GEORGIA
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures of elections in GEORGIA.
The information is grouped by three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review. It aims to be a go-to resource, especially when journalists must cover close, contested, and disputed elections. Today's voters have many questions about the fairness of elections. So, the Election Overtime project aims to inform media coverage of elections that helps explain how elections are grounded in the impartial rule of law. The brief focuses on structures that enable fairness and confidence, such as the role of poll watchers, rigorous verification procedures, and the evidentiary requirements of the courts for races that are contested.
The Election Reformers Network team stands ready to support journalists in deploying this content in your coverage.
The information is grouped by three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review. It aims to be a go-to resource, especially when journalists must cover close, contested, and disputed elections. Today's voters have many questions about the fairness of elections. So, the Election Overtime project aims to inform media coverage of elections that helps explain how elections are grounded in the impartial rule of law. The brief focuses on structures that enable fairness and confidence, such as the role of poll watchers, rigorous verification procedures, and the evidentiary requirements of the courts for races that are contested.
The Election Reformers Network team stands ready to support journalists in deploying this content in your coverage.
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, with a process as critical as elections, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
In recent decades, as democratization efforts challenged authoritarian rule in many countries, reformers prioritized the right of parties to observe elections as an essential element of free and fair elections.
QUESTION 1: What are the roles of election boards, poll workers, and observers?
1.a. A hierarchy of election groups and people oversee elections in Georgia. The major parties can nominate candidates for oversight roles and directly observe the election.
State Election Board: The State Election Board oversees election administration across the state and investigates irregularities. Per state law, the five-member board includes:
This structure can raise concerns since Georgia’s board could, theoretically, have four of its five members from the same political party. Currently, the makeup is: one Independent appointed by Republicans, three Republicans, and one Democrat.
County Election Boards: County boards of elections oversee local election administration and are the key certification authorities for county votes. The appointment process for each board is determined on a county level. Some are statutorily bipartisan. For example, some of the state’s 159 counties require that the Democratic and Republican parties each appoint two members of a five-person board and that the fifth member be approved by majority vote. Other boards have more one-sided control including the possibility of all county board members hailing from the same party. Georgia currently allows probate judges to serve as the election authority in some counties. However, this is being phased out and will no longer be an option in 2025.
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CONTEXT: August Rule Would Have Affected County Board Authority
In August 2024, the State Election Board passed an amendment to its rules that will first apply to the November 2024 election, giving county boards of elections the authority to conduct inquiries before certifying election results. The decision was controversial, with advocates saying the rule-change allows county boards to better protect voters. Opponents fear the rule change threatens existing checks and balances, and moves the boards away from their traditional ministerial, non-discretionary function.
UPDATE: This rule-change is under appeal and will not take effect in the 2024 general election.
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Poll Managers (Polling Place Board): Poll managers, per Georgia law, are poll workers hired under authority of the county board. They take an oath of impartiality, and cannot be candidates, family members of candidates, nor elected officials. Political parties may submit a list of qualified persons to be considered as poll managers.
Poll Watchers: Poll watchers are designated representatives of the parties and candidates who may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes. When inside the election area, poll watchers are prohibited from “talking to voters, checking elector lists, using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, using cellular telephones, or participating in any form of campaigning.” Parties can designate up to two people per precinct or advance voting place and 25 state-wide poll watchers.
Duplication Panel: This three-member panel approves duplicated ballots, approves the counting of any ballots rejected by the tabulator if the voter intent is clear, and sends ballots to a review panel. It includes one person assigned by the county election board (or its designee) and one individual picked by the county executive committee of each political party.
Vote Review Panel: This three-member panel reviews ballots when intent is difficult to determine. It includes one person assigned by the county election board (or its designee) and one individual picked by the county executive committee of each political party.
Recount Team (Hand Count): This three-member team is assembled for hand recounts only. Like the panels above, it includes one person assigned by the county election board (or its designee) and two individuals selected by the county election board (or its designee), and one individual nominated by the county executive committee of each political party.
1.b. Georgia places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan poll watcher.
Who can observe: Per state law, poll watchers must attend a party sponsored training covering their duties, applicable laws, and rules and regulations. Only individuals officially designated, appropriately trained, and wearing a badge provided by the election authority are allowed to closely watch the election process. Documentation of their appointment to specific locations is provided by the parties in writing. Although many processes are done in view of the public, other individuals seeking to observe must remain outside the designated election area.
Who cannot observe: Candidates appearing on the ballot may not serve as poll watchers. However, beyond this basic requirement there are very little limits on who can serve as a poll watcher. Poll watchers are not required to be registered voters or residents of the county in which they are a poll watcher, as is the case in many states. Finally, no more than two statewide poll watchers of a political party can be in a precinct at the same time.
To compare these procedures with other states, visit this resource by the National Conference of State Legislatures.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll watchers.
Georgia requires training to become a poll watcher in the duties of the role, applicable laws, and rules and regulations. The Secretary of State publishes training materials online. However, the parties are also free to use their own material and include any additional instructions as they see fit.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions. Some states require training; many do not.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by signing a short online form.
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State Election Board: The State Election Board oversees election administration across the state and investigates irregularities. Per state law, the five-member board includes:
- A chairperson selected by majority vote by both chambers of the General Assembly (the state legislature), or by the governor if the Assembly is not in session
- A registered voter selected by the majority party in the state House
- A registered voter selected by the majority party of the state Senate
- A registered voter selected by the Democratic party
- A registered voter selected by the Republican party.
This structure can raise concerns since Georgia’s board could, theoretically, have four of its five members from the same political party. Currently, the makeup is: one Independent appointed by Republicans, three Republicans, and one Democrat.
County Election Boards: County boards of elections oversee local election administration and are the key certification authorities for county votes. The appointment process for each board is determined on a county level. Some are statutorily bipartisan. For example, some of the state’s 159 counties require that the Democratic and Republican parties each appoint two members of a five-person board and that the fifth member be approved by majority vote. Other boards have more one-sided control including the possibility of all county board members hailing from the same party. Georgia currently allows probate judges to serve as the election authority in some counties. However, this is being phased out and will no longer be an option in 2025.
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CONTEXT: August Rule Would Have Affected County Board Authority
In August 2024, the State Election Board passed an amendment to its rules that will first apply to the November 2024 election, giving county boards of elections the authority to conduct inquiries before certifying election results. The decision was controversial, with advocates saying the rule-change allows county boards to better protect voters. Opponents fear the rule change threatens existing checks and balances, and moves the boards away from their traditional ministerial, non-discretionary function.
UPDATE: This rule-change is under appeal and will not take effect in the 2024 general election.
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Poll Managers (Polling Place Board): Poll managers, per Georgia law, are poll workers hired under authority of the county board. They take an oath of impartiality, and cannot be candidates, family members of candidates, nor elected officials. Political parties may submit a list of qualified persons to be considered as poll managers.
Poll Watchers: Poll watchers are designated representatives of the parties and candidates who may observe the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes. When inside the election area, poll watchers are prohibited from “talking to voters, checking elector lists, using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices, using cellular telephones, or participating in any form of campaigning.” Parties can designate up to two people per precinct or advance voting place and 25 state-wide poll watchers.
Duplication Panel: This three-member panel approves duplicated ballots, approves the counting of any ballots rejected by the tabulator if the voter intent is clear, and sends ballots to a review panel. It includes one person assigned by the county election board (or its designee) and one individual picked by the county executive committee of each political party.
Vote Review Panel: This three-member panel reviews ballots when intent is difficult to determine. It includes one person assigned by the county election board (or its designee) and one individual picked by the county executive committee of each political party.
Recount Team (Hand Count): This three-member team is assembled for hand recounts only. Like the panels above, it includes one person assigned by the county election board (or its designee) and two individuals selected by the county election board (or its designee), and one individual nominated by the county executive committee of each political party.
1.b. Georgia places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan poll watcher.
Who can observe: Per state law, poll watchers must attend a party sponsored training covering their duties, applicable laws, and rules and regulations. Only individuals officially designated, appropriately trained, and wearing a badge provided by the election authority are allowed to closely watch the election process. Documentation of their appointment to specific locations is provided by the parties in writing. Although many processes are done in view of the public, other individuals seeking to observe must remain outside the designated election area.
Who cannot observe: Candidates appearing on the ballot may not serve as poll watchers. However, beyond this basic requirement there are very little limits on who can serve as a poll watcher. Poll watchers are not required to be registered voters or residents of the county in which they are a poll watcher, as is the case in many states. Finally, no more than two statewide poll watchers of a political party can be in a precinct at the same time.
To compare these procedures with other states, visit this resource by the National Conference of State Legislatures.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of poll watchers.
Georgia requires training to become a poll watcher in the duties of the role, applicable laws, and rules and regulations. The Secretary of State publishes training materials online. However, the parties are also free to use their own material and include any additional instructions as they see fit.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions. Some states require training; many do not.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by signing a short online form.
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election monitors or the general public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Georgia provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Based on Georgia’s regulatory code, the state does not appear to explicitly provide opportunities for nonpartisan monitors or the general public to observe most election procedures. This lack of opportunity provides an opportunity for potential future election reform.
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CONTEXT: Titles can be confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. Note: this role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and don’t interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Georgia provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Based on Georgia’s regulatory code, the state does not appear to explicitly provide opportunities for nonpartisan monitors or the general public to observe most election procedures. This lack of opportunity provides an opportunity for potential future election reform.
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CONTEXT: Titles can be confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. Note: this role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are poll watchers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures are open to political party observation.
Georgia law allows poll watchers (whom, as noted above, generally represent a political party or candidate) to observe any significant voting, processing, and counting activities. However, they cannot interfere with or impede the election procedures or staff, and they can be asked to leave if they do so.
Passed this Spring, House Bill 1207 (Act 599) spelled out in new detail what poll watchers have a right to observe. These changes provide watchers the ability to go largely anywhere in a space where election activity is taking place, including polling stations and tabulation centers, and to get as “as close as is practicable to the observed activity so as to be able to see and hear the poll worker or election official being observed.” These changes also provide new protections against anyone who threatens violence against a poll watcher. At the same time “the poll manager may [still] make reasonable regulations to avoid such interference.” These changes will be in effect for the first time in November and may result in more frequent accusations of rule breaking, aggressive actions by poll watchers, or too strict regulations set by administrators.
Georgia law allows poll watchers (whom, as noted above, generally represent a political party or candidate) to observe any significant voting, processing, and counting activities. However, they cannot interfere with or impede the election procedures or staff, and they can be asked to leave if they do so.
Passed this Spring, House Bill 1207 (Act 599) spelled out in new detail what poll watchers have a right to observe. These changes provide watchers the ability to go largely anywhere in a space where election activity is taking place, including polling stations and tabulation centers, and to get as “as close as is practicable to the observed activity so as to be able to see and hear the poll worker or election official being observed.” These changes also provide new protections against anyone who threatens violence against a poll watcher. At the same time “the poll manager may [still] make reasonable regulations to avoid such interference.” These changes will be in effect for the first time in November and may result in more frequent accusations of rule breaking, aggressive actions by poll watchers, or too strict regulations set by administrators.
QUESTION 4: What are challengers and what contribution do they make to transparency and verification?
4.a. Georgia allows citizens to challenge voter eligibility.
Like most states, Georgia retains laws from early in state history, before the time of formal voter registration, that drew on residents’ knowledge of the community to ensure integrity of the ballot, through the right to challenge individual voter eligibility. These measures represent an early commitment to transparency, to the rights of members of a community to help ensure ineligible people weren’t voting. With the advent of registration lists, citizen challenges arguably are no longer needed.
Georgia has one of the most expansive challenge laws in the country, one strengthened by recent legislation [maybe footnote to SB202 or an article about it such as this article.]
Citizens in Georgia can challenge an unlimited number of voters in their county or municipality and election officials are given tight deadlines by which to respond. There is no penalty for frivolous or false challenges. For example, NBC reported, “A Forsyth County resident filed one of the biggest…challenging 15,787 voters — about 6% of the county’s voter rolls — in one fell swoop.” According to a report by Protect Democracy, most challenges are dismissed, but they have the effect of distracting administrators with potentially unnecessary work during busy electoral seasons and may dissuade challenged voters from participating in the state’s democratic process. Secretary Raffensperger has proposed changing challenge laws to reduce their burden on election officials.
Like most states, Georgia retains laws from early in state history, before the time of formal voter registration, that drew on residents’ knowledge of the community to ensure integrity of the ballot, through the right to challenge individual voter eligibility. These measures represent an early commitment to transparency, to the rights of members of a community to help ensure ineligible people weren’t voting. With the advent of registration lists, citizen challenges arguably are no longer needed.
Georgia has one of the most expansive challenge laws in the country, one strengthened by recent legislation [maybe footnote to SB202 or an article about it such as this article.]
Citizens in Georgia can challenge an unlimited number of voters in their county or municipality and election officials are given tight deadlines by which to respond. There is no penalty for frivolous or false challenges. For example, NBC reported, “A Forsyth County resident filed one of the biggest…challenging 15,787 voters — about 6% of the county’s voter rolls — in one fell swoop.” According to a report by Protect Democracy, most challenges are dismissed, but they have the effect of distracting administrators with potentially unnecessary work during busy electoral seasons and may dissuade challenged voters from participating in the state’s democratic process. Secretary Raffensperger has proposed changing challenge laws to reduce their burden on election officials.
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance including seal numbers on equipment, ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 5: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
5.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before voting.
Vote counting in Georgia is done with the use of scanners that read voters’ electronically- or hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. Nearly all ballots marked at the polling station on election day, including electronically marked ballots, are fed into the scanner by the voters themselves, according to state regulation and comments by Secretary Brad Raffensperger. (The exceptions are provisional ballots, discussed later.)
Regulations further require that absentee ballots that are mailed or dropped off in appropriate locations are scanned by an election official in the presence of three other poll workers or clerks and in a location viewable by the public. Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a set of test ballots is accurately recorded by each ballot marking device and tabulated by each scanner. This process is called “Logic and Accuracy” testing and can be observed by the public. Georgia’s testing is generally on par with many other states and should, combined with the state’s risk-limiting audits, catch the vast majority of errors before election results are finalized. However, the state placed 27th in a national ranking of logic and accuracy testing. One way to improve its procedures would be to test all types of ballots (such as a republican and democratic ballot during a primary) and different vote totals.
5.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Per state regulation, tabulation and other voting equipment is physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections throughout the process. Equipment is also isolated from internet connections and external software. After polls have closed, vote tabulations are required to be stored on paper and on a memory card that, if needed, is physically transported for consolidation.
A person who inappropriately modifies voting equipment may be charged with a felony.
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CONTEXT: The law is clear
“Electronic ballot markers, ballot scanners, and election management systems shall not be connected to the internet and no other software shall be loaded onto or maintained or used on computers on which the election management system software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.” (GA Administrative Code)
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5.c. Votes are marked on paper by an electronic ballot marking device (BMD). This paper is retained to be available for rechecking.
Maintaining a paper-trail, as Georgia counties and cities do, is a recommended best practice for election administration. Officials can audit or recount the paper ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
Ballot marking devices (BMDs) are an assistive device like a touch screen that provides voters with a printed copy and QR coded version of their ballot. These devices do not store information; the only record is the printout. In Georgia, voters receive a ballot summary and a unique QR code, which is scanned, and the information is stored by the election authority. Other states in which most voters use a BMD to vote include, Texas, New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, Arkansas, and West Virginia.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, doesn’t take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
To compare the different types of voting technology, visit MIT’s election data lab.
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Starting in 2026, Georgia’s BMDs will no longer use QR codes, instead the State will require the use of tabulators to scan the printed version of the ballot. Some experts, including Secretary Raffensperger, disagree with this solution, calling for risk-limiting audits instead. However, this debate is moot in Georgia, given the legislature’s decision earlier this year. BMDs are supplied by the Georgia Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. Georgia’s Administrative Code sets requirements for certifying voting equipment, including that it must have a Qualification Certificate from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission assuring that it is in compliance with federal security requirements. Only one type of BMD is in use.
Vote counting in Georgia is done with the use of scanners that read voters’ electronically- or hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. Nearly all ballots marked at the polling station on election day, including electronically marked ballots, are fed into the scanner by the voters themselves, according to state regulation and comments by Secretary Brad Raffensperger. (The exceptions are provisional ballots, discussed later.)
Regulations further require that absentee ballots that are mailed or dropped off in appropriate locations are scanned by an election official in the presence of three other poll workers or clerks and in a location viewable by the public. Election officials must demonstrate before any equipment is used that a set of test ballots is accurately recorded by each ballot marking device and tabulated by each scanner. This process is called “Logic and Accuracy” testing and can be observed by the public. Georgia’s testing is generally on par with many other states and should, combined with the state’s risk-limiting audits, catch the vast majority of errors before election results are finalized. However, the state placed 27th in a national ranking of logic and accuracy testing. One way to improve its procedures would be to test all types of ballots (such as a republican and democratic ballot during a primary) and different vote totals.
5.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
Per state regulation, tabulation and other voting equipment is physically sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections throughout the process. Equipment is also isolated from internet connections and external software. After polls have closed, vote tabulations are required to be stored on paper and on a memory card that, if needed, is physically transported for consolidation.
A person who inappropriately modifies voting equipment may be charged with a felony.
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CONTEXT: The law is clear
“Electronic ballot markers, ballot scanners, and election management systems shall not be connected to the internet and no other software shall be loaded onto or maintained or used on computers on which the election management system software is located except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of State.” (GA Administrative Code)
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5.c. Votes are marked on paper by an electronic ballot marking device (BMD). This paper is retained to be available for rechecking.
Maintaining a paper-trail, as Georgia counties and cities do, is a recommended best practice for election administration. Officials can audit or recount the paper ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators.
Ballot marking devices (BMDs) are an assistive device like a touch screen that provides voters with a printed copy and QR coded version of their ballot. These devices do not store information; the only record is the printout. In Georgia, voters receive a ballot summary and a unique QR code, which is scanned, and the information is stored by the election authority. Other states in which most voters use a BMD to vote include, Texas, New Jersey, Delaware, South Carolina, Arkansas, and West Virginia.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, doesn’t take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
To compare the different types of voting technology, visit MIT’s election data lab.
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Starting in 2026, Georgia’s BMDs will no longer use QR codes, instead the State will require the use of tabulators to scan the printed version of the ballot. Some experts, including Secretary Raffensperger, disagree with this solution, calling for risk-limiting audits instead. However, this debate is moot in Georgia, given the legislature’s decision earlier this year. BMDs are supplied by the Georgia Secretary of State or purchased by the counties with the authorization of the Secretary of State. Georgia’s Administrative Code sets requirements for certifying voting equipment, including that it must have a Qualification Certificate from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission assuring that it is in compliance with federal security requirements. Only one type of BMD is in use.
QUESTION 6: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
6.a. A photo ID is required to vote in person, or a voter may use a provisional ballot.
All in-person voters must show a photo ID demonstrating that they are a legal resident of Georgia to vote, per state law. Those that do not have appropriate ID are given a provisional ballot which is only counted if the voter brings their ID to the county registrar within three business days.
While 36 states require or request photo ID at the polls, Georgia’s three-day provision makes it one of the 12 states ranked the strictest.
Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency, criminal status, or lack of citizenship, is a felony offense in Georgia. To help enforce this provision, the Secretary of State can cross-reference information held by the state’s DMV and the Social Security Administration.
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CONTEXT: Good News on Provisionals
Georgia has very few provisional ballots. Since 2012 less than .6% of ballots cast were provisional.
In 2022 provisional ballots made up only .15% of ballots cast. Of those, only .05% were ultimately rejected. One likely reason for this trend is that the public is better educated about how to keep their registrations up to date and what ID to present when voting. (MIT election data)
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6.b. Georgia officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Georgia, and every other state faces, is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state.
However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression (as seen by mixed views on Georgia’s voter registration list maintenance in summer 2023 in which over 190,000 voters were slated to be removed from the rolls).
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for non-voting, but a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter who fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Georgia is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify the names of voters no longer in the state. Georgia has retained its membership in ERIC, standing against what is widely considered by election officials to be misinformation about the program. In the last two years, nine states withdrew their membership and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.
In addition to ERIC, the Secretary of State keeps voter rolls current using automatic updates from other state agencies. These updates include lists of people who,
6.c. The law prevents registration by noncitizens.
Georgia requires that voters be citizens and uses a database cross-checking process to confirm citizenship status. In some circumstances, Georgia law places voter registrations in a pending status until the applicant’s citizenship status can be verified via the Department of Driver Services or the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. An audit by the Secretary of State for the period 1997 to 2022 found that 1,634 registrations out of several million registration applications that were not able to be verified for citizenship and were placed in pending status.
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CONTEXT: Long-Running Litigation on Georgia’s Citizenship Regulations
Georgia's regulation requiring proof of citizenship and its practice of placing voters in "pending" status has been a source of long-running litigation. The program can delay new, naturalized citizens from exercising their right to vote if outdated government databases or prior documentation do not reflect the individual’s citizenship.
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6.d. Vote by mail is signed and ID-verified.
As of 2023, Georgia, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia have no-excuse absentee laws. Seven states conduct their entire election by “absentee” ballot. State law allows ballots to be mailed, dropped off in boxes at polling locations or other approved locations which are only open during voting hours and are under constant surveillance.
ID is required for receipts of all early ballots, including ballots-by-mail and those cast in-person. The envelope containing the returned ballot must be signed and include an ID such as a driver’s license number that can be checked against the voter’s registration information, per state law.
6.e. Georgia officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In Georgia, early in-person and mail ballots can be pre-processed (accepted or rejected by the registrar or clerk) using the outer envelope as soon as they are received. They can be fully opened and scanned beginning on the third Monday prior to the election. However, the results cannot be tabulated until the polls close.
Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan ballots before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
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CONTEXT: Official Results Come Later
In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night. But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted, audited, and certified. Today, lack of understanding of the audit and certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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All in-person voters must show a photo ID demonstrating that they are a legal resident of Georgia to vote, per state law. Those that do not have appropriate ID are given a provisional ballot which is only counted if the voter brings their ID to the county registrar within three business days.
While 36 states require or request photo ID at the polls, Georgia’s three-day provision makes it one of the 12 states ranked the strictest.
Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency, criminal status, or lack of citizenship, is a felony offense in Georgia. To help enforce this provision, the Secretary of State can cross-reference information held by the state’s DMV and the Social Security Administration.
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CONTEXT: Good News on Provisionals
Georgia has very few provisional ballots. Since 2012 less than .6% of ballots cast were provisional.
In 2022 provisional ballots made up only .15% of ballots cast. Of those, only .05% were ultimately rejected. One likely reason for this trend is that the public is better educated about how to keep their registrations up to date and what ID to present when voting. (MIT election data)
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6.b. Georgia officials draw on a range of sources to update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Georgia, and every other state faces, is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state.
However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression (as seen by mixed views on Georgia’s voter registration list maintenance in summer 2023 in which over 190,000 voters were slated to be removed from the rolls).
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for non-voting, but a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter who fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Georgia is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify the names of voters no longer in the state. Georgia has retained its membership in ERIC, standing against what is widely considered by election officials to be misinformation about the program. In the last two years, nine states withdrew their membership and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.
In addition to ERIC, the Secretary of State keeps voter rolls current using automatic updates from other state agencies. These updates include lists of people who,
- are imprisoned with felony convictions (who cannot vote),
- have served their time and whose voting rights are reinstated,
- have been declared mentally incompetent resulting in the lose of their voting rights, and
- who are deceased.
6.c. The law prevents registration by noncitizens.
Georgia requires that voters be citizens and uses a database cross-checking process to confirm citizenship status. In some circumstances, Georgia law places voter registrations in a pending status until the applicant’s citizenship status can be verified via the Department of Driver Services or the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program. An audit by the Secretary of State for the period 1997 to 2022 found that 1,634 registrations out of several million registration applications that were not able to be verified for citizenship and were placed in pending status.
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CONTEXT: Long-Running Litigation on Georgia’s Citizenship Regulations
Georgia's regulation requiring proof of citizenship and its practice of placing voters in "pending" status has been a source of long-running litigation. The program can delay new, naturalized citizens from exercising their right to vote if outdated government databases or prior documentation do not reflect the individual’s citizenship.
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6.d. Vote by mail is signed and ID-verified.
As of 2023, Georgia, along with 28 states and the District of Columbia have no-excuse absentee laws. Seven states conduct their entire election by “absentee” ballot. State law allows ballots to be mailed, dropped off in boxes at polling locations or other approved locations which are only open during voting hours and are under constant surveillance.
ID is required for receipts of all early ballots, including ballots-by-mail and those cast in-person. The envelope containing the returned ballot must be signed and include an ID such as a driver’s license number that can be checked against the voter’s registration information, per state law.
6.e. Georgia officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In Georgia, early in-person and mail ballots can be pre-processed (accepted or rejected by the registrar or clerk) using the outer envelope as soon as they are received. They can be fully opened and scanned beginning on the third Monday prior to the election. However, the results cannot be tabulated until the polls close.
Allowing officials to prepare ballots for counting and scan ballots before election day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
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CONTEXT: Official Results Come Later
In the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night. But this is not the final word. Official returns come later, after all ballots have been counted, audited, and certified. Today, lack of understanding of the audit and certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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QUESTION 7: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
7.a. Initial results are available within a week.
By midnight on election night, polling place officials are required to provide the registrar with a report showing the total number of ballots cast, including provisional ballots, and absentee-by-mail ballots received by the close of polls.
Provisional ballots may require additional follow-up information from voters, as do a small percentage of absentee ballots, and those deadlines fall in the days immediately following the election. Once that information is received registrars have the full documentation of the preliminary results, which are provided to the county election board for certification one week after election day. Additional deadlines are provided in Georgia’s election calendar.
7.b. Initial results are then subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
The next step required by Georgia law is a risk-limiting tabulation audit. In the audit, officials compare a hand count of a random sample of votes across every county in at least the highest race (in this case the Presidential) plus one additional race such as U.S. senate, governor, or attorney general. During this hand count sworn members of an audit team count a sample of ballots and compare their outcome to the electronic tallies at the close of the polls. The teams, per state regulation, count electronically marked ballots based on the printed text. This is an important backstop that helps ensure the QR codes properly translated results.
Although a majority of states conduct some form of reliable audit, Georgia is among an elite few who go further with risk-limiting audits. Other states include Colorado, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Official certification of the election results cannot happen until after this audit is complete.
Audits, especially risk-limiting audits, are considered a best practice for election management. The key to a risk-limiting audit is that instead of sample size set by law, the number of ballots counted adjusts to the margin of victory in the preliminary results. In close elections, a larger number of ballots are counted because of the need to reach a confidence threshold that the winner has been accurately identified. If the race is not close, a smaller sample is needed. This method is more efficient than full recounts and allows election authorities to be confident that the preliminary results have accurately identified the winner. In Georgia, the audit must provide a risk limit of not greater than 5 percent, meaning there is a 95% chance that – if there were an error – it would be caught and corrected. As an example, the 2022 Georgia audit process is detailed in this Carter Center report.
7.c. Georgia’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but research indicates that full hand counts would likely make elections slower and less accurate.
————
CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors and gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We want our teachers and police officers to do their jobs using the best, most proven, technology and methods. We should want the same for election officials. In Georgia, conducting risk-limiting audits empowers officials to get voters results in a timely and effective manner. This is especially important in Georgia as election officials must simultaneously complete the November election procedures while getting ready for any runoff elections.
————
7.d. Once all audits are complete, certification can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
Votes are recorded and certified on a county level by the county board of elections based on documentation that appropriate election procedures were conducted, including audits and investigation of concerns. Once certified at the county level, the law passes authority to the Secretary of State, who must certify the results no later than 17 days after voting ends.
Georgia counties differ in the makeup of their boards, resulting in some counties that have more bipartisan oversight of the elections process than others, according to analysis by Informing Democracy.
7.e. Candidates in close elections or nearly anyone who suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns can request recounts.
Georgia’s law provides election authorities with a number of discretionary recounts. First, a partial recount can be done within precincts or on specific voting machines if an election authority suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns. A group of three voters can also make a formal request for such a recount. Partial recounts like this happen before certification of the results.
Second, candidates in races with a winning margin of .5% or less may request a full recount without any underlying reason. This request comes at the end of the returns process - after tabulation, audit, and certification - and must be made within two days of the results being certified. In 2020, former President Trump requested and received such a recount after he lost in Georgia by .25%.
Finally, at any time the Secretary of State may request a full or partial recount if a candidate for federal or state office submits a petition regarding an apparent discrepancy or error in the returns.
In the case of a full recount, the equipment used for the recount is tested using real ballots from at least three different precincts. State rules require that the recount team include an election worker and one person each from lists of individuals submitted by the political parties on the ballot. A hand count only occurs in the event that all equipment fails testing or under a court order.
These procedures are in place to ensure that discrepancies are found, investigated, and cannot occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election. If, upon completing the recount, it appears that the original vote count for the recounted contest was incorrect, the results will be corrected accordingly.
—————
CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by Fairvote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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By midnight on election night, polling place officials are required to provide the registrar with a report showing the total number of ballots cast, including provisional ballots, and absentee-by-mail ballots received by the close of polls.
Provisional ballots may require additional follow-up information from voters, as do a small percentage of absentee ballots, and those deadlines fall in the days immediately following the election. Once that information is received registrars have the full documentation of the preliminary results, which are provided to the county election board for certification one week after election day. Additional deadlines are provided in Georgia’s election calendar.
7.b. Initial results are then subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
The next step required by Georgia law is a risk-limiting tabulation audit. In the audit, officials compare a hand count of a random sample of votes across every county in at least the highest race (in this case the Presidential) plus one additional race such as U.S. senate, governor, or attorney general. During this hand count sworn members of an audit team count a sample of ballots and compare their outcome to the electronic tallies at the close of the polls. The teams, per state regulation, count electronically marked ballots based on the printed text. This is an important backstop that helps ensure the QR codes properly translated results.
Although a majority of states conduct some form of reliable audit, Georgia is among an elite few who go further with risk-limiting audits. Other states include Colorado, Rhode Island, and Virginia. Official certification of the election results cannot happen until after this audit is complete.
Audits, especially risk-limiting audits, are considered a best practice for election management. The key to a risk-limiting audit is that instead of sample size set by law, the number of ballots counted adjusts to the margin of victory in the preliminary results. In close elections, a larger number of ballots are counted because of the need to reach a confidence threshold that the winner has been accurately identified. If the race is not close, a smaller sample is needed. This method is more efficient than full recounts and allows election authorities to be confident that the preliminary results have accurately identified the winner. In Georgia, the audit must provide a risk limit of not greater than 5 percent, meaning there is a 95% chance that – if there were an error – it would be caught and corrected. As an example, the 2022 Georgia audit process is detailed in this Carter Center report.
7.c. Georgia’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but research indicates that full hand counts would likely make elections slower and less accurate.
————
CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors and gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We want our teachers and police officers to do their jobs using the best, most proven, technology and methods. We should want the same for election officials. In Georgia, conducting risk-limiting audits empowers officials to get voters results in a timely and effective manner. This is especially important in Georgia as election officials must simultaneously complete the November election procedures while getting ready for any runoff elections.
————
7.d. Once all audits are complete, certification can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
Votes are recorded and certified on a county level by the county board of elections based on documentation that appropriate election procedures were conducted, including audits and investigation of concerns. Once certified at the county level, the law passes authority to the Secretary of State, who must certify the results no later than 17 days after voting ends.
Georgia counties differ in the makeup of their boards, resulting in some counties that have more bipartisan oversight of the elections process than others, according to analysis by Informing Democracy.
7.e. Candidates in close elections or nearly anyone who suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns can request recounts.
Georgia’s law provides election authorities with a number of discretionary recounts. First, a partial recount can be done within precincts or on specific voting machines if an election authority suspects an error or discrepancy in the returns. A group of three voters can also make a formal request for such a recount. Partial recounts like this happen before certification of the results.
Second, candidates in races with a winning margin of .5% or less may request a full recount without any underlying reason. This request comes at the end of the returns process - after tabulation, audit, and certification - and must be made within two days of the results being certified. In 2020, former President Trump requested and received such a recount after he lost in Georgia by .25%.
Finally, at any time the Secretary of State may request a full or partial recount if a candidate for federal or state office submits a petition regarding an apparent discrepancy or error in the returns.
In the case of a full recount, the equipment used for the recount is tested using real ballots from at least three different precincts. State rules require that the recount team include an election worker and one person each from lists of individuals submitted by the political parties on the ballot. A hand count only occurs in the event that all equipment fails testing or under a court order.
These procedures are in place to ensure that discrepancies are found, investigated, and cannot occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election. If, upon completing the recount, it appears that the original vote count for the recounted contest was incorrect, the results will be corrected accordingly.
—————
CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by Fairvote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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QUESTION 8: Who certifies results in Georgia, and what issues have arisen around certification?
8.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In Georgia, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification in most counties is the responsibility of the county board of election and registration. These boards vary in composition and selection method across the state, but a common feature is that most have members nominated by the two parties. In roughly a quarter of Georgia’s 159 counties, election oversight and certification are the responsibility of a probate judge, rather than a board. In some of these counties, the probate judge acts with assistance from two voters of each major party. Georgia law uses the term “election superintendent” as a general term encompassing these various county-level structures.
During certification, the election superintendents receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. The superintendents are required to “tabulate the figures for the entire county and sign, announce and attest the same.” State law mandates that county-level certification must be completed no later than 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the election.
State level certification is the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The law states that “the Secretary of State shall certify the votes cast” “not later than 5:00 P.M. on the seventeenth day” after the election.
8.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” a required function, not an exercise of investigation or judgment.
A court can compel county elections boards or the Secretary of State to certify if they refuse. Georgia courts have repeatedly confirmed the ministerial nature of certification. For example, the Georgia Commonwealth court ruled in 2005 that “the duties of a board of elections under the Election Code are ministerial and allow for no exercise of discretion.”
The superintendents have some powers to examine precinct returns. For example, the law provides that if the recorded votes for candidates in a precinct are found to exceed the total ballots cast, such “excess shall authorize” a range of specific steps by the superintendent including, "a recount or recanvass of the votes of that precinct” and a “report of the facts of the case to the district attorney.”
Certification must be completed no later than 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the election. If a county board or the Secretary of State refused to certify, or delayed certification beyond that deadline, a court can mandate that certification be completed by relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
_________
CONTEXT: Clarification on County Board Discretion
The State Election Board caused controversy this fall by expanding the scope of certification for county election boards. The amendments to rules 183-1-12-.02 and 183-1-12-.12 raised questions as to whether local officials could refuse to certify election results. However, a recent court ruling clarifies that local officials may not refuse to certify or abstain from certifying under any circumstance, stating, “The superintendent [county election board members] must certify and must do so by a time certain. There are no exceptions.” Although the ruling can be appealed, the court's decision appears likely to stand going into the November election.
_________
8.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Georgia have refused to certify results. All refusers were outvoted.
In recent elections, members of five county boards of election in Georgia refused to certify results. In each case the refuser was outvoted by the majority on the board.
Across the county in recent years, all instance of refusal to certify were resolved by: courts compelling certification, the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
8.d. Georgia law provides other, better-suited means to address challenges and concerns about the accuracy of results.
Candidates and political parties have the right to challenge election results in court after county and state certification. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Georgia law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the county boards of elections and the Secretary of State may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
_________
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A recent study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries, involve political parties in the results process. In the US, by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
—————
In Georgia, certification happens at the county and state levels. County certification in most counties is the responsibility of the county board of election and registration. These boards vary in composition and selection method across the state, but a common feature is that most have members nominated by the two parties. In roughly a quarter of Georgia’s 159 counties, election oversight and certification are the responsibility of a probate judge, rather than a board. In some of these counties, the probate judge acts with assistance from two voters of each major party. Georgia law uses the term “election superintendent” as a general term encompassing these various county-level structures.
During certification, the election superintendents receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data. The superintendents are required to “tabulate the figures for the entire county and sign, announce and attest the same.” State law mandates that county-level certification must be completed no later than 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the election.
State level certification is the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The law states that “the Secretary of State shall certify the votes cast” “not later than 5:00 P.M. on the seventeenth day” after the election.
8.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” a required function, not an exercise of investigation or judgment.
A court can compel county elections boards or the Secretary of State to certify if they refuse. Georgia courts have repeatedly confirmed the ministerial nature of certification. For example, the Georgia Commonwealth court ruled in 2005 that “the duties of a board of elections under the Election Code are ministerial and allow for no exercise of discretion.”
The superintendents have some powers to examine precinct returns. For example, the law provides that if the recorded votes for candidates in a precinct are found to exceed the total ballots cast, such “excess shall authorize” a range of specific steps by the superintendent including, "a recount or recanvass of the votes of that precinct” and a “report of the facts of the case to the district attorney.”
Certification must be completed no later than 5:00 P.M. on the Monday following the election. If a county board or the Secretary of State refused to certify, or delayed certification beyond that deadline, a court can mandate that certification be completed by relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
_________
CONTEXT: Clarification on County Board Discretion
The State Election Board caused controversy this fall by expanding the scope of certification for county election boards. The amendments to rules 183-1-12-.02 and 183-1-12-.12 raised questions as to whether local officials could refuse to certify election results. However, a recent court ruling clarifies that local officials may not refuse to certify or abstain from certifying under any circumstance, stating, “The superintendent [county election board members] must certify and must do so by a time certain. There are no exceptions.” Although the ruling can be appealed, the court's decision appears likely to stand going into the November election.
_________
8.c. Some individuals responsible for certification in Georgia have refused to certify results. All refusers were outvoted.
In recent elections, members of five county boards of election in Georgia refused to certify results. In each case the refuser was outvoted by the majority on the board.
Across the county in recent years, all instance of refusal to certify were resolved by: courts compelling certification, the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
8.d. Georgia law provides other, better-suited means to address challenges and concerns about the accuracy of results.
Candidates and political parties have the right to challenge election results in court after county and state certification. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Georgia law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the county boards of elections and the Secretary of State may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
_________
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A recent study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries, involve political parties in the results process. In the US, by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
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QUESTION 9: What's changed since 2020 about how Congress concludes the presidential election process?
9.a. In 2022, Congress passed the bipartisan Electoral Count Reform Act (ECRA), replacing an outdated law from 1887.
The new federal law addresses vulnerabilities in the presidential election process that were exposed by events following the 2020 election. ECRA clarified several procedures that had been ambiguous under federal law, including that the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes is “solely ministerial.” Because the presidential election is administered by the states, ECRA also impacted aspects of state law (described below).
9.b. ECRA aims to prevent unsanctioned electors and related problems with presidential elections by clarifying details about the official submission to Congress of each state’s presidential electoral count.
Under ECRA, the governor must issue a state’s Certificate of Ascertainment of Appointment of Electors, unless state law explicitly delegates that duty to another executive official. ECRA also specifies that each certificate must contain:
Then, when those electors hold their official meeting, they sign and submit a different certificate of votes delineating the electoral college votes for President and Vice President.
In addition to these federal requirements, 33 states have passed laws prohibiting unsanctioned or “faithless” electors in the presidential election process. Georgia is not among them.
—————
CONTEXT: 2020 “Fake Electors” Highlighted the Need For ECRA
In 2020, after it became clear that former President Donald Trump’s multiple lawsuits contesting the election results lacked evidentiary merit to alter the outcome, he and allies assembled their own slates of presidential electors in seven states where Trump did not win. Those unsanctioned electors met the same day as the legitimate electors, cast votes for Trump, and submitted to Congress competing Certificates of Ascertainment. President Trump began a pressure campaign to urge then-Vice President Mike Pence to discard the actual results from those seven states, and instead accept the fraudulent ones during the January 6, 2021, vote counting hearing. Had the Vice President done so, and had enough members of Congress gone along, President Joe Biden would have fallen short of the 270-vote Electoral College majority.
—————
9.c. ECRA clarifies the timeline for the presidential post-election process, with implications for states.
This timeline includes a new mandatory deadline for issuing the Certificate of Ascertainment, a new deadline for court intervention, and an updated date for the electors to meet and cast their votes. As a result, many intermediate state deadlines (such as vote counting, recounts, and audits) may need to be updated to comply with the new mandatory deadlines. Some states have updated their laws to reflect this timeline. Although Georgia is not among them, federal law should generally preempt state law where there is overlap.
9.d. Legislatures cannot change the rules after Election Day.
ECRA requires that elections be administered according to the state laws in place prior to Election Day, including laws governing presidential electors, voting emergencies, and related provisions. Importantly, ECRA also removed language from the old law pertaining to "failed elections" that bad-faith actors relied upon to argue that federal law allowed state legislatures to step in after the election was over and to appoint their own presidential electors, potentially overturning the will of the voters.
9.e. ECRA strengthens the role of courts.
The new law gives the courts the last word over disputes regarding a state's presidential election results, including any needed changes to the state's Certificate of Ascertainment. It also establishes a process for aggrieved presidential or vice-presidential candidates to bring cases before three-judge federal district courts.
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CONTEXT: Do Americans Vote For the President, Or For the Electors?
Actually, under the somewhat convoluted provisions of the Electoral College, Americans technically vote for the electors, who in turn vote for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates. Most states deploy a “winner takes all” approach in which all the Electoral College votes are awarded to the ticket that won the popular vote in that state. Two states (Maine and Nebraska) split a portion of their electoral votes by congressional district.
—————
The new federal law addresses vulnerabilities in the presidential election process that were exposed by events following the 2020 election. ECRA clarified several procedures that had been ambiguous under federal law, including that the Vice President’s role in counting electoral votes is “solely ministerial.” Because the presidential election is administered by the states, ECRA also impacted aspects of state law (described below).
9.b. ECRA aims to prevent unsanctioned electors and related problems with presidential elections by clarifying details about the official submission to Congress of each state’s presidential electoral count.
Under ECRA, the governor must issue a state’s Certificate of Ascertainment of Appointment of Electors, unless state law explicitly delegates that duty to another executive official. ECRA also specifies that each certificate must contain:
- The names of the state’s electors
- The number of popular votes won in that state by each of the presidential candidates’ electors (see below, “Do Americans vote for the President, or the electors?”)
- Authenticity elements, such as the seal of the State and at least one security feature
Then, when those electors hold their official meeting, they sign and submit a different certificate of votes delineating the electoral college votes for President and Vice President.
In addition to these federal requirements, 33 states have passed laws prohibiting unsanctioned or “faithless” electors in the presidential election process. Georgia is not among them.
—————
CONTEXT: 2020 “Fake Electors” Highlighted the Need For ECRA
In 2020, after it became clear that former President Donald Trump’s multiple lawsuits contesting the election results lacked evidentiary merit to alter the outcome, he and allies assembled their own slates of presidential electors in seven states where Trump did not win. Those unsanctioned electors met the same day as the legitimate electors, cast votes for Trump, and submitted to Congress competing Certificates of Ascertainment. President Trump began a pressure campaign to urge then-Vice President Mike Pence to discard the actual results from those seven states, and instead accept the fraudulent ones during the January 6, 2021, vote counting hearing. Had the Vice President done so, and had enough members of Congress gone along, President Joe Biden would have fallen short of the 270-vote Electoral College majority.
—————
9.c. ECRA clarifies the timeline for the presidential post-election process, with implications for states.
This timeline includes a new mandatory deadline for issuing the Certificate of Ascertainment, a new deadline for court intervention, and an updated date for the electors to meet and cast their votes. As a result, many intermediate state deadlines (such as vote counting, recounts, and audits) may need to be updated to comply with the new mandatory deadlines. Some states have updated their laws to reflect this timeline. Although Georgia is not among them, federal law should generally preempt state law where there is overlap.
9.d. Legislatures cannot change the rules after Election Day.
ECRA requires that elections be administered according to the state laws in place prior to Election Day, including laws governing presidential electors, voting emergencies, and related provisions. Importantly, ECRA also removed language from the old law pertaining to "failed elections" that bad-faith actors relied upon to argue that federal law allowed state legislatures to step in after the election was over and to appoint their own presidential electors, potentially overturning the will of the voters.
9.e. ECRA strengthens the role of courts.
The new law gives the courts the last word over disputes regarding a state's presidential election results, including any needed changes to the state's Certificate of Ascertainment. It also establishes a process for aggrieved presidential or vice-presidential candidates to bring cases before three-judge federal district courts.
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CONTEXT: Do Americans Vote For the President, Or For the Electors?
Actually, under the somewhat convoluted provisions of the Electoral College, Americans technically vote for the electors, who in turn vote for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates. Most states deploy a “winner takes all” approach in which all the Electoral College votes are awarded to the ticket that won the popular vote in that state. Two states (Maine and Nebraska) split a portion of their electoral votes by congressional district.
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PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was inconsistent and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
Fortunately, this era – when the protection of courts sometimes stopped at the polling station door – has largely come to an end. State and federal courts now provide a critical check against most unlawful activities that could impact results. But our political culture hasn’t fully caught up. Overviews of election procedures usually don’t include judicial review as a step in the process, when, arguably it provides one of the most important reasons for acceptance and trust on all sides.
This judicial role gives competing parties and candidates the opportunity to bring challenges that ensure elections are conducted under procedures established by law. Conversely, parties and candidates that question the legitimacy of election results but fail to provide evidence to support their position should not be provided an unchecked platform for amplifying unsubstantiated claims.
For a long time, the United States didn’t measure up to that standard. Historically, the role of courts in policing the electoral arena was inconsistent and contested at best. As a result, some egregious election misconduct was allowed to stand.
Fortunately, this era – when the protection of courts sometimes stopped at the polling station door – has largely come to an end. State and federal courts now provide a critical check against most unlawful activities that could impact results. But our political culture hasn’t fully caught up. Overviews of election procedures usually don’t include judicial review as a step in the process, when, arguably it provides one of the most important reasons for acceptance and trust on all sides.
This judicial role gives competing parties and candidates the opportunity to bring challenges that ensure elections are conducted under procedures established by law. Conversely, parties and candidates that question the legitimacy of election results but fail to provide evidence to support their position should not be provided an unchecked platform for amplifying unsubstantiated claims.
QUESTION 10: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
10.a. In addition to requesting a recount, candidates and individual citizens in Georgia can challenge an election through the court system.
Georgia’s laws allow candidates, those entitled to vote, and election workers themselves to request a recount. In addition to this option, elections can be challenged through the court system.
10.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court, and even allows for a jury trial. Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that don’t affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: They may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
Georgia’s laws allow candidates, those entitled to vote, and election workers themselves to request a recount. In addition to this option, elections can be challenged through the court system.
10.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court, and even allows for a jury trial. Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that don’t affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: They may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 11: What’s required of plaintiffs and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
11.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
11.b. To utilize Georgia’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must make specific accusations of wrongdoing and work within a narrow timeline.
Election contests may be brought by a candidate or any individual entitled to vote for a candidate in the contested race, per Georgia law. Election results may be contested on any grounds that show another person was legally elected. For example, an accusation of fraud may not on its own be grounds for a contest, the fraud should also be significant enough to change the certified results of the election.
Claims must be made within five days after the certification of the election results.
11.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. For example, a plaintiff may claim that a method of updating registration caused some eligible voters to be erroneously removed from the rolls in a specific election. Or, a plaintiff may claim that that ineligible individuals were allowed to vote. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state-legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
11.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
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CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
—————
11.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
In an expedited election contest, state law provides a clear and narrow set of grounds for contesting results. Whatever the accusation, the alleged behavior must be “sufficient to change or place in doubt the result [of the election].” This standard is central to any form of litigation in which a plaintiff is requesting a remedy as extreme as annulling an election or certifying a different winner.
If a plaintiff brings credible and reliable evidence, and if they prove that the election result was wrong or the winning candidate was ineligible, then a court may annul the election and order a new one or may declare a different winner.
Outside of election contests, if an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation that, if true, may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, including expedited election contests, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
—————
CONTEXT: Do the math.
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election that was won by 4000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
—————
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state court. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
11.b. To utilize Georgia’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must make specific accusations of wrongdoing and work within a narrow timeline.
Election contests may be brought by a candidate or any individual entitled to vote for a candidate in the contested race, per Georgia law. Election results may be contested on any grounds that show another person was legally elected. For example, an accusation of fraud may not on its own be grounds for a contest, the fraud should also be significant enough to change the certified results of the election.
Claims must be made within five days after the certification of the election results.
11.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. For example, a plaintiff may claim that a method of updating registration caused some eligible voters to be erroneously removed from the rolls in a specific election. Or, a plaintiff may claim that that ineligible individuals were allowed to vote. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state-legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts that are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
11.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
—————
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
—————
11.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
In an expedited election contest, state law provides a clear and narrow set of grounds for contesting results. Whatever the accusation, the alleged behavior must be “sufficient to change or place in doubt the result [of the election].” This standard is central to any form of litigation in which a plaintiff is requesting a remedy as extreme as annulling an election or certifying a different winner.
If a plaintiff brings credible and reliable evidence, and if they prove that the election result was wrong or the winning candidate was ineligible, then a court may annul the election and order a new one or may declare a different winner.
Outside of election contests, if an accusation doesn’t involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation that, if true, may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, including expedited election contests, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
—————
CONTEXT: Do the math.
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election that was won by 4000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
—————
QUESTION 12: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
12.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons.
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Statement of a claim: There may be insufficient evidence to warrant a trial, or the allegations of the plaintiff may not even describe a violation of law.
- Unreasonable delays (also known as "Laches"): A suit may challenge the rules after the election when it should, instead, have challenged those rules well in advance.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards. Here are some theoretical examples.
- A voter from one state attempts to challenge an election result in a different state.
- A case brought on the theory that voting equipment could have been connected to the internet but provides no evidence that the equipment ever was, in fact, connected to the internet.
- A challenge calls for overturning an election won by 10,000 votes, based on evidence of errors only affecting one polling station of 100 voters.
Many election challenges in 2020 were dismissed for one or more of the reasons above. (This review of the 2020 presidential election legal challenges by a group of Republican judges and election lawyers summarizes these issues.)
QUESTION 13: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases?
13.a. The timelines are tight.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections. The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021. Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and that can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
13.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implication of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the contestants’ claims are so far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press lawyers to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on in order translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Election contests typically need to be heard and decided quickly, and this is particularly true of presidential elections. The timeline for judicial action in presidential elections is governed in substantial part by the Electoral Count Reform Act, enacted in 2022 in response to the events of January 6, 2021. Cases often involve a sequence of motions and responses that happen in quick succession and that can be challenging to explain to the media audience.
13.b. Historically, the legal system is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings typically address questions of law, for example whether a particular statute applies to the circumstances of the case. This can mean that the implication of the decision for the election results are not directly stated.
Challenges that are dismissed without going to trial (discussed above) can often be interpreted as dodging the issue, as technical avoidance of a question that one side sees as a burning issue. In fact, as the examples above illustrate, dismissal often means the contestants’ claims are so far-fetched or so unsupported by evidence that an actual trial is not even needed.
Reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press lawyers to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on in order translate decisions into writing that readers can easily understand.
Experts
Donald Balfour, Senior Advisor to Georgia Democracy Resilience Network; Former State Senator from North Carolina's 9th district (1993 to 2015)
Ben Ginsberg, Pillars of the Community Co-Chair (national expert)
Jason Carter, Board Chair of the Carter Center
Kathleen Hamill, Senior Counsel to ABA GA Democracy Task Force
Jennifer Morrell, The Elections Group CEO & Co-Founder (national expert)
Rashad Richey, Senior Advisor to Georgia Democracy Resilience Network; Political Analyst CBS News Atlanta
Kim Wyman, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow (national expert)
Ben Ginsberg, Pillars of the Community Co-Chair (national expert)
Jason Carter, Board Chair of the Carter Center
Kathleen Hamill, Senior Counsel to ABA GA Democracy Task Force
Jennifer Morrell, The Elections Group CEO & Co-Founder (national expert)
Rashad Richey, Senior Advisor to Georgia Democracy Resilience Network; Political Analyst CBS News Atlanta
Kim Wyman, Bipartisan Policy Center Senior Fellow (national expert)
External Resources
Georgia Election Code
Georgia Administrative Election Code
Secretary of State Elections Website
Board of Elections Website
Georgia Poll Worker Manual
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Georgia Administrative Election Code
Secretary of State Elections Website
Board of Elections Website
Georgia Poll Worker Manual
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters.
Event |
Audience and Purpose |
Date or Target Week Times |
National press briefing #1 |
Pre-election: Launch the series. Orient to the project, resources, and expected priorities for coverage nationally. |
9/16/24* |
GA pre-election press briefing |
Pre-election, in-state reporters |
9/30/24 |
National press briefing #2 |
Pre-election, all reporters, all states: Summary the state briefings, what we are hearing in the key states, what to watch for. |
10/21/24* |
National press briefing #3 |
Post-election, all reporters, all states: What we saw this week. States where judicial review may be called on. |
11/7/24 ** |
In-state briefings as needed |
Post-election, state specific: We may, or may not, need the chance to put forward our in-state experts, depending on what happens in each state. |
11/6/24 or 11/12/24 |
National press briefing #4 |
Post-election: Electoral Count Reform Act in action. Certificates of Ascertainment to be issued the next day. Our legal team briefs reporters on the next month of deadlines. |
12/10/24 ** |
National press briefing #5 |
Post-election: Congress meets tomorrow to accept electoral votes. ERN’s team of commentators will brief reporters on what’s expected. |
1/5/25 ** |
Date |
Election Activity |
Runoff Timeline |
11/8/2024 |
Last day for voters to cure timely submitted absentee ballots and provisional ballots requiring ID verification. |
|
11/12/2024 |
Last day for county certification. |
|
11/14/2024 |
Last day for candidates to request a recount (Subject to certification, deadline is within two business days after county certification.) |
|
11/14/2024 through 11/15/2024 |
Election officials conduct risk-limiting audit. |
|
11/22/2024 |
Last day to request absentee by mail ballot for a December runoff election. |
|
11/22/2024 |
Last day for SOS to certify the votes cast for federal and statewide contests and for the Governor to certify the slates of presidential electors. |
|
11/25/2024 |
Early voting for runoff must start |
* |
11/27/2024 |
Early voting ends |
* |
12/3/2024 |
General Election Runoff |
* |
12/6/2024 |
Last day for runoff voters to cure timely submitted absentee ballots and provisional ballots requiring ID verification. |
* |
12/9/2024 |
Last day for county certification of runoff returns. |
* |
12/11/2024 |
Last day for candidates to request a recount of runoff returns (Subject to certification, deadline is within two business days after certification.) |
* |
12/11/2024 through 12/12/2024 |
Election officials conduct risk-limiting audit of returns if required. |
* |
12/13/2024 |
Last day to contest results. (Deadline is within five calendar days after county certification.) |
* |
12/11/24 |
Federal deadline to issue certificates of ascertainment officially appointing the state's presidential electors |
|
12/17/2024 |
Meeting of the Electoral College |
|
12/27/2024 |
Last day for SOS to certify the runoff votes cast for federal and statewide contests. |
* |
1/13/2025 |
Secretary of State issues certificates of election |
For More Dates See the Georgia Secretary of State's Calendar
Edits:
9/27/2024, 7.a., added information regarding new ballot counting rule, see "After changes were approved...October 1st."; Deleted this same information on 10/17/2024 following a court opinion.
10/17/2024, 8.b. deleted information and added information related to rules 183-1-12-.02 and 183-1-12-.12 to reflect facts in the context of a recent court opinion.
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
9/27/2024, 7.a., added information regarding new ballot counting rule, see "After changes were approved...October 1st."; Deleted this same information on 10/17/2024 following a court opinion.
10/17/2024, 8.b. deleted information and added information related to rules 183-1-12-.02 and 183-1-12-.12 to reflect facts in the context of a recent court opinion.
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
