GEORGIA
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures governing elections in Georgia.
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Title 21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated are abbreviated "OCGA"
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Title 21 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated are abbreviated "OCGA"
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
QUESTION 1: What are the roles of election boards, poll workers, and observers?
1.a. A hierarchy of election groups and people oversee elections in Georgia. The major parties can nominate candidates for oversight roles and directly observe the election.
State Election Board: The State Election Board oversees election administration across the state and investigates irregularities (OCGA §21-2-30). The five-member board includes:
This structure can raise concerns since Georgia’s board could have four of its five members from the same political party. Currently, the makeup is: one Independent appointed by Republicans, three Republicans, and one Democrat.
County Election Boards: County boards of elections oversee local election administration and certify county election results (OCGA §21-2-40.1). Boards consist of either three or five members appointed by the local governing body, often on the recommendation of local party executive committees. Boards select a chair from among their members. There are no statewide requirements for partisan parity on boards, although some counties may impose such requirements.
Poll Managers (Polling Place Board): Poll managers are poll workers hired under the authority of the county board. Political parties may submit a list of qualified persons to be considered as poll managers, and state law requires an equal number of managers from each party “insofar as practicable” (OCGA §21-2-90). Poll managers take an oath to “truly, impartially, and faithfully perform [their] duties” (OCGA §21-2-94), and cannot be candidates, family members of candidates, nor elected officials.
Poll Watchers: Poll watchers are designated representatives of the parties or certain independent and nonpartisan candidates. Poll watchers may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes. When inside the election area, poll watchers are prohibited from “talking to voters, checking elector lists, using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, using cellular telephones, or participating in any form of campaigning” (OCGA §21-2-408). Parties can designate up to two people per precinct or advance voting place and 25 statewide poll watchers.
Duplication Panel: This three-member panel consists of the election superintendent (or designee) and one person nominated by the county executive committee of each political party with at least one candidate on the ballot (OCGA §21-2-483). The Duplication Panel prepares and approves a duplicate of ballots that are “so torn, bent, or otherwise defective that [they] cannot be processed by the tabulating machine” (OCGA §21-2-483).
Vote Review Panel: This three-member panel consists of the election superintendent (or designee) and one person nominated by the county executive committee of each political party with at least one candidate on the ballot (OCGA §21-2-483). The panel reviews ballots that have been rejected by the tabulator in order to decide whether the voter’s intent can be determined.
Recount Team (Hand Count): This three-member team is assembled for hand recounts only (GA Rule 183-1-15). Like the panels above, it includes the election superintendent (or designee) and one person nominated by the county executive committee of each political party with at least one candidate on the ballot.
1.b. Georgia places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan poll watcher.
Who can observe: State law requires parties and candidates to train the poll watchers they appoint (OCGA §21-2-408). The training must cover poll watchers’ duties, applicable laws, and rules and regulations. Only individuals officially designated, appropriately trained, and wearing a badge provided by the election authority are allowed to serve as poll watchers. Documentation of their appointment to specific locations is provided in writing by the parties.
Who cannot observe: Candidates appearing on the ballot may not serve as poll watchers (OCGA §21-2-408). Beyond this basic requirement, there are few limits on who can serve as a poll watcher. Poll watchers are not required to be registered voters or residents of the county in which they are a poll watcher. Finally, no more than two statewide poll watchers of a political party can be in a precinct at the same time.
To compare these procedures with other states, visit this resource by the National Conference of State Legislatures.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll watchers.
Georgia requires poll watchers to be trained in the duties of the role, applicable laws, and rules and regulations (OCGA §21-2-408). The Secretary of State publishes training materials online. However, the parties are also free to use their own material and include any additional instructions as they see fit.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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State Election Board: The State Election Board oversees election administration across the state and investigates irregularities (OCGA §21-2-30). The five-member board includes:
- A chairperson selected by majority vote by both chambers of the General Assembly (the state legislature), or by the governor if the Assembly is not in session
- A registered voter selected by the majority party in the state House
- A registered voter selected by the majority party of the state Senate
- A registered voter selected by the Democratic party
- A registered voter selected by the Republican party
This structure can raise concerns since Georgia’s board could have four of its five members from the same political party. Currently, the makeup is: one Independent appointed by Republicans, three Republicans, and one Democrat.
County Election Boards: County boards of elections oversee local election administration and certify county election results (OCGA §21-2-40.1). Boards consist of either three or five members appointed by the local governing body, often on the recommendation of local party executive committees. Boards select a chair from among their members. There are no statewide requirements for partisan parity on boards, although some counties may impose such requirements.
Poll Managers (Polling Place Board): Poll managers are poll workers hired under the authority of the county board. Political parties may submit a list of qualified persons to be considered as poll managers, and state law requires an equal number of managers from each party “insofar as practicable” (OCGA §21-2-90). Poll managers take an oath to “truly, impartially, and faithfully perform [their] duties” (OCGA §21-2-94), and cannot be candidates, family members of candidates, nor elected officials.
Poll Watchers: Poll watchers are designated representatives of the parties or certain independent and nonpartisan candidates. Poll watchers may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes. When inside the election area, poll watchers are prohibited from “talking to voters, checking elector lists, using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, using cellular telephones, or participating in any form of campaigning” (OCGA §21-2-408). Parties can designate up to two people per precinct or advance voting place and 25 statewide poll watchers.
Duplication Panel: This three-member panel consists of the election superintendent (or designee) and one person nominated by the county executive committee of each political party with at least one candidate on the ballot (OCGA §21-2-483). The Duplication Panel prepares and approves a duplicate of ballots that are “so torn, bent, or otherwise defective that [they] cannot be processed by the tabulating machine” (OCGA §21-2-483).
Vote Review Panel: This three-member panel consists of the election superintendent (or designee) and one person nominated by the county executive committee of each political party with at least one candidate on the ballot (OCGA §21-2-483). The panel reviews ballots that have been rejected by the tabulator in order to decide whether the voter’s intent can be determined.
Recount Team (Hand Count): This three-member team is assembled for hand recounts only (GA Rule 183-1-15). Like the panels above, it includes the election superintendent (or designee) and one person nominated by the county executive committee of each political party with at least one candidate on the ballot.
1.b. Georgia places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan poll watcher.
Who can observe: State law requires parties and candidates to train the poll watchers they appoint (OCGA §21-2-408). The training must cover poll watchers’ duties, applicable laws, and rules and regulations. Only individuals officially designated, appropriately trained, and wearing a badge provided by the election authority are allowed to serve as poll watchers. Documentation of their appointment to specific locations is provided in writing by the parties.
Who cannot observe: Candidates appearing on the ballot may not serve as poll watchers (OCGA §21-2-408). Beyond this basic requirement, there are few limits on who can serve as a poll watcher. Poll watchers are not required to be registered voters or residents of the county in which they are a poll watcher. Finally, no more than two statewide poll watchers of a political party can be in a precinct at the same time.
To compare these procedures with other states, visit this resource by the National Conference of State Legislatures.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll watchers.
Georgia requires poll watchers to be trained in the duties of the role, applicable laws, and rules and regulations (OCGA §21-2-408). The Secretary of State publishes training materials online. However, the parties are also free to use their own material and include any additional instructions as they see fit.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election monitors or the general public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Georgia provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Georgia does not explicitly provide opportunities for nonpartisan monitors to observe election procedures. Members of the general public may observe some election procedures that are conducted publicly, but they do not receive the same access within election areas as credentialed poll watchers.
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Georgia provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Georgia does not explicitly provide opportunities for nonpartisan monitors to observe election procedures. Members of the general public may observe some election procedures that are conducted publicly, but they do not receive the same access within election areas as credentialed poll watchers.
———--
CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are poll watchers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to political party observation.
Georgia law allows poll watchers (whom, as noted above, generally represent a political party or candidate) to observe any significant voting, processing, and counting activities (OCGA §21-2-408). However, they cannot interfere with or impede the election procedures or staff, and they can be asked to leave if they do so.
Georgia law gives credentialed poll watchers access to polling places, advance-voting locations, tabulation centers, and locations where absentee ballots are verified, processed, adjudicated, and scanned. Poll watchers may generally observe election activities from a location close enough to see and hear the activity being observed, but they may not interfere with election procedures or view information protected from disclosure (OCGA §21-2-408).
Georgia law allows poll watchers (whom, as noted above, generally represent a political party or candidate) to observe any significant voting, processing, and counting activities (OCGA §21-2-408). However, they cannot interfere with or impede the election procedures or staff, and they can be asked to leave if they do so.
Georgia law gives credentialed poll watchers access to polling places, advance-voting locations, tabulation centers, and locations where absentee ballots are verified, processed, adjudicated, and scanned. Poll watchers may generally observe election activities from a location close enough to see and hear the activity being observed, but they may not interfere with election procedures or view information protected from disclosure (OCGA §21-2-408).
QUESTION 4: What are challengers and how do they impact transparency and verification?
4.a. Georgia allows citizens to challenge voter eligibility.
Any voter may challenge the eligibility of any other voter in their county or municipality. Georgia law does not impose a numerical limit on the number of voters who may be challenged, but a challenge must state distinct grounds and the board of elections must determine whether probable cause exists to sustain it. Acceptable grounds for challenging a voter’s eligibility include evidence that they are deceased, registered to vote in another jurisdiction, or are registered to vote at a nonresidential address (OCGA §21-2-230). There is no penalty for frivolous or false challenges. Challenges filed within 45 days of an election are postponed until after the certification of that election.
According to a report by Protect Democracy, most challenges are dismissed, but they have the effect of distracting administrators with potentially unnecessary work during busy election seasons and may dissuade challenged voters from participating in the state’s democratic process.
Any voter may challenge the eligibility of any other voter in their county or municipality. Georgia law does not impose a numerical limit on the number of voters who may be challenged, but a challenge must state distinct grounds and the board of elections must determine whether probable cause exists to sustain it. Acceptable grounds for challenging a voter’s eligibility include evidence that they are deceased, registered to vote in another jurisdiction, or are registered to vote at a nonresidential address (OCGA §21-2-230). There is no penalty for frivolous or false challenges. Challenges filed within 45 days of an election are postponed until after the certification of that election.
According to a report by Protect Democracy, most challenges are dismissed, but they have the effect of distracting administrators with potentially unnecessary work during busy election seasons and may dissuade challenged voters from participating in the state’s democratic process.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance, including seal numbers on equipment, the number of ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 5: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
5.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before voting.
Vote counting in Georgia is done with the use of scanners that read voters’ electronically- or hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. Nearly all ballots marked at the polling station on Election Day, including electronically-marked ballots, are fed into the scanner by voters themselves (GA Rule 183-1-12).
Absentee ballots that are mailed or dropped off are scanned by an election official in the presence of three other poll workers or clerks and in a location viewable by the public (GA Rule 183-1-13-.14). Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a set of test ballots is accurately recorded by each ballot marking device and tabulated by each scanner (GA Rule 183-1-12-.08). This process is called “logic and accuracy” testing and can be observed by the public. Georgia’s testing is generally on par with many other states and should, combined with the state’s risk-limiting audits, catch the vast majority of errors before election results are finalized.
5.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Tabulation machines and other voting equipment is physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections throughout the election process (GA Rule 183-1-12-.05). Equipment is also isolated from internet connections and external software. After polls have closed, vote tabulations are required to be stored on paper and on a memory card that, if needed, is physically transported for consolidation (GA Rule 183-1-12-.12).
A person who inappropriately modifies voting equipment may be charged with a felony (OCGA §21-2-580).
5.c. Votes are marked on paper by an electronic ballot marking device (BMD). This paper trail is retained to be available for rechecking.
Georgia law requires electronic voting systems to produce a physical paper ballot for tabulation purposes (OCGA §21-2-300). This paper trail allows officials to conduct post-election audits and recounts if there are concerns about the results. This requirement ensures that all votes cast in Georgia have a physical paper backup, enhancing the security and verifiability of the election process.
Ballot marking devices (BMDs) are assistive devices like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator. These devices do not store information; the only record generated by the BMD is the printout.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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Legislation enacted in 2024 will eventually require Georgia tabulators to count the human-readable text printed on ballots rather than QR codes or similar machine coding. The change was originally scheduled for 2026 but legislation enacted in June 2026 postponed its effective date until January 1, 2028. Georgia's current voting system therefore continues to use QR-code tabulation for the 2026 election (OCGA §21-2-379.23).
Vote counting in Georgia is done with the use of scanners that read voters’ electronically- or hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. Nearly all ballots marked at the polling station on Election Day, including electronically-marked ballots, are fed into the scanner by voters themselves (GA Rule 183-1-12).
Absentee ballots that are mailed or dropped off are scanned by an election official in the presence of three other poll workers or clerks and in a location viewable by the public (GA Rule 183-1-13-.14). Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a set of test ballots is accurately recorded by each ballot marking device and tabulated by each scanner (GA Rule 183-1-12-.08). This process is called “logic and accuracy” testing and can be observed by the public. Georgia’s testing is generally on par with many other states and should, combined with the state’s risk-limiting audits, catch the vast majority of errors before election results are finalized.
5.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Tabulation machines and other voting equipment is physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections throughout the election process (GA Rule 183-1-12-.05). Equipment is also isolated from internet connections and external software. After polls have closed, vote tabulations are required to be stored on paper and on a memory card that, if needed, is physically transported for consolidation (GA Rule 183-1-12-.12).
A person who inappropriately modifies voting equipment may be charged with a felony (OCGA §21-2-580).
5.c. Votes are marked on paper by an electronic ballot marking device (BMD). This paper trail is retained to be available for rechecking.
Georgia law requires electronic voting systems to produce a physical paper ballot for tabulation purposes (OCGA §21-2-300). This paper trail allows officials to conduct post-election audits and recounts if there are concerns about the results. This requirement ensures that all votes cast in Georgia have a physical paper backup, enhancing the security and verifiability of the election process.
Ballot marking devices (BMDs) are assistive devices like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator. These devices do not store information; the only record generated by the BMD is the printout.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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Legislation enacted in 2024 will eventually require Georgia tabulators to count the human-readable text printed on ballots rather than QR codes or similar machine coding. The change was originally scheduled for 2026 but legislation enacted in June 2026 postponed its effective date until January 1, 2028. Georgia's current voting system therefore continues to use QR-code tabulation for the 2026 election (OCGA §21-2-379.23).
QUESTION 6: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
6.a. A photo ID is required to vote in person, or a voter may use a provisional ballot.
All in-person voters must show a photo ID demonstrating that they are a legal resident of Georgia (OCGA §21-2-417). A voter who does not present acceptable identification may cast a provisional ballot and provide the required identification within the statutory cure period.
6.b. Georgia officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Georgia, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state.
However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression (as seen by Georgia’s voter registration list maintenance in summer 2023, in which over 190,000 voters were slated to be removed from the rolls).
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Georgia is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, the Secretary of State keeps voter rolls current using automatic updates from other state agencies (OCGA §21-2-231). These updates include lists of people who:
Georgia offers automatic voter registration when residents obtain or update their driver's licenses.
6.c. The law prevents registration by noncitizens.
Georgia requires that voters be citizens and uses a database cross-checking process to confirm citizenship status. In some circumstances, Georgia law places voter registrations in a pending status until the applicant’s citizenship status can be verified via the Department of Driver Services or the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program. An audit by the Secretary of State for the period 1997 to 2022 found that 1,634 registrations out of several million registration applications that were not able to be verified for citizenship and were placed in pending status.
Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency, criminal status, or lack of citizenship, is a felony offense in Georgia (OCGA §21-2-561). Federal law separately makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
6.d. Vote by mail is signature and ID verified.
Absentee ballots may be mailed, deposited in drop boxes, or delivered to the board of registrars. Voters must sign the outer envelope and write their identification number, both of which are verified against the voter’s registration record (OCGA §21-2-386).
6.e. Georgia officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In Georgia, early in-person and mail ballots can be pre-processed, including signature and identification verification, as soon as they are received. They can be fully opened and scanned beginning on the third Monday prior to the election; however, the results cannot be tabulated until the polls close (OCGA §21-2-386).
Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan ballots before Election Day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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All in-person voters must show a photo ID demonstrating that they are a legal resident of Georgia (OCGA §21-2-417). A voter who does not present acceptable identification may cast a provisional ballot and provide the required identification within the statutory cure period.
6.b. Georgia officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Georgia, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state.
However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression (as seen by Georgia’s voter registration list maintenance in summer 2023, in which over 190,000 voters were slated to be removed from the rolls).
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Georgia is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, the Secretary of State keeps voter rolls current using automatic updates from other state agencies (OCGA §21-2-231). These updates include lists of people who:
- are imprisoned with felony convictions (who cannot vote)
- have served their time and whose voting rights are reinstated
- have been declared mentally incompetent (resulting in the loss of their voting rights)
- are deceased
Georgia offers automatic voter registration when residents obtain or update their driver's licenses.
6.c. The law prevents registration by noncitizens.
Georgia requires that voters be citizens and uses a database cross-checking process to confirm citizenship status. In some circumstances, Georgia law places voter registrations in a pending status until the applicant’s citizenship status can be verified via the Department of Driver Services or the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program. An audit by the Secretary of State for the period 1997 to 2022 found that 1,634 registrations out of several million registration applications that were not able to be verified for citizenship and were placed in pending status.
Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency, criminal status, or lack of citizenship, is a felony offense in Georgia (OCGA §21-2-561). Federal law separately makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
6.d. Vote by mail is signature and ID verified.
Absentee ballots may be mailed, deposited in drop boxes, or delivered to the board of registrars. Voters must sign the outer envelope and write their identification number, both of which are verified against the voter’s registration record (OCGA §21-2-386).
6.e. Georgia officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In Georgia, early in-person and mail ballots can be pre-processed, including signature and identification verification, as soon as they are received. They can be fully opened and scanned beginning on the third Monday prior to the election; however, the results cannot be tabulated until the polls close (OCGA §21-2-386).
Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan ballots before Election Day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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QUESTION 7: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
7.a. Election night results remain preliminary while officials complete outstanding ballot and verification procedures.
Following the close of polls, each poll manager and two poll officers must close each ballot scanner and advise the election superintendent of the number of ballots scanned by each scanner, the number of provisional ballots issued at the precinct, and the number of cast but unscanned ballots (GA Rule 183-1-12-.12). By midnight, each election superintendent must report to the Secretary of State the number of ballots cast (including provisional ballots) on Election Day, the number of ballots cast during early voting, and the number of absentee ballots returned (OCGA §21-2-421).
Provisional ballots may require additional information from voters, as do a small percentage of absentee ballots, and those deadlines fall in the days immediately following the election. Once that information is received, registrars have the full documentation of the preliminary results, which are provided to the county election board.
7.b. Initial results are then subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
After an election, counties participate in risk-limiting audits that manually examine samples of paper ballots and compare them with reported results (OCGA §21-2-498). State law requires a risk-limiting audit to be conducted in elections for President, U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General. One additional contest must also be selected from among State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Supreme Court Justice, Judge of the Court of Appeals, or Public Service Commissioner. This additional race is chosen via majority vote by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Senate Minority Leader, and House Minority Leader (if there is no majority, then the Chair of the State Election Board chooses which race to audit).
During this hand count, sworn members of an audit team count a random sample of ballots and compare the outcome to the electronic tallies at the close of the polls. The audit continues until it provides the level of statistical confidence required by state law. In 2026, the audit must provide a risk limit of not greater than six percent, meaning there is a 94% chance that – if there were an error – it would be caught and corrected (OCGA §21-2-498). Starting in 2028, the risk limit will be set at five percent.
The risk-limiting audit must be completed before final certification of the selected races (OCGA §21-2-498).
Audits, especially risk-limiting audits, are considered a best practice for election management. The key to a risk-limiting audit is that instead of a sample size set by law, the number of ballots counted adjusts to the margin of victory in the preliminary results. In close elections, a larger number of ballots are counted because of the need to reach a confidence threshold that the winner has been accurately identified. If the race is not close, a smaller sample is needed. This method is more efficient than full recounts and allows election authorities to be confident that the preliminary results have accurately identified the winner.
7.c. Georgia’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. Georgia and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
———--
CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods.
———--
7.d. Candidates in close elections, or nearly anyone who suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns, can request recounts.
Georgia’s law provides election authorities with the option to request a recount in several situations (OCGA §21-2-495).
First, a partial recount can be conducted within precincts or on specific voting machines if an election official suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns. A group of three voters can also make a formal request for such a recount. Partial recounts like this happen before certification of the results.
Second, candidates in races with a winning margin of 0.5% or less may request a full recount within two business days after certification of the results.
Third, an automatic recount is required when the winning margin is 0.5% or less in a general election for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, or Commissioner of Labor, provided that the contest appears first or second on the ballot. These automatic recounts are conducted by hand across the state and must begin within two days of certification.
Finally, at any time the Secretary of State may request a full or partial recount if a candidate for federal or state office submits a petition regarding an apparent discrepancy or error in the returns.
In the case of a full recount, the equipment used for the recount is tested using real ballots from at least three different precincts. The recount team must include the election superintendent (or designee) and one person from each of the political parties on the ballot, who are nominated by the party’s county executive committee and selected by the superintendent (GA Rule 183-1-15-.03).
These procedures are in place to ensure that discrepancies are found, investigated, and cannot occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election. If, upon completing the recount, it appears that the original vote count for the recounted contest was incorrect, the results will be corrected accordingly.
———--
CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
———--
Following the close of polls, each poll manager and two poll officers must close each ballot scanner and advise the election superintendent of the number of ballots scanned by each scanner, the number of provisional ballots issued at the precinct, and the number of cast but unscanned ballots (GA Rule 183-1-12-.12). By midnight, each election superintendent must report to the Secretary of State the number of ballots cast (including provisional ballots) on Election Day, the number of ballots cast during early voting, and the number of absentee ballots returned (OCGA §21-2-421).
Provisional ballots may require additional information from voters, as do a small percentage of absentee ballots, and those deadlines fall in the days immediately following the election. Once that information is received, registrars have the full documentation of the preliminary results, which are provided to the county election board.
7.b. Initial results are then subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
After an election, counties participate in risk-limiting audits that manually examine samples of paper ballots and compare them with reported results (OCGA §21-2-498). State law requires a risk-limiting audit to be conducted in elections for President, U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General. One additional contest must also be selected from among State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commissioner of Labor, Supreme Court Justice, Judge of the Court of Appeals, or Public Service Commissioner. This additional race is chosen via majority vote by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Senate Minority Leader, and House Minority Leader (if there is no majority, then the Chair of the State Election Board chooses which race to audit).
During this hand count, sworn members of an audit team count a random sample of ballots and compare the outcome to the electronic tallies at the close of the polls. The audit continues until it provides the level of statistical confidence required by state law. In 2026, the audit must provide a risk limit of not greater than six percent, meaning there is a 94% chance that – if there were an error – it would be caught and corrected (OCGA §21-2-498). Starting in 2028, the risk limit will be set at five percent.
The risk-limiting audit must be completed before final certification of the selected races (OCGA §21-2-498).
Audits, especially risk-limiting audits, are considered a best practice for election management. The key to a risk-limiting audit is that instead of a sample size set by law, the number of ballots counted adjusts to the margin of victory in the preliminary results. In close elections, a larger number of ballots are counted because of the need to reach a confidence threshold that the winner has been accurately identified. If the race is not close, a smaller sample is needed. This method is more efficient than full recounts and allows election authorities to be confident that the preliminary results have accurately identified the winner.
7.c. Georgia’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. Georgia and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
———--
CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods.
———--
7.d. Candidates in close elections, or nearly anyone who suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns, can request recounts.
Georgia’s law provides election authorities with the option to request a recount in several situations (OCGA §21-2-495).
First, a partial recount can be conducted within precincts or on specific voting machines if an election official suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns. A group of three voters can also make a formal request for such a recount. Partial recounts like this happen before certification of the results.
Second, candidates in races with a winning margin of 0.5% or less may request a full recount within two business days after certification of the results.
Third, an automatic recount is required when the winning margin is 0.5% or less in a general election for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, State School Superintendent, Commissioner of Insurance, Commissioner of Agriculture, or Commissioner of Labor, provided that the contest appears first or second on the ballot. These automatic recounts are conducted by hand across the state and must begin within two days of certification.
Finally, at any time the Secretary of State may request a full or partial recount if a candidate for federal or state office submits a petition regarding an apparent discrepancy or error in the returns.
In the case of a full recount, the equipment used for the recount is tested using real ballots from at least three different precincts. The recount team must include the election superintendent (or designee) and one person from each of the political parties on the ballot, who are nominated by the party’s county executive committee and selected by the superintendent (GA Rule 183-1-15-.03).
These procedures are in place to ensure that discrepancies are found, investigated, and cannot occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election. If, upon completing the recount, it appears that the original vote count for the recounted contest was incorrect, the results will be corrected accordingly.
———--
CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
———--
QUESTION 8: Who certifies results in Georgia, and what issues have arisen around certification?
8.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In Georgia, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the county board of election and registration (OCGA §21-2-493). These boards vary in composition and selection method across the state, but a common feature is that most have members nominated by the two parties.
During certification, the election superintendents receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. The superintendents are required to “tabulate the figures for the entire county and sign, announce, and attest the same.” The superintendents have some powers to examine precinct returns. For example, the law provides that if the recorded votes for candidates in a precinct are found to exceed the total ballots cast, such “excess shall authorize” a range of specific steps by the superintendent, including "a recount or recanvass of the votes of that precinct” and a “report of the facts of the case to the district attorney” (OCGA §21-2-493).
County certification must be completed no later than 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the election (OCGA §21-2-493).
State-level certification is the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The law states that “the Secretary of State shall certify the votes cast…no later than 5:00 P.M. on the eighteenth day” after the election (OCGA §21-2-499).
8.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” a required function, not an exercise of investigation or judgment.
A court can compel county elections boards or the Secretary of State to certify if they refuse. Georgia courts have repeatedly confirmed the ministerial nature of certification. If a county board or the Secretary of State refused to certify, or delayed certification beyond the deadline, a court can mandate that certification be completed by relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
8.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Georgia have refused to certify results. All refusers were outvoted.
In recent elections, members of county election boards in Georgia refused to certify results. In each case the refuser was outvoted by the majority on the board.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
8.d. Georgia law provides other means to address challenges and concerns about election results.
Candidates, political parties, voters, and other parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results in state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and applicable law. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Georgia law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the secretary of state and county election boards may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
———--
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
———--
In Georgia, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the county board of election and registration (OCGA §21-2-493). These boards vary in composition and selection method across the state, but a common feature is that most have members nominated by the two parties.
During certification, the election superintendents receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. The superintendents are required to “tabulate the figures for the entire county and sign, announce, and attest the same.” The superintendents have some powers to examine precinct returns. For example, the law provides that if the recorded votes for candidates in a precinct are found to exceed the total ballots cast, such “excess shall authorize” a range of specific steps by the superintendent, including "a recount or recanvass of the votes of that precinct” and a “report of the facts of the case to the district attorney” (OCGA §21-2-493).
County certification must be completed no later than 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the election (OCGA §21-2-493).
State-level certification is the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The law states that “the Secretary of State shall certify the votes cast…no later than 5:00 P.M. on the eighteenth day” after the election (OCGA §21-2-499).
8.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” a required function, not an exercise of investigation or judgment.
A court can compel county elections boards or the Secretary of State to certify if they refuse. Georgia courts have repeatedly confirmed the ministerial nature of certification. If a county board or the Secretary of State refused to certify, or delayed certification beyond the deadline, a court can mandate that certification be completed by relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
8.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Georgia have refused to certify results. All refusers were outvoted.
In recent elections, members of county election boards in Georgia refused to certify results. In each case the refuser was outvoted by the majority on the board.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
8.d. Georgia law provides other means to address challenges and concerns about election results.
Candidates, political parties, voters, and other parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results in state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and applicable law. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Georgia law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the secretary of state and county election boards may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
———--
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
———--
PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming the results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
QUESTION 9: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
9.a. In addition to requesting a recount, candidates and individual citizens in Georgia can challenge an election through the court system.
Georgia’s laws allow candidates, voters, and election workers to request a recount (see Question 7). In addition to this option, elections can be challenged through the court system.
9.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law permits candidates or voters to contest election results in court and receive expedited consideration of their claims (OCGA §21-2-521). Legal grounds for such a challenge include (OCGA §21-2-522; §21-2-523):
State law also allows challengers to request a trial by jury, although the determination is left up to the judge (OCGA §21-2-526).
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
Georgia’s laws allow candidates, voters, and election workers to request a recount (see Question 7). In addition to this option, elections can be challenged through the court system.
9.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law permits candidates or voters to contest election results in court and receive expedited consideration of their claims (OCGA §21-2-521). Legal grounds for such a challenge include (OCGA §21-2-522; §21-2-523):
- Misconduct or fraud by election officials sufficient to “change or place in doubt” the result
- Candidate ineligibility
- Illegal voting
- Error in vote counting, if such error would change the result
- Other causes that cast doubt on the accuracy of the results
State law also allows challengers to request a trial by jury, although the determination is left up to the judge (OCGA §21-2-526).
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 10: What is required of plaintiffs and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
10.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
10.b. To utilize Georgia’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must make specific accusations of wrongdoing and work within a narrow timeline.
Election contests may be brought by a candidate or any individual entitled to vote for a candidate in the contested race (OCGA §21-2-521). Election results may be contested on grounds specified by statute or any other grounds that show another person was legally elected (OCGA §21-2-522).
Claims must be made within five days after the certification of results (OCGA §21-2-524).
10.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
10.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
———--
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
———--
10.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
———--
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
———--
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
10.b. To utilize Georgia’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must make specific accusations of wrongdoing and work within a narrow timeline.
Election contests may be brought by a candidate or any individual entitled to vote for a candidate in the contested race (OCGA §21-2-521). Election results may be contested on grounds specified by statute or any other grounds that show another person was legally elected (OCGA §21-2-522).
Claims must be made within five days after the certification of results (OCGA §21-2-524).
10.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
10.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
———--
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
———--
10.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
———--
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
———--
QUESTION 11: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
11.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Failure to State a Claim: The plaintiff’s allegations may not contain a legally recognizable claim that can be adjudicated by the courts.
- Unreasonable Delays (also known as "Laches"): A case may be dismissed if a party unreasonably delays bringing it, and if that delay causes prejudice.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
QUESTION 12: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
12.a. The timelines are tight.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
12.b. The legal system generally is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
12.b. The legal system generally is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Timeline of Georgia Election Procedures
Georgia Election Code
Georgia Poll Worker Manual
Department of State Elections Website
State Election Board Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Georgia Election Code
Georgia Poll Worker Manual
Department of State Elections Website
State Election Board Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Date |
Election Activity |
Runoff Timeline |
11/3/26 |
Election Day |
-- |
11/6/26 |
Deadline for voters to cure signature on absentee ballot return envelope. |
-- |
11/9/26 |
Deadline for county canvass and certification. |
-- |
11/13/26 - 11/17/26 |
Risk-limiting audit period. |
-- |
11/20/26 |
Deadline for Secretary of State to complete canvass and certification. |
-- |
11/24/26 |
Deadline to petition Secretary of State for a recount. |
-- |
12/1/26 |
-- |
Runoff Election |
12/4/26 |
-- |
Deadline for voters to cure signature on absentee ballot return envelope. |
12/7/26 |
-- |
Deadline for county canvass and certification. |
12/10/26 - 12/14/26 |
-- |
Risk-limiting audit period. |
12/18/26 |
-- |
Deadline for Secretary of State to complete canvass and certification. |
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
