ARIZONA
This policy brief gives reporters quick access to important concepts, laws, and procedures governing elections in Arizona.
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Title 16 of the Arizona Revised Statutes are abbreviated "ARS"
It is organized around three pillars: transparency, verification of results, and judicial review, with particular attention to the processes that matter when elections are close, contested, or disputed. The brief explains the roles of election officials and observers, procedures for verifying and certifying results, recounts, and the legal processes available when election disputes arise.
Note: References to the state Election Code in Title 16 of the Arizona Revised Statutes are abbreviated "ARS"
PILLAR 1: Transparency
Election officials, like all public servants, deserve respect and support. However, it’s important to ensure these officials are accountable to the voters. Like many other areas of governance in the United States, transparency is one of the key mechanisms for that accountability. While there are many ways transparency can be built into election systems, one of the most important is the right established by law for competing parties to post their own observers to watch many of the phases of the election.
QUESTION 1: Who can observe elections?
1.a. The major parties are provided with multiple opportunities to observe election processes to ensure transparency and accountability.
1.b. Arizona places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan observer.
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of observers.
Arizona does not require election observers to complete training. However, observers should understand their role and be familiar with election procedures so they can effectively represent the parties that appoint them. Appropriate training can also help ensure that observers accurately identify and credibly report potential problems.
In some states, the state election department supports observer training. Regardless of state requirements, parties have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand election procedures, the boundaries of their role, and the importance of observing without interfering with the election process.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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- Inspectors and Judges are senior poll workers appointed by the county board of supervisors. Candidates for the position of judge, and in some cases inspector, may be chosen by the parties. Each set of judges and inspectors constitutes a board of elections (ARS §16-531).
- Observers are designated representatives of the parties and candidates; they may observe and take written record of election procedures, including equipment testing, voting operations, ballot transfers, and recounts (EPM 2025 §8-III). Observers may be stationed at polling places and voting centers, including in-person early-voting and emergency voting locations. They may challenge another voter’s qualifications, something any qualified elector of the county is allowed to do (ARS §16-591). Nonpartisan candidates and political action committees for ballot measures are together only allowed three additional people at a time and only during certain processes (EPM 2025 §8-III).
- Early Ballot Challengers are designated representatives of the parties who may challenge early ballots based on specific statutory grounds (EPM 2025 §2-V).
1.b. Arizona places few restrictions on who can serve as a partisan observer.
- Who can observe: Partisan observers must be residents and registered to vote in Arizona (ARS §16-590). They are not required to be registered in the county in which they do their observation.
- Who cannot observe: Candidates appearing on the ballot and official write-in candidates may not serve as partisan observers (with the exception that candidates for precinct committeeman may do so) (EPM 2025 §8-III). Only observers appointed by recognized parties and groups are allowed to officially observe the election process. Documentation of their appointment to specific locations is provided by the parties in writing. In general, no more than one representative per party is allowed to be present at a site, unless the parties agree to a different number (ARS §16-590)
1.c. Parties control the selection and management of observers.
Arizona does not require election observers to complete training. However, observers should understand their role and be familiar with election procedures so they can effectively represent the parties that appoint them. Appropriate training can also help ensure that observers accurately identify and credibly report potential problems.
In some states, the state election department supports observer training. Regardless of state requirements, parties have a responsibility to ensure their observers understand election procedures, the boundaries of their role, and the importance of observing without interfering with the election process.
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CONTEXT: Political party observers are an important part of the process.
Election observers who represent their political parties can provide important validation about the vote counting process, and they can be trusted messengers within their political networks. However, without proper training, they can make mistakes or false assumptions.
One example of the importance of training observers comes from the Principles for Trusted Elections, a cross-partisan program co-chaired by family members of former U.S. Presidents Gerald R. Ford (Republican) and Jimmy Carter (Democrat). The principles call on all candidates to “encourage political parties and others to train poll-watchers on the election process and appropriate roles and behaviors, responsibilities, and obligations.”
Candidates, voters, and civic organizations can endorse these principles by completing a short online form.
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QUESTION 2: What about nonpartisan election monitors and the general public?
2.a. Nonpartisan election monitoring is different from partisan observation.
Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Arizona provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Arizona does not explicitly provide opportunities for impartial or nonpartisan monitors. However, the state livestreams counting procedures, enabling the general public and researchers to observe election processes that continue after the polls close. Recordings of vote counting livestreams are public records; state law requires their availability during the vote counting process and their retention after the election (ARS §16-621).
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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Nonpartisan election observation is an impartial process where trained observers systematically gather data about an election in order to assess key aspects of the process and report on the degree to which the election was fair, peaceful, and credible. Grounded by facts and evidence, trustworthy observers validate the critical work being done by those on the front lines of our democracy. When organized correctly, observers cannot be party actors or advocates — in fact, observers agree to follow a strict code of conduct to ensure they remain nonpartisan and do not interfere with the voting process. According to The Carter Center, which is an international leader in election monitoring, nonpartisan observation is a common best practice in many democracies around the globe.
2.b. Arizona provides limited opportunities for nonpartisan monitors and the general public to observe election procedures.
Arizona does not explicitly provide opportunities for impartial or nonpartisan monitors. However, the state livestreams counting procedures, enabling the general public and researchers to observe election processes that continue after the polls close. Recordings of vote counting livestreams are public records; state law requires their availability during the vote counting process and their retention after the election (ARS §16-621).
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CONTEXT: Titles Can Be Confusing
Throughout this section we use the terms “nonpartisan election observers” or “nonpartisan election monitors” to refer to people whose role is to be impartial and focus on the process. These people are often researchers or “good government” experts. This role is often confused with assigned observers for ballot initiatives, independent candidates, or nonpartisan candidates (such as observers for nonpartisan school board races).
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QUESTION 3: What are observers allowed to see?
3.a. Most election procedures, including testing of election equipment, are open to observation from party representatives and the public.
Political party representatives may observe voting and ballot processing activities at voting locations and central counting places, subject to rules designed to protect ballot secrecy and prevent interference with election procedures (ARS §16-590). They may also observe the transportation of ballots from voting sites to central receiving sites. Observers may not handle ballots or election materials and must direct questions or objections through a designated election official. Observers found interfering can be asked to leave (EPM 2025 §8-III).
Political party representatives may observe voting and ballot processing activities at voting locations and central counting places, subject to rules designed to protect ballot secrecy and prevent interference with election procedures (ARS §16-590). They may also observe the transportation of ballots from voting sites to central receiving sites. Observers may not handle ballots or election materials and must direct questions or objections through a designated election official. Observers found interfering can be asked to leave (EPM 2025 §8-III).
PILLAR 2: Verification of Results
For citizens and politicians, elections are a lot like horse races, with the focus squarely on who’s ahead at the end. For election professionals, by contrast, a better metaphor is a series of accounting problems. Does everything balance, including seal numbers on equipment, the number of ballots used, initial tabulations and audit results, etc.? Election procedures and paperwork are built to facilitate this verification.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
Verification is supported by redundancy, with multiple layers of checks designed to find any errors and confirm accuracy.
QUESTION 4: How is the security and accuracy of equipment verified?
4.a. Vote counting accuracy is tested before and after voting.
Vote counting in Arizona is done with tabulators that scan voters’ hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. In large communities, nearly all ballots marked at the polling station on Election Day are fed into the scanner by voters themselves. In smaller counties, ballots are sometimes scanned and counted in a central location with oversight from observers and publicly available via a legally-mandated livestream. The exceptions are provisional ballots, or ballots that are mailed or placed in drop boxes. Mailed and drop-box ballots are transported to central facilities and scanned with high-speed scanners.
For both types of equipment, election officials must demonstrate before and after voting takes place that a set of test ballots is accurately counted. This process is often called a “logic and accuracy” test. Before tabulation equipment is used, election officials conduct logic and accuracy testing to determine whether the equipment and programs correctly count votes. The test uses preaudited ballots with predetermined results and is open to political party representatives, candidates, the press, and the public. If an error is detected, officials must identify and correct the cause and produce an errorless count before the equipment is approved (ARS §16-449; EPM 2025 §4).
4.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
As explained in the Elections Procedures Manual, tabulation and other voting equipment is secured and sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections throughout the voting process (EPM 2025 §4-II). Equipment is “air-gapped,” meaning there is no physical or network connection between pieces of equipment. After polls have closed, vote tabulations are transferred on a memory stick or device that, if needed, is physically transported for consolidation. A person who inappropriately modifies voting equipment may be charged with a felony (EPM 2025 §4-II).
4.c. Votes are marked on paper ballots which are retained to be available for rechecking.
Paper ballots are considered a best practice. Maintaining a paper trail, as Arizona counties do, is the recommended approach for election administration. Officials can audit or recount the paper ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators. According to Verified Voting, on Election Day the vast majority of voters in the U.S., including in Arizona, mark their ballots by hand. (Equipment used for early voting may differ from that used on Election Day.)
Voters who are unable to mark a ballot by hand have the option to use a ballot marking device (BMD), which is an assistive device like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator. These devices do not store information; the only record generated by the BMD is the printout.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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4.d. Equipment is certified by the Secretary of State.
According to statute, voting and tabulation equipment must be certified by the Arizona Secretary of State after review by a bipartisan committee of three legal and election experts (ARS §16-442). Local jurisdictions can only use machines that are on the list of technology certified by the Secretary of State and in compliance with federal security guidelines.
Vote counting in Arizona is done with tabulators that scan voters’ hand-marked ballots and total the votes for the different races as ballots are entered. In large communities, nearly all ballots marked at the polling station on Election Day are fed into the scanner by voters themselves. In smaller counties, ballots are sometimes scanned and counted in a central location with oversight from observers and publicly available via a legally-mandated livestream. The exceptions are provisional ballots, or ballots that are mailed or placed in drop boxes. Mailed and drop-box ballots are transported to central facilities and scanned with high-speed scanners.
For both types of equipment, election officials must demonstrate before and after voting takes place that a set of test ballots is accurately counted. This process is often called a “logic and accuracy” test. Before tabulation equipment is used, election officials conduct logic and accuracy testing to determine whether the equipment and programs correctly count votes. The test uses preaudited ballots with predetermined results and is open to political party representatives, candidates, the press, and the public. If an error is detected, officials must identify and correct the cause and produce an errorless count before the equipment is approved (ARS §16-449; EPM 2025 §4).
4.b. No equipment used to cast a ballot is connected to the internet.
As explained in the Elections Procedures Manual, tabulation and other voting equipment is secured and sealed, tracked, and isolated from external connections throughout the voting process (EPM 2025 §4-II). Equipment is “air-gapped,” meaning there is no physical or network connection between pieces of equipment. After polls have closed, vote tabulations are transferred on a memory stick or device that, if needed, is physically transported for consolidation. A person who inappropriately modifies voting equipment may be charged with a felony (EPM 2025 §4-II).
4.c. Votes are marked on paper ballots which are retained to be available for rechecking.
Paper ballots are considered a best practice. Maintaining a paper trail, as Arizona counties do, is the recommended approach for election administration. Officials can audit or recount the paper ballots if there are concerns about the results from electronic tabulators. According to Verified Voting, on Election Day the vast majority of voters in the U.S., including in Arizona, mark their ballots by hand. (Equipment used for early voting may differ from that used on Election Day.)
Voters who are unable to mark a ballot by hand have the option to use a ballot marking device (BMD), which is an assistive device like a touch screen that provide voters with a printed copy of their ballot that they insert into the tabulator. These devices do not store information; the only record generated by the BMD is the printout.
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CONTEXT: A Note About Ballot Marking Devices
While some experts suggest voting is more efficient and accessible when all voters use a BMD, others disagree. The national organization Verified Voting recommends that voters mark ballots by hand, citing research that voters are not likely to verify their BMD printout before putting it in the machine. On the other hand, the Center for Civic Design favors BMDs, in part because of their speed in tabulation and ease of use for voters with disabilities. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a bipartisan federal commission, does not take a position on BMDs but simply recommends that jurisdictions maintain paper ballots, regardless of how they are marked.
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4.d. Equipment is certified by the Secretary of State.
According to statute, voting and tabulation equipment must be certified by the Arizona Secretary of State after review by a bipartisan committee of three legal and election experts (ARS §16-442). Local jurisdictions can only use machines that are on the list of technology certified by the Secretary of State and in compliance with federal security guidelines.
QUESTION 5: How do officials verify registration and validity of individual votes?
5.a. Arizona officials draw on a range of sources to check voter qualifications and update voter rolls, within limits set by federal law.
A challenge that Arizona, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Arizona is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, Arizona voter registrations are also cross-referenced with other state and national databases, including from the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles, the Social Security Administration, and court documentation on felony convictions and jury service disclosure (EPM 2025 §1-IX). Throughout the country, election officials also draw on the National Change of Address (NOCA) service to identify voters who have moved.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
Note: Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency, criminal status, or lack of citizenship, is a felony offense in Arizona (ARS §16-182).
5.b. Protections prevent registration by noncitizens.
Arizona requires documentary proof of citizenship to register as a full-ballot voter. A full-ballot voter may vote in federal, state, county, and local races and ballot measures. An otherwise eligible applicant using the federal voter registration form who attests to U.S. citizenship, but whose citizenship cannot be verified, may register as a “federal-only” voter and vote only in federal races. By contrast, an applicant using Arizona's state registration form whose citizenship cannot be verified must provide documentary proof of citizenship before the registration can be completed (EPM 2025 §1-II).
Federal law makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
County recorders use official records, including Arizona motor-vehicle records and, where applicable, the federal SAVE system, to verify documentary proof of citizenship. If an otherwise eligible federal form applicant's citizenship cannot be verified, the applicant is registered as a federal-only voter until valid documentary proof of citizenship is provided (EPM 2025 §1-II(A)6).
5.c. An ID is required to vote in person, or a voter may use a conditional provisional ballot.
Arizona requires voters casting a ballot in person to present identification. State law permits several forms and combinations of identification. A voter who does not present sufficient identification may cast a provisional or conditional provisional ballot and must provide the required identification within the statutory cure period for the ballot to count (ARS §16-579).
5.d. Vote by mail is verified by signature or identification.
Arizona voters may vote early by mail or in person. Early ballots returned through the ordinary process are generally verified by comparing the signature on the ballot affidavit with signatures in the voter's registration record. Election officials must attempt to contact voters when a signature cannot initially be verified and provide an opportunity to cure the problem within the period established by law (ARS §16-550; EPM 2025 §2-VI; EPM 2025 §9-VII).
Beginning in 2026, a voter returning a mailed early ballot at a voting location may instead choose to present the identification required for in-person voting. If election officials verify the voter's identity and mark the ballot affidavit “ID verified,” additional signature verification is not required (ARS §16-579.02; EPM 2025 §9-VII).
5.e. Arizona officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In Arizona, early in-person and mail ballots can be processed and tabulated as soon as the safety and accuracy of tabulation equipment is verified (ARS §16-550; EPM §2-VI). However, the results cannot be reported until all voting is complete. Allowing officials to verify signatures, prepare ballots for counting, and scan ballots into tabulators before Election Day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
A challenge that Arizona, and every other state, faces is that Americans move a lot and rarely let voting officials know. The result is an ongoing risk that voting rolls will contain names of people no longer eligible to vote in the state. However, wide-scale purges of voter rolls can lead to worries about possible voter suppression.
A system that helps address voter registration problems is the Election Registration Information Center (ERIC), which enables limited information-sharing between states. Arizona is a member of ERIC and can use that membership to help identify names of voters no longer in the state. (In the last several years, nine states withdrew their membership in ERIC based on misinformation about the program, and subsequently encountered significant problems replacing the data benefits of the system.)
In addition to ERIC, Arizona voter registrations are also cross-referenced with other state and national databases, including from the state’s Department of Motor Vehicles, the Social Security Administration, and court documentation on felony convictions and jury service disclosure (EPM 2025 §1-IX). Throughout the country, election officials also draw on the National Change of Address (NOCA) service to identify voters who have moved.
Federal law prohibits removing voters simply for not voting. But a state can remove someone from the rolls if it sends a notice to a non-voter, or a voter who appears to have moved, and the voter fails to respond (or vote) within the next two federal elections. Even if a voter has not responded during that time frame, federal law prohibits removing voters from the rolls within 90 days of an election.
Note: Improperly registering and voting, whether by lack of residency, criminal status, or lack of citizenship, is a felony offense in Arizona (ARS §16-182).
5.b. Protections prevent registration by noncitizens.
Arizona requires documentary proof of citizenship to register as a full-ballot voter. A full-ballot voter may vote in federal, state, county, and local races and ballot measures. An otherwise eligible applicant using the federal voter registration form who attests to U.S. citizenship, but whose citizenship cannot be verified, may register as a “federal-only” voter and vote only in federal races. By contrast, an applicant using Arizona's state registration form whose citizenship cannot be verified must provide documentary proof of citizenship before the registration can be completed (EPM 2025 §1-II).
Federal law makes it a crime to willfully falsely represent oneself as a U.S. citizen, and false claims of U.S. citizenship can carry immigration consequences for noncitizens (8 U.S.C. §1182). Non-citizen voting is extremely rare.
County recorders use official records, including Arizona motor-vehicle records and, where applicable, the federal SAVE system, to verify documentary proof of citizenship. If an otherwise eligible federal form applicant's citizenship cannot be verified, the applicant is registered as a federal-only voter until valid documentary proof of citizenship is provided (EPM 2025 §1-II(A)6).
5.c. An ID is required to vote in person, or a voter may use a conditional provisional ballot.
Arizona requires voters casting a ballot in person to present identification. State law permits several forms and combinations of identification. A voter who does not present sufficient identification may cast a provisional or conditional provisional ballot and must provide the required identification within the statutory cure period for the ballot to count (ARS §16-579).
5.d. Vote by mail is verified by signature or identification.
Arizona voters may vote early by mail or in person. Early ballots returned through the ordinary process are generally verified by comparing the signature on the ballot affidavit with signatures in the voter's registration record. Election officials must attempt to contact voters when a signature cannot initially be verified and provide an opportunity to cure the problem within the period established by law (ARS §16-550; EPM 2025 §2-VI; EPM 2025 §9-VII).
Beginning in 2026, a voter returning a mailed early ballot at a voting location may instead choose to present the identification required for in-person voting. If election officials verify the voter's identity and mark the ballot affidavit “ID verified,” additional signature verification is not required (ARS §16-579.02; EPM 2025 §9-VII).
5.e. Arizona officials can pre-process and scan early ballots.
In Arizona, early in-person and mail ballots can be processed and tabulated as soon as the safety and accuracy of tabulation equipment is verified (ARS §16-550; EPM §2-VI). However, the results cannot be reported until all voting is complete. Allowing officials to verify signatures, prepare ballots for counting, and scan ballots into tabulators before Election Day is a best practice that greatly improves their ability to provide timely unofficial results.
QUESTION 6: How are the initial tabulations checked and verified?
6.a. The initial results are subject to confirmation testing and oversight.
Within 24 hours after the polls close, local elections officials launch a tabulation audit in a random selection of at least 2% of precincts in the county or two precincts (whichever is greater). In the audit, officials compare a hand count of votes from a randomly selected set of races to the electronic tallies at the close of the polls (ARS §16-602; EPM §11).
Election results do not become official until ballots are reviewed and processed, and until the auditing process is complete. Official certification, via canvassing, must be completed by the third Thursday after the election (ARS §16-642).
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CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
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6.b. Arizona’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. Arizona and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
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CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods. In Arizona, conducting audits and carrying out automatic recounts empowers officials to produce results in a timely and effective manner.
A further improvement on Arizona’s approach would involve risk-limiting audits, which are already used in several states.
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6.c. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the official recording and certification of the results; the county governing board must meet to canvass election results by the third Thursday after the election (ARS §16-642).The canvass requires documentation to ensure that appropriate election procedures were followed, including any required audits and or investigations.
6.d. Close elections are automatically subject to a recount.
Arizona automatically recounts certain races when the margin between the two candidates receiving the most votes is 0.5% or less (ARS §16-661). The same threshold applies to covered ballot measures. State law excludes certain local and special-district offices from automatic recounts. These recounts ensure that close races, where wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern, are closely checked. While the automatic recount is in progress, officials can’t release vote totals. Instead, a judge must declare the winner in open court (EPM §13-III).
Some states allow campaigns or individuals to request a recount when the margin is too large to trigger an automatic recount, but Arizona does not have this provision (EPM §13-3). The automatic recount process is largely the same as the original count procedure. All equipment must be tested again and random precincts are audited. These procedures are in place to ensure that discrepancies are found and investigated and cannot occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election.
Where there are discrepancies between the initial result and the result from the automatic recount, the officer in charge of elections shall undertake reasonable efforts to reconcile the discrepancy and provide a report to the Secretary of State explaining the reasons.
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
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Within 24 hours after the polls close, local elections officials launch a tabulation audit in a random selection of at least 2% of precincts in the county or two precincts (whichever is greater). In the audit, officials compare a hand count of votes from a randomly selected set of races to the electronic tallies at the close of the polls (ARS §16-602; EPM §11).
Election results do not become official until ballots are reviewed and processed, and until the auditing process is complete. Official certification, via canvassing, must be completed by the third Thursday after the election (ARS §16-642).
———--
CONTEXT: Official results come later; in the interest of transparency, preliminary returns are presented on election night.
Today, lack of understanding of the certification process contributes to concerns about the accuracy and trustworthiness of results. When misinformation about these post-election activities is disseminated, it can make it harder for officials to do their jobs in a timely and accurate manner.
———--
6.b. Arizona’s method of auditing is preferable to widespread hand counts.
Confusion about the certification process has led some activists to demand that ballots be hand counted. This is not recommended as a best practice in election administration.
Research shows that hand counts are less accurate than machine counting. Audits involving partial hand counts can be used as an additional data point and an additional check to verify the overall outcome, but full hand counts would make elections slower, less accurate, and less secure. Arizona and most other states use sample-based audits to ensure their count is timely and accurate.
———--
CONTEXT: More On Hand Counts
At best, a system that relies on hand counting will take longer to generate results. But, the real risk is that it opens the door to exhausted poll workers making errors, which gives bad-faith actors more fodder and time to act. We should want our election officials to do their jobs using the best, most proven technology and methods. In Arizona, conducting audits and carrying out automatic recounts empowers officials to produce results in a timely and effective manner.
A further improvement on Arizona’s approach would involve risk-limiting audits, which are already used in several states.
———--
6.c. Once all audits are complete, the canvass can help to ensure that significant issues are addressed.
The canvass is the official recording and certification of the results; the county governing board must meet to canvass election results by the third Thursday after the election (ARS §16-642).The canvass requires documentation to ensure that appropriate election procedures were followed, including any required audits and or investigations.
6.d. Close elections are automatically subject to a recount.
Arizona automatically recounts certain races when the margin between the two candidates receiving the most votes is 0.5% or less (ARS §16-661). The same threshold applies to covered ballot measures. State law excludes certain local and special-district offices from automatic recounts. These recounts ensure that close races, where wrongdoing and mistakes are of heightened concern, are closely checked. While the automatic recount is in progress, officials can’t release vote totals. Instead, a judge must declare the winner in open court (EPM §13-III).
Some states allow campaigns or individuals to request a recount when the margin is too large to trigger an automatic recount, but Arizona does not have this provision (EPM §13-3). The automatic recount process is largely the same as the original count procedure. All equipment must be tested again and random precincts are audited. These procedures are in place to ensure that discrepancies are found and investigated and cannot occur on a scale that could affect the outcome of the election.
Where there are discrepancies between the initial result and the result from the automatic recount, the officer in charge of elections shall undertake reasonable efforts to reconcile the discrepancy and provide a report to the Secretary of State explaining the reasons.
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CONTEXT: Recounts Rarely Change the Outcome
An analysis by FairVote found that in roughly 7,000 statewide races across the U.S. from 2000-2023, there were only three recounts that changed the outcome of the race, and those were all elections with a margin of victory of less than 0.06%. In fact, most recounts differ marginally from the original results of the election. The purpose of recounts is not to confirm exactly the same results, but rather to ensure that any individual errors or attempts at fraud could not have changed the results of an election.
———--
QUESTION 7: Who certifies results in Arizona, and what issues have arisen around certification?
7.a. Certification is the official sign-off on election results at different levels of election governance.
In Arizona, certification takes place at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the county boards of supervisors, which are composed of three or five members elected in partisan elections. The boards have broad administrative responsibilities in the county, in addition to their narrow involvement in elections. Counties must certify elections no later than the third Thursday after the election (ARS §16-642).
During certification, the boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data.
County reports are submitted to the Secretary of State, who is responsible for certifying the results for all elections that cross county lines, such as for state officials, U.S. House, U.S. Senate, relevant state legislative offices, and ballot initiatives. This state-level certification must be completed by the third Monday following the election (ARS §16-642).
7.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” a required function, not an exercise of investigation or judgment.
A court can compel certification if necessary. Arizona laws, procedures, and court precedents make clear that certification is not optional or discretionary. For example, the Arizona Election Procedures Manual states that the county boards of supervisors have a “non-discretionary duty to canvass” and have “no authority to change vote totals, reject the election results, or delay certifying the results” (EPM 2025 §13-II).
If a county board of supervisors or the Secretary of State were to refuse to certify, a court can mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
County boards and the Secretary of State can raise clerical questions during certification, such as whether results have been provided from all jurisdictions, but questions and concerns about the accuracy of the results are addressed by other means (ARS §16-642). (See 7.d.)
7.c. Arizona has experienced disputes over certification in recent years; all were resolved.
In previous elections, some members of county boards of supervisors in Arizona initially refused to certify results or voted to delay certification. All these instances were resolved, with members eventually voting to certify. In one case, state election officials filed legal actions that led to a court mandating that the board members certify the results.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
7.d. Arizona law provides other means to address challenges and concerns about election results.
Candidates, political parties, voters, and other parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results in state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and applicable law. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Arizona law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the Secretary of State and county boards may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
———--
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
———--
In Arizona, certification takes place at the county and state levels. County certification is the responsibility of the county boards of supervisors, which are composed of three or five members elected in partisan elections. The boards have broad administrative responsibilities in the county, in addition to their narrow involvement in elections. Counties must certify elections no later than the third Thursday after the election (ARS §16-642).
During certification, the boards receive precinct-by-precinct results and other information from county election officials, and they affirm that the aggregate outcome accurately sums up the underlying data.
County reports are submitted to the Secretary of State, who is responsible for certifying the results for all elections that cross county lines, such as for state officials, U.S. House, U.S. Senate, relevant state legislative offices, and ballot initiatives. This state-level certification must be completed by the third Monday following the election (ARS §16-642).
7.b. Certifying results is “ministerial,” a required function, not an exercise of investigation or judgment.
A court can compel certification if necessary. Arizona laws, procedures, and court precedents make clear that certification is not optional or discretionary. For example, the Arizona Election Procedures Manual states that the county boards of supervisors have a “non-discretionary duty to canvass” and have “no authority to change vote totals, reject the election results, or delay certifying the results” (EPM 2025 §13-II).
If a county board of supervisors or the Secretary of State were to refuse to certify, a court can mandate certification be completed, relying on a writ of mandamus, which compels government officials to comply with the law and is an effective tool for addressing certification refusal.
County boards and the Secretary of State can raise clerical questions during certification, such as whether results have been provided from all jurisdictions, but questions and concerns about the accuracy of the results are addressed by other means (ARS §16-642). (See 7.d.)
7.c. Arizona has experienced disputes over certification in recent years; all were resolved.
In previous elections, some members of county boards of supervisors in Arizona initially refused to certify results or voted to delay certification. All these instances were resolved, with members eventually voting to certify. In one case, state election officials filed legal actions that led to a court mandating that the board members certify the results.
Across the country in recent years, each instance of refusal to certify was resolved: courts compelling certification; the refuser changing their vote; or the refuser being outvoted on the certifying body. Election results were not affected, nor were post-election timeframes significantly delayed. However, these types of conflicts can create baseless doubts about elections among voters, and they can undermine faith that officials will adhere to the law in the face of partisan concerns and pressures.
7.d. Arizona law provides other means to address challenges and concerns about election results.
Candidates, political parties, voters, and other parties may be able to challenge election-related actions or results in state or federal court, depending on the nature of the claim and applicable law. These challenges are managed by courts, institutions expressly designed for the task of hearing evidence and rendering judgment. Arizona law also provides for audits and recounts, which can identify potential problems with the accuracy of results. (See Pillar 3 for information on legal challenges to election results.)
Strictly speaking, therefore, until any recounts and court challenges are completed, the results certified by the Secretary of State and county boards may be subject to change. It is rare, however, for an election outcome to change after certification.
———--
CONTEXT: Certification in U.S. Different from Other Democracies
Election certification is a feature of U.S. elections that is highly unusual from an international perspective. A study of 12 major democracies found that none has a separate certification step in their election process. In fact, none has the word “certification” (or its equivalent) in their election laws at all. Instead, election administrators announce the results, courts hear any challenges, and court decisions are final. Also, very few countries involve political parties in the results process. In the U.S., by contrast, most of the individuals involved in certification at the state and local levels are either party members elected in partisan elections or are nominated by parties to election boards.
———--
PILLAR 3: Judicial Review
No institution is better suited to consider evidence and render judgment than the judicial system; this is why the rule of law in elections is anchored in recourse to the courts. Many countries give courts responsibility for confirming the results of all elections, not just contested ones, and some countries have election tribunals solely dedicated to this task. At a minimum, all democracies allow some level of judicial recourse to challenge potentially unlawful behavior that may have impacted election results.
QUESTION 8: What recourse do candidates or citizens have if they think election officials did something wrong?
8.a. The only way to challenge an election in Arizona is to contest the election in the court system.
This process is different from automatic recounts. Automatic recounts are provided by Arizona law and no individual can request one (ARS §16-661).
8.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest some election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court. Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that do not affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
This process is different from automatic recounts. Automatic recounts are provided by Arizona law and no individual can request one (ARS §16-661).
8.b. Challenges can happen in state or federal court.
State law provides explicit grounds for challengers to contest some election results and receive expedited consideration of their claims in state court. Voters and candidates may also be able to bring a broader set of claims in state or federal court. These claims may involve issues that do not affect the outcome of the election.
People or entities challenging elections have many of the same types of rights as those bringing a lawsuit in a non-election context: they may provide evidence, present arguments, and appeal to a higher court if they lose.
QUESTION 9: What’s required of plaintiffs, and what can journalists expect in an election challenge?
9.a. Plaintiffs must be able to show they have standing.
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
9.b. To utilize Arizona’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must make specific accusations of wrongdoing and work within a narrow timeline.
Elections can be contested in Arizona courts on the following grounds (ARS §16-672):
9.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
9.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
———--
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
———--
9.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
———--
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
———--
The person bringing the contest or lawsuit must have standing. The source of this requirement—and what plaintiffs must show to meet it—may vary between federal and state courts. But either way, the plaintiff must show a concrete interest in the outcome. For example, a voter or elected official from one state will not have standing to challenge the result in a different state.
9.b. To utilize Arizona’s expedited contest process, plaintiffs must make specific accusations of wrongdoing and work within a narrow timeline.
Elections can be contested in Arizona courts on the following grounds (ARS §16-672):
- Misconduct by election officials and officers
- Candidate eligibility
- Bribery
- Illegal votes
- Erroneous count of votes
9.c. Other challenges in state or federal court may include a broader set of allegations and races.
Challenges to elections do not always focus on disputing the vote count or challenging election results. Some cases may be brought to ensure voters are treated equally and fairly under the law and seek remedies aside from changing the outcome of a particular race. These cases may continue well after the certification of results and the seating of elected officials.
Challenges in state or federal court alleging the violation of state or federal law may implicate multiple races, including state legislative and federal races. Because this type of litigation can be so varied and complicated, journalists should consult with election law experts who are not involved in the case for help explaining the context and potential implications to readers.
9.d. Courts assume the election results produced through the election process are accurate until plaintiffs can prove otherwise.
This starting point is roughly analogous to the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” in criminal cases. Altering the outcome of an election without proof invalidates the votes of the people.
———--
CONTEXT: Fraud is not fraud without proof.
Much of the discussion of flaws in recent elections is based on the theory that because fraud theoretically might have occurred, the election must be suspect. A criminal conviction based solely on what might have happened would never be tolerated, and a change in an election outcome based on similar logic would be deeply unfair to candidates and voters alike.
———--
9.e. The presence of wrongdoing alone is generally not enough to change results.
If an accusation of error or wrongdoing does not involve enough votes to change the results of an election, some cases may still continue on other grounds. For example, even if an accusation of bribery involves only a small number of votes, it is still a serious accusation. If proven true, that accusation may not warrant changing the outcome of an election, but may point to other remedies against the individuals involved.
In practice, most claims against election results do not withstand scrutiny in court and very few election contests result in a decision to change the outcome. In most circumstances, the parties may appeal to a higher court.
———--
CONTEXT: Do the Math
Journalists reporting on election cases, especially in the immediate aftermath of the election, should carefully examine the remedy requested by the plaintiffs and weigh whether the allegations in the complaint could plausibly justify the remedy. Consider an election which was won by 4,000 votes. Even if a plaintiff proves that 1,000 voters were improperly turned away from polling stations, overturning the election results would be an inappropriate remedy. The judge may rule against the election authority and order process changes or individual penalties, but the results of the election will stand.
———--
QUESTION 10: Why do some election challenges go to trial while others are dismissed by the judge?
10.a. Dismissal decisions hinge on multiple variables.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
Before any case goes to trial, there are typically hearings and motions to determine if the case should be dismissed. A case may be dismissed for many reasons:
- Jurisdiction: The court may lack the power/authority to hear the claim.
- Standing: The plaintiff may lack the legal right to bring the challenge.
- Venue: The plaintiff may have filed in the wrong court.
- Failure to State a Claim: The plaintiff’s allegations may not contain a legally recognizable claim that can be adjudicated by the courts.
- Unreasonable Delays (also known as "Laches"): A case may be dismissed if a party unreasonably delays bringing it, and if that delay causes prejudice.
Many election-related legal actions are dismissed without going to trial because they fall short of one or more of these standards.
QUESTION 11: What are some of the challenges of reporting on election cases
11.a. The timelines are tight.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
11.b. The legal system generally is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Election cases can involve compressed timelines, particularly when a dispute could affect canvassing, certification, a recount, or the seating of an elected official. Cases may involve a rapid sequence of motions, responses, hearings, and appeals that can be challenging to explain to a general audience.
11.b. The legal system generally is not focused on communicating to the public.
Court rulings address questions of law. This can mean that the implications of a decision for election results are not directly stated or are expressed using technical legal terminology.
For example, a dismissal does not necessarily mean that a court resolved every factual dispute in a case. Courts may dismiss cases for legal or procedural reasons, including lack of jurisdiction or standing, untimeliness, or failure to state a legally sufficient claim. Reporters should identify the specific basis for dismissal when explaining what a ruling does—and does not—decide.
In other words, reporters need to learn to “speak court” and press legal experts to give clear, simple explanations of what is going on inside the courtroom in order to translate important legal developments into language the public can understand.
Timeline of Arizona Election Procedures
Arizona Election Code
Election Procedures Manual
Department of State Elections Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters
Arizona Election Code
Election Procedures Manual
Department of State Elections Website
Certification Processes and Guardrails, provided by the Brennan Center for Justice
VOTE411, a project of the League of Women Voters that provides state-by-state information for everyday voters
Date |
Election Activity |
11/3/26 |
Election Day |
11/4/26 |
Hand count audit begins. (Must deliver results to Secretary of State within 48 hours.) |
11/8/26 |
Deadline for identification verification and ballot curing. |
11/9/26 |
County canvass begins. |
11/19/26 |
Deadline for county canvass. |
11/23/26 |
Deadline for state canvass. |
11/28/26 |
Deadline to file state election contest. |
Note: This material should be used for general informational purposes only.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
It is provided as a resource to journalists and reflects ERN's research findings at the time of publication. It does not constitute legal advice, nor should it replace independent confirmation.
