appropriately, would have delivered them a win. Individual voters cannot request recounts through the petition process.
A request for a recount does not need to contain specific evidence. In the case of state and federal offices, the recount request must arrive at the Board of State Canvassers no later than 48 hours following completion of the canvass. In the case of local offices, requests must arrive at the relevant board of county canvassers on or by the sixth day following the completion of the county canvass. Petitioning candidates also submit a deposit for each precinct in the request, the deposit for closer races is lower than races with a large spread between the runner-up and the winner. If the recount is conducted and does not result in a change in the election or ballot question’s outcome, the deposit is retained by the county.
Recounts are conducted in public and all interested parties, such as the winning and losing candidates or their representatives must be present. When a recount occurs, the Board of State Canvassers compiles the returns and re-certifies the result for the relevant race. The result of the recount is adopted as the final result, even in the, unlikely, scenario that it conflicts with the previously certified election outcome.
When a recount occurs, the Board of State Canvassers compiles the returns and re-certifies the result for the relevant race. The result of the recount is adopted as the final result, even in the, unlikely, scenario that it conflicts with the previously certified election outcome.
_________
CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by Fairvote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
—————
QUESTION 8: Who certifies results in Michigan, and what issues have arisen around certification?
8.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In Michigan, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the boards of county canvassers, entities that have a narrow set of election responsibilities and no other county administrative roles. These boards are composed of four members who are nominated by the two major parties’ county committees. The boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. State law requires the boards to canvass and certify the results “at the earliest possible time” and “no later than the fourteenth day after the election.”
County reports are submitted to the Board of State Canvassers, which is responsible for certifying the results for all statewide elections, elections for legislative districts that cross county lines, most judicial offices, and state-level ballot proposals. The Board likewise has four members, equally divided between the two major parties. The Board must meet “as soon as practicable” and complete the canvass “not later than the 20th day after the election.” In the scenario of a less than 25,000 vote differential for a presidential election, the secretary of state will direct the county and state-level canvassing on an “expedited schedule.”
8.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” meaning it is non-discretionary and a required function.
Michigan law makes clear that certification is not optional or discretionary. The Michigan Constitution states: “It shall be the ministerial, clerical, nondiscretionary duty of a board of canvassers, and of each individual member thereof, to certify election results based solely on: (1) certified statements of votes from counties; or (2) in the case of boards of county canvassers, statements of returns from the precincts and absent voter counting boards in the county and any corrected returns.” These duties are also clearly set forth in Michigan laws (MCL 168.822 & 842).
If a board of canvassers refuses to certify, Michigan law requires that the Board of State Canvassers must receive all appropriate materials and certify in its place. In addition, as referenced by Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson in a letter written earlier this year, the board members may be guilty of a misdemeanor. Across the U.S. a court can also mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law.
The boards of county canvassers can correct “obvious mathematical errors in the tallies and returns,” but questions and concerns about the accuracy of the results are addressed by recounts.
—————
CONTEXT: Certification Processes Similar to Congressional Validation of the Presidential Election
The final counting of Electoral votes in Congress during the Presidential election follows the same logic. (See ECRA section below.) Members of Congress can object to electoral votes only on extremely narrow grounds, such as if an elector voted to elect a president and vice president of the same state, which is not permitted by the Constitution.
—————
8.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Michigan refused to certify results.
In recent elections, Michigan has faced several instances where officials initially refused to certify election results. For example, in 2020 two members of the Wayne Board of Canvassers initially refused to certify results but ultimately voted to do so. And, in May of 2024, two Delta County canvassers refused to certify the results of a special recall election. The canvassers complied after intervention by the Michigan Director of Elections, who is also Secretary of the Board of State Canvassers.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved by: courts compelling certification, the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
8.d. Michigan law provides other, better-suited means to address challenges and concerns about the accuracy of results.
Candidates and political parties have the right to challenge election results in court after county and state certification. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Michigan law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the state and county boards of canvassers may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
—————
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A recent study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the US, by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
—————
In Michigan, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the boards of county canvassers, entities that have a narrow set of election responsibilities and no other county administrative roles. These boards are composed of four members who are nominated by the two major parties’ county committees. The boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. State law requires the boards to canvass and certify the results “at the earliest possible time” and “no later than the fourteenth day after the election.”
County reports are submitted to the Board of State Canvassers, which is responsible for certifying the results for all statewide elections, elections for legislative districts that cross county lines, most judicial offices, and state-level ballot proposals. The Board likewise has four members, equally divided between the two major parties. The Board must meet “as soon as practicable” and complete the canvass “not later than the 20th day after the election.” In the scenario of a less than 25,000 vote differential for a presidential election, the secretary of state will direct the county and state-level canvassing on an “expedited schedule.”
8.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” meaning it is non-discretionary and a required function.
Michigan law makes clear that certification is not optional or discretionary. The Michigan Constitution states: “It shall be the ministerial, clerical, nondiscretionary duty of a board of canvassers, and of each individual member thereof, to certify election results based solely on: (1) certified statements of votes from counties; or (2) in the case of boards of county canvassers, statements of returns from the precincts and absent voter counting boards in the county and any corrected returns.” These duties are also clearly set forth in Michigan laws (MCL 168.822 & 842).
If a board of canvassers refuses to certify, Michigan law requires that the Board of State Canvassers must receive all appropriate materials and certify in its place. In addition, as referenced by Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson in a letter written earlier this year, the board members may be guilty of a misdemeanor. Across the U.S. a court can also mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law.
The boards of county canvassers can correct “obvious mathematical errors in the tallies and returns,” but questions and concerns about the accuracy of the results are addressed by recounts.
—————
CONTEXT: Certification Processes Similar to Congressional Validation of the Presidential Election
The final counting of Electoral votes in Congress during the Presidential election follows the same logic. (See ECRA section below.) Members of Congress can object to electoral votes only on extremely narrow grounds, such as if an elector voted to elect a president and vice president of the same state, which is not permitted by the Constitution.
—————
8.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Michigan refused to certify results.
In recent elections, Michigan has faced several instances where officials initially refused to certify election results. For example, in 2020 two members of the Wayne Board of Canvassers initially refused to certify results but ultimately voted to do so. And, in May of 2024, two Delta County canvassers refused to certify the results of a special recall election. The canvassers complied after intervention by the Michigan Director of Elections, who is also Secretary of the Board of State Canvassers.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved by: courts compelling certification, the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
8.d. Michigan law provides other, better-suited means to address challenges and concerns about the accuracy of results.
Candidates and political parties have the right to challenge election results in court after county and state certification. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Michigan law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the state and county boards of canvassers may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
—————
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A recent study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the US, by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
—————
QUESTION 9: What's changed since 2020 about how Congress concludes the presidential election process?
9.a. In 2022, Congress passed the bipartisan Electoral Count Reform Act (ECRA), replacing an outdated law from 1887.
The new federal law addresses vulnerabilities in the presidential election process that were exposed by events following the 2020 election. ECRA clarified several procedures that had been ambiguous under federal law, including that the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes is “solely ministerial.” Because the presidential election is administered by the states, ECRA also impacted aspects of state law (described below).
9.b. ECRA aims to prevent unsanctioned electors and related problems with presidential elections by clarifying the submission process to Congress of each state’s presidential electoral count.
Under ECRA, the governor must issue a state’s Certificate of Ascertainment of Appointment of Electors, unless state law explicitly delegates that duty to another executive official. ECRA also specifies that each certificate must contain:
Then, when those electors hold their official meeting, they sign and submit a different certificate of votes delineating the electoral college votes for President and Vice President. In addition to these federal requirements, 33 states have passed laws prohibiting unsanctioned or “faithless” electors in the presidential election process. Georgia is not among them.
—————
CONTEXT: 2020 “Fake Electors” Highlighted the Need for ECRA
In 2020, after it became clear that former President Donald Trump’s multiple lawsuits contesting the election results lacked evidentiary merit to alter the outcome, he and allies assembled their own slates of presidential electors in seven states where Trump did not win.
Those unsanctioned electors met the same day as the legitimate electors, cast votes for Trump, and submitted to Congress competing Certificates of Ascertainment. President Trump began a pressure campaign to urge then-Vice President Mike Pence to discard the actual results from those seven states, and instead accept the fraudulent ones during the January 6, 2021, vote counting hearing. Had the Vice President done so, and had enough members of Congress gone along, President Joe Biden would have fallen short of the 270-vote Electoral College majority.
—————
9.c. ECRA clarifies the timeline for the presidential post-election process, with implications for states.
This timeline includes a new mandatory deadline for issuing the Certificate of Ascertainment, a new deadline for court intervention, and an updated date for the electors to meet and cast their votes. As a result, many intermediate state deadlines (such as vote counting, recounts, and audits) may need to be updated to comply with the new mandatory deadlines. Some states, including Michigan, have updated their laws to reflect this timeline. Georgia is not among them.
9.d. Legislatures cannot change the rules after Election Day.
ECRA requires that elections be administered according to the state laws in place prior to Election Day, including laws governing presidential electors, voting emergencies, and related provisions. Importantly, ECRA also removed language from the old law pertaining to "failed elections" that bad-faith actors relied upon to argue that federal law allowed state legislatures to step in after the election was over and to appoint their own presidential electors, potentially overturning the will of the voters.
9.e. ECRA strengthens the role of courts.
The new law gives the courts the last word over disputes regarding a state's presidential election results, including any needed changes to the state's Certificate of Ascertainment. It also establishes a process for aggrieved presidential or vice-presidential candidates to bring cases before three-judge federal district courts.
————--
CONTEXT: Do Americans Vote for the President, or the Electors?
Actually, under the somewhat convoluted provisions of the Electoral College, Americans technically vote for the electors, who in turn vote for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates. Most states deploy a “winner takes all” approach in which all the Electoral College votes are awarded to the ticket that won the popular vote in that state. Two states (Maine and Nebraska) split a portion of their electoral votes by congressional district.
—————
The new federal law addresses vulnerabilities in the presidential election process that were exposed by events following the 2020 election. ECRA clarified several procedures that had been ambiguous under federal law, including that the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes is “solely ministerial.” Because the presidential election is administered by the states, ECRA also impacted aspects of state law (described below).
9.b. ECRA aims to prevent unsanctioned electors and related problems with presidential elections by clarifying the submission process to Congress of each state’s presidential electoral count.
Under ECRA, the governor must issue a state’s Certificate of Ascertainment of Appointment of Electors, unless state law explicitly delegates that duty to another executive official. ECRA also specifies that each certificate must contain:
- The names of the state’s electors
- The number of popular votes won in that state by each of the presidential candidates’ electors (see below, “Do Americans vote for the President, or the electors?”)
- Authenticity elements, such as the seal of the State and at least one security feature
Then, when those electors hold their official meeting, they sign and submit a different certificate of votes delineating the electoral college votes for President and Vice President. In addition to these federal requirements, 33 states have passed laws prohibiting unsanctioned or “faithless” electors in the presidential election process. Georgia is not among them.
—————
CONTEXT: 2020 “Fake Electors” Highlighted the Need for ECRA
In 2020, after it became clear that former President Donald Trump’s multiple lawsuits contesting the election results lacked evidentiary merit to alter the outcome, he and allies assembled their own slates of presidential electors in seven states where Trump did not win.
Those unsanctioned electors met the same day as the legitimate electors, cast votes for Trump, and submitted to Congress competing Certificates of Ascertainment. President Trump began a pressure campaign to urge then-Vice President Mike Pence to discard the actual results from those seven states, and instead accept the fraudulent ones during the January 6, 2021, vote counting hearing. Had the Vice President done so, and had enough members of Congress gone along, President Joe Biden would have fallen short of the 270-vote Electoral College majority.
—————
9.c. ECRA clarifies the timeline for the presidential post-election process, with implications for states.
This timeline includes a new mandatory deadline for issuing the Certificate of Ascertainment, a new deadline for court intervention, and an updated date for the electors to meet and cast their votes. As a result, many intermediate state deadlines (such as vote counting, recounts, and audits) may need to be updated to comply with the new mandatory deadlines. Some states, including Michigan, have updated their laws to reflect this timeline. Georgia is not among them.
9.d. Legislatures cannot change the rules after Election Day.
ECRA requires that elections be administered according to the state laws in place prior to Election Day, including laws governing presidential electors, voting emergencies, and related provisions. Importantly, ECRA also removed language from the old law pertaining to "failed elections" that bad-faith actors relied upon to argue that federal law allowed state legislatures to step in after the election was over and to appoint their own presidential electors, potentially overturning the will of the voters.
9.e. ECRA strengthens the role of courts.
The new law gives the courts the last word over disputes regarding a state's presidential election results, including any needed changes to the state's Certificate of Ascertainment. It also establishes a process for aggrieved presidential or vice-presidential candidates to bring cases before three-judge federal district courts.
————--
CONTEXT: Do Americans Vote for the President, or the Electors?
Actually, under the somewhat convoluted provisions of the Electoral College, Americans technically vote for the electors, who in turn vote for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates. Most states deploy a “winner takes all” approach in which all the Electoral College votes are awarded to the ticket that won the popular vote in that state. Two states (Maine and Nebraska) split a portion of their electoral votes by congressional district.
—————
PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in election is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was inconsistent and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was inconsistent and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
QUESTION 10: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
10.a. The only way for an individual citizen to challenge an election in Michigan is to contest the election in the court system.
State law provides explicit grounds for candidates for the office of President or Vice President to contest election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in the state’s supreme court. This process is different from recounts. Recounts cover all offices and are either automatic or can only be requested by candidates.
Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that don’t affect the outcome of the election. People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: They may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
State law provides explicit grounds for candidates for the office of President or Vice President to contest election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in the state’s supreme court. This process is different from recounts. Recounts cover all offices and are either automatic or can only be requested by candidates.
Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that don’t affect the outcome of the election. People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: They may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 11: What’s required of plaintiffs and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
11.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
11.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts and expedited contests.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state-legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
11.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
—————
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
—————
11.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
—————
CONTEXT: Do the MATH
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
—————
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
11.b. Challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races than in recounts and expedited contests.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state-legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
11.c. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
—————
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
—————
11.d. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
—————
CONTEXT: Do the MATH
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
—————
QUESTION 12: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
12.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Statement of a claim: There may be insufficient evidence to warrant a trial, or the allegations of the plaintiff may not even describe a violation of law.
- Unreasonable delays (also known as "Laches"): A suit may challenge the rules after the election when it should, instead, have challenged those rules well in advance.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
- A voter from one state attempts to challenge an election result in a different state.
- A case brought on the theory that voting equipment could have been connected to the internet but provides no evidence that the equipment ever was, in fact, connected to the internet. A challenge calls for overturning an election won by 10,000 votes, based on evidence of errors only affecting one polling station of 100 voters.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
QUESTION 13: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
13.a. The timelines are tight.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections. The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021. Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and that can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
13.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implication of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the contestants’ claims are so far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press lawyers to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on in order translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections. The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021. Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and that can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
13.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implication of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the contestants’ claims are so far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press lawyers to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on in order translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Experts
Ben Ginsberg, Pillars of the Community Co-Chair (national expert)
Christine Greig, Left Leaning Lead for Michiganders for Civic Resilience; Minority Leader of the Michigan House of Representatives from (2019 -2021) and State of Representatives to the 37th district (2015-2021)
Ari Mittleman, Keep Our Republic Executive Director
Jennifer Morrell, The Elections Group CEO & Co-Founder (national expert)
Erica Peresman, Promote the Vote Senior advisor and attorney
Justin Roebuck, CEO and Co-Founder of The Elections Group and Ottawa County Clerk and Register of Deeds
Tonya Schuitmaker, Right Leaning Lead for Michiganders for Civic Resilience; former State Senator and President Pro Tempore
Kim Wyman, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow (national expert)
Christine Greig, Left Leaning Lead for Michiganders for Civic Resilience; Minority Leader of the Michigan House of Representatives from (2019 -2021) and State of Representatives to the 37th district (2015-2021)
Ari Mittleman, Keep Our Republic Executive Director
Jennifer Morrell, The Elections Group CEO & Co-Founder (national expert)
Erica Peresman, Promote the Vote Senior advisor and attorney
Justin Roebuck, CEO and Co-Founder of The Elections Group and Ottawa County Clerk and Register of Deeds
Tonya Schuitmaker, Right Leaning Lead for Michiganders for Civic Resilience; former State Senator and President Pro Tempore
Kim Wyman, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow (national expert)
External Resources
Timeline of Michigan Election Procedures
Michigan Election Code
Michigan Administrative Election Code
State Board of Elections Website
State’s Voter Education Videos
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Michigan Election Code
Michigan Administrative Election Code
State Board of Elections Website
State’s Voter Education Videos
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Event |
Audience and Purpose |
Date or Target Week Times |
National press briefing #1 |
Pre-election: Launch the series. Orient to the project, resources, and expected priorities for coverage nationally. |
9/16/24* |
MI pre-election press briefing |
Pre-election, in-state reporters |
10/7/24 |
National press briefing #2 |
Pre-election, all reporters, all states: Summary the state briefings, what we are hearing in the key states, what to watch for. |
10/21/24* |
National press briefing #3 |
Post-election, all reporters, all states: What we saw this week. States where judicial review may be called on. |
11/7/24 ** |
In-state briefings as needed |
Post-election, state specific: We may, or may not, need the chance to put forward our in-state experts, depending on what happens in each state. |
11/6/24 or 11/12/24 |
National press briefing #4 |
Post-election: Electoral Count Reform Act in action. Certificates of Ascertainment to be issued the next day. Our legal team briefs reporters on the next month of deadlines. |
12/10/24 ** |
National press briefing #5 |
Post-election: Congress meets tomorrow to accept electoral votes. ERN’s team of commentators will brief reporters on what’s expected. |
1/5/25 ** |
Date |
Michigan Election Activity |
11/7/24 |
Deadline for Boards of County Canvassers to meet to canvass the election. |
11/8/24 |
Deadline for voters to cure the signature on absentee ballot return envelope. |
11/19/24 |
Deadline for boards of county canvassers to complete canvass; county clerks forward results to the Secretary of State within 24 hours. |
11/25/24 |
Deadline for Board of State Canvassers to meet to canvass the election. |
11/27/24 |
Last day to file a state supreme court complaint regarding the outcome of presidential election. (Must happen within 48 hours after completion of state canvass) |
11/27/24 |
Last day to file a petition for recount. (Must happen within 48 hours after completion of state canvass) |
11/29/24 |
Last possible opportunity to file a counter-petition or objection to a recount. (Must happen within 48 hours after filing of recount petition) |
12/11/24 |
Federal deadline to issue certificates of ascertainment officially appointing the state's presidential electors |
12/16/24 |
Deadline for state supreme court to issue ruling regarding the presidential election. |
12/17/24 |
Meeting of the Electoral College |
12/29/24 |
All recounts (automatic or requested) must be completed by this date. (Certificate of ascertainment is not wholly dependent on completion.) |
For More Dates See the Michigan Secretary of State's Calendar
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.